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Director: Steve Siebert
This thesis approaches the topic of wildlife policy as the struggle between interest
groups that hold varying perceptions and interpretations of a specific issue. These
perceptions are based on the ecological, economic and socio-cultural conditions that
operate both within and outside a specific location. Additionally, public perceptions are
dynamic in that they are re-negotiated in response to changing wildlife management
systems.
The purpose of this study was to examine the political struggle surrounding the elk
industry within the Rocky Mountain region. More specifically, a historical and
comparative analysis was conducted in an effort to both understand the public’s (Rocky
Mountain region) views of the elk industiy and highlight the various interest groups and
their influence on Montana game farm policy. A review of both the historical
management of Rocky Mountain bison and the current public interpretations of the
Yellowstone bison issue provides a referent for an analysis of the elk industry
Although elk farming represents a viable short-term economic diversification strategy
for the private rancher, it can be argued that the majority of the costs are borne by the
public. Within the Rocky Mountain region, many people have developed a strong
relationship between themselves and wild elk. Consequently, they are opposed to the
images associated with farmed elk populations. However, elk farming in Montana is
strongly supported by the livestock interests and supporters of private property rights,
which have had a tremendous influence on past decisions regarding elk farm policy.
When compared to the historical development of bison management, elk appear to be
headed down a similar path. Ranched bison populations in the Rocky Mountain region
are managed solely as livestock, and the trend is to manage wild bison populations under
the split jurisdiction of wildlife and livestock agencies. Similarly, with regard to elk farm
policy, the trend is to legalize elk farming and place control of the industry with
agricultural officials. Given the dynamic nature of public perception, the re-negotiation
that will occur as management systems change to reflect policy may affect the future
management of wild elk populations in the Rocky Mountain region.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Due to decreasing economic stability within traditional agricultural economies, the
livestock industry within the Northern Rocky Mountain region has diversified to include
elk farming as an alternative livestock enterprise. Montana is currently home to 83
mixed-species game farms and a velvet processing plant.' (Montana Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks 1998). Elk farming represents a relatively new and controversial
enterprise within the United States. Those interested in rural development view such
wildlife production systems as a means to access a broader range of markets while
insuring the maintenance of culturally consistent livelihoods for traditional agricultural
producers (Hudson 1989a, Hudson and Dezhkin 1989). However, others argue that
future prospects for game farms within the United States are limited due to the presence
of a strong animal welfare lobby, inconsistent and restrictive regulations, and an
inadequately developed infrastructure (Yorks 1989). In addition, the creation of wildlife
markets may weaken North America’s successful conservation strategy (Geist 1988).
Finally, other arguments against the development of game farms include: negative
environmental impacts, such as habitat fragmentation due to increased fencing, risk of
hybridization and subsequent genetic deterioration of wild stocks, and the increased
potential disease transmission.
' Velvet processing refers to the value-added process of drying antler velvet,
which is then sold as a herbal medicine.

The practice of wildlife production has been in existence for centuries (Varro, 11627 BC as cited in Hudson 1996). The term 'wildlife production systems' refers to a
spectrum of management practices including the intensive management of relatively small
fenced acreages to the extensive management of wild game populations on unfenced
private lands (White 1986). According to Hudson (1989b), wildlife production systems
can be classified into four main types (hunting, herding, ranching and farming) based on
the control of animal distributions and the intensity of management (figure 1],
Figure 1: Ordination of Wildlife Production Systems (Hudson 1989b)
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Game ranching and farming are considered containment systems, which means that
physical barriers control animal distributions (Hudson 1989b). The term ranching is used
to denote systems in which animals are fenced but managed as wild populations, while
game farming refers to systems that employ intensive husbandry on fenced properties (i.e.,
the enclosure of deer in pastures, paddocks or pens) (Hudson 1989b). It is also important
to note that there is a difference between the terms ‘commercialization’ and ‘privatization’
According to Rasker and Freese (1995), ‘commercialization’ refers to management
systems in which monetary gain is derived from the use of wildlife or trade in wildlife
products (i.e., fee hunting). 'Privatization', on the other hand, implies that wildlife is
privately owned, with ownership being transferred from that state to a private entity
(Rasker and Freese 1995). Thus, game farms represent privatized containment systems
that are intensively managed.
The World Conservation Strategy (lUCNAJNEPAVWF 1980 as cited in Hudson
1989a) and the Brundtland Commission Report, Our Common Future, (World
Commission on Environment and Development 1987 as cited m Meffe and Carroll 1994)
support wildlife production as part of their global initiatives for sustainable development.
In 1980, the World Conservation Strategy noted that the social and economic potential of
ranching wild herbivores for subsistence and commercial use should be given priority
attention (Hudson 1989a). Similarly, Kahn (1993) argues that since public support for
wildlife programs is key to their success, wildlife managers should understand public

perceptions within their geographical area before they decide whether to allow (or ban)
game farms. Few studies exist that meet this call.
The purpose of this study is to examine the dynamics of the development of elk farm
policy and management within the Rocky Mountain region. The first objective was to
conduct a historical analysis of the dynamics of the struggle over wild elk and bison policy
and management decisions in the Rocky Mountain region. The second was to review the
current ecological, economic, and socio-cultural conditions surrounding elk farming within
the Rocky Mountain region (local, regional and international). The third was to conduct
historical analysis of the political struggle surrounding the development of Montana's elk
farm policy. The final objective was to compare contemporary Montana policy to the
broad policy framework surrounding the regional elk farming industry

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A systems model represents one way to frame public policy According to Dye
(1972) the systems model seeks to address the following questions:
123-

what are the significant dimensions of the environment that generate demands?
what are the significant characteristics of the political system that enable it to
transform demands into public policy and to preserve itself over time?
how does public policy affect, through feedback, the environment and character
of the political system?

Within this model, inputs represent forces that are generated within the environment,
which is any condition or circumstance that is external to the political system but affects
the political system (Dye 1972). Inputs into the political system can be in the form of
demands, when individuals or groups act to affect public policy; or support, when
individuals or groups conform to policy decisions (Dye 1972). The political system
represents a group of interrelated structures and processes that function authoritatively to
develop public policy (Dye 1972). This system works to transform conflicting demands
into public policy (Dye 1972). Public policy is represented within the model as an output
(Dye 1972). As indicated by the feedback loop within the model, public policy decisions
affect the environment, as well as future demands and the character of the political
system (Dye 1972).

6

According to Dana and Fairfax (1980), resource policy within the United States is a
dynamic process, which is both a major influence on and expression of the social,
economic, and political structure of society As a society evolves, the concept of
resources also develops, reflecting the needs and wants of the public. “Conservation
comprises a conscious, individual or public, to a certain perceived condition-usually one of
scarcity-oi a particular component of the natural environment which is known as a
resource " (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1952:28 as cited in Dana and Fairfax 1980:2, Duane 1997).
Thus, in order to understand resource policy, one must realize that the social perceptions,
or constructions, of scarcity vary within different contexts of space and time.
According to Blaikie (1995:203), “Landscapes and environments are perceived
and interpreted fi'om many different and contested points of view which reflect the
particular experience, culture and values of the viewer”. Thus, the concept of political
ecology seeks to address the surrounding physical, economic, political and socio-cultural
conditions within which a particular environmental issue has arisen and exists (Bryant
1992, Blaikie 1995). In addition, the level of analysis can be further divided into a placebased concern and a non-place based concern. A place-based concern addresses both the
physical, as well as the socio-cultural, economic and political conditions within a specific
location (Blaikie 1985).^ On the other hand, a non-place-based concern addresses the

^ According to Blaikie (1985), the social factors that operate with regard to soil
erosion within place-based concerns are expressed through the following: land-use
patterns, the spatial patterns of agricultural technology including the diffusion of
innovations, price-distance relationships of inputs and outputs, spatial patterns of size of
landholdings and other more complex 'eco-class' relationships (i.e., spatial displacement
and marginalization of weaker groups).

7

ecological, socio-cultural, economic and political conditions that operate beyond where
symptoms of ecological process are shown (Blaikie 1985)/ In order to incorporate both
place-based and non-place based concerns with regard to a particular phenomenon, a
'bottom-up' analytical approach should be used (Blaikie 1985). A 'bottom-up' approach is
based on the concept o f nested scales of analysis' In other words, "[t]he individual within
a household, a household itself, the village or local community, the local bureaucracy, the
bureaucracy, government and nature of the state, and finally international relations all
represent contexts within which actions affecting...conservation [or wildlife management]
take place" (Blaikie 1985:88).
The concept of social construction also seeks to understand an individual's, or
cultural group's, relationship with and understanding of nature, wildlife and the
environment. Greider and Garkovitch (1994 1) evoke this fi’amework in their discussion
of'landscapes', which are defined as the symbolic environment created by a human act of
conferring meaning on nature and the environment. In other words, the dynamic
interactions between individuals and natural phenomena result in the continual
transformation of the physical environment into 'landscapes' (Greider and Garkovitch
1994). Consequently, these landscapes carry multiple symbolic meanings that reflect the
values, or cultural filter/lens, through which people define themselves [life theme, personal
construction] and the relationships between themselves and the physical environment [life
projects] (Greider and Garkovitch 1994). "Landscapes are the reflection of these cultural

^ The social factors operating within non-place based concerns are the politicaleconomic structures within which land-use decisions are made (Blaikie 1985).

8

identities, which is about us, rather than the natural environment.

When attempting to

identify and understand the potential human consequences of changes in the natural
environment, it is imperative that these consequences are understood from the many
cultural definitions that create landscapes" (Greider and Garkovitch 1994:2). In a
discussion of elk farming within the Rocky Mountain region one would incorporate the
following: how various cultural groups define the relationship between themselves and elk,
how this relationship will be affected by the farming of elk, and whether various cultural
groups define these new relationships as proper or improper. In other words, are
individuals able to change their personal constructions and negotiate new symbols and
meanings as this relationship changes?
According to the interactionist approach toward understanding society and the
environment recognizes that there is not one objective reality but many subjective ones
(Blaikie 1995). Different groups have different definitions, or landscapes, of the physical
environment, manifest in different attitudes regarding both the physical changes within an
environment and the human consequences of this change (Greider and Garkovitch 1994).
Certain externally introduced changes may be voluntarily incorporated into the lives of
people because they do not contradict their self-definitions or their relationships between
themselves and the environment [landscape] (Greider and Garkovitch 1994). However,
this is not always the case; rather, some externally introduced changes are not voluntarily
accepted because they represent a extreme contradiction to an individual's or a culture's
construction of nature (or an elk).

9

Three axiomatic truths regarding the nature of power lie at the foundation of modem
political science: "namely, that power ordinarily presupposes a group of human beings
who can share objectives, interests, values, in other words, a community; second,
therefore power presupposes objectives, interests, values, ends, which these human beings
can share, fight over, or exchange; third, that all power situations contain both consent
(shared objectives) and constraints (contested objectives)" (Friedrich as cited in Dye
1972:32). In other words, the major determinant of the response [public policy output] to
a particular environmental phenomena is the degree of political power of the classes or
groups involved (Blaikie 1985). According to Blaikie (1995:207), “there is a political
economic arena in which various people pursue their ‘projects’ with very unequal access
to power in which to pack their own particular knowledge claim and to enroll others into
their own project.” Access to power within a political system is dependent upon the
following factors: (1) the ability to define what constitutes information, (2) the control of
socially constructed information, and (3) the symbolic mobilization of support (Greider
and Garkovitch 1994).
According to the elite model, public policy is determined by the values of the elite,
which are drawn disproportionately from the upper socioeconomic strata of society (Dye
1972). [figure 2] In other words, society is divided into the few who have access to
power and the many who do not (Dye 1972). "Elite theory- suggests that 'the people' are
apathetic and ill-informed about public policy, that elites actually shape mass opinion on
policy questions more than masses shape elite opinion" (Dye 1972:20). Consequently,
rather than arising from mass demand, policies flow downward from the elite to the
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masses (Dye 1972). According to Blaikie (1985:89), "[pjolitical action is required to
tackle the more systemic and widespread symptoms of environmental deterioration.
Very often those without enough political power to influence the course of events
resulting from [environmental changes]. . ., are those who are politically subordinated in
other related ways." Thus, when performing any concrete policy analysis with regard to
elk farming, Blaikie (1985) feels that there are four questions to be asked :
1234-

what precise groups and classes are affected by elk farming?
what power does each of them have in the state apparatus and outside it?
in what ideological terms do these classes or groups perceive elk farming?
are the costs or benefits associated with elk farming perceived to be important
enough for them to unite on this so that their combined power leads to a
coherent response? \Are these groups able to unite coherently?^
Figure 2: The Elite Model (Dye 1972)
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The concept of Institutionalism is closely tied to elitism because it refers to a
governing elite. The important contribution of this model is the delineation of the
relationship between public policy and governmental institutions (Dye 1972). Blaikie
(1985) reminds us to consider the political effects of the nature and interrelationship
between the state, government and administration (or bureaucracy) on the
institutionalism/elite model. According to Blaikie (1985), the state represents the final
repository of agreement of the people to be ruled, the government speaks and acts in the
name of the state, the administration/bureaucracy represents the instrument for
governing, and the sub-government represents a channel of communication between the
central government and local people. Finally, it is important to note that national politicaleconomic processes are linked to international affairs, which are mediated through the
state systems of different countries (Blaikie 1985).
"Strictly speaking, a policy does not become a public policy until it is adopted,
implemented, and enforced by some governmental institution" (Dye 1972:32-33).
Governmental institutions give public policy three distinctive characteristics: (1) they lend
legitimacy to policies [government policies involve legal obligations], (2) they incorporate
universality into policies [governmental policies extend to all people in a society], and (3)
they monopolize coercion within society [governmental policies are enforced through
threats of imprisonment or death] (Dye 1972). Additionally, governmental institutions
often represent patterns of behavior that tend to persist over time (Dye 1972). In turn,
institutions may be structured in such a way that gives advantages to certain interests in
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society and withholds advantages from other interests, which results in certain individuals
and groups enjoying greater access to government power (Dye 1972). "[W]e recognize
that the bureaucracy itself is political in the course of exercising its executive powers,
particularly in the realm of policy-making at the upper levels and in implementation at the
lower levels (Blaikie 1985:84)
An underlying premise of the institutionalism/elitism model is that primary interest of
the governing elite lies in preserving the system (Dye 1972). In turn, most public policy
changes are incremental rather than revolutionary (Dye 1972).

"Incrementalism is

conservative in that existing programs, policies, and expenditures are considered as a base,
and attention is concentrated on new programs and policies and on increases, decreases or
modifications of the current program" (Dye 1972:30). In other words, the incremental
policy model [figure 3] views public policy as a continuation of past government activity
with only slight modifications (Dye 1972).
Figure 3: The Incremental Model (Dye 1972)
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Based on a review of the above theories and models, it becomes increasingly evident
that wildlife policy, specifically game policy, is directly affected by the public’s perception
and interpretation of certain issues (Dana & Fairfax 1980, Bryant 1992, Greider and
Garkovitch 1994, Blaikie 1995). [figure 4] In other words, the perceptions surrounding a
wildlife species not only gives meaning to the species as a social symbol, but also
influences the development of policy regarding its management. These perceptions are
based on the ecological, economic, and socio-cultural conditions existing both within and
outside a specific location (Blaikie 1985). Various interest groups, which are comprised
of individuals that share common perceptions or interpretations of wildlife issues are then
formed. Within the political system, the relative political and economic power of the
various communities guides the development of both public policy decisions and
subsequent wildlife management systems (Dye 1972, Blaikie 1995). Finally, the above
literature suggests that public perceptions and interpretations are dynamic, and change in
response to policy outputs (Dye 1972, Greider and Garkovitch 1994). Thus, there is a
dynamic interplay between the wildlife management systems as defined by public policy
decisions, and the future inputs into the political system. This interplay is represented by
the feedback loop in figure 4, which indicates that changes in wildlife management systems
result in ecological, economic and socio-cultural changes. These changes are then
incorporated into an individual’s or a community's construction of wildlife as a result of
their renegotiations of symbols and meanings.

14

Figure 4: A Systems-Based Policy Model {modifiedfrom Dye 1972)
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The conditions affecting public perceptions and interpretations should be analyzed at various scales
(i.e.. local, regional, national and intemational).(Blaiide 1995).
The term ‘socio-cultural condiuons’ refers specifically to social constructions of nattue. These
constructions are influenced by various aspects of our culture, including; the media, gender roles,
geographic location, and existing tenure arrangements with regard to land and wildlife.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This study is a qualitative analysis of both primary and secondary data. The latter
included: legislative history, legislative intent, committee reports, agency management
directives, research articles, interest group publications, and newspaper articles/news
briefs. According to Maxwell (1996), there are five particular research purposes for
which qualitative studies are particularly suited, which include:
(1) to facilitate understanding of the context within which game farm policy has
evolved at the various levels (community, state and regional)
(2) to identify the meaning (reasons for the development of different contexts, and
associations between the contexts and the creation of various wildlife
management systems) behind the development of wildlife policy
(3) to identify unanticipated phenomena and influences surrounding the
development of game farm policy
(4) to examine the process through which policy developments occur
(5) to develop preliminary associations which explain why different policies have
developed.
My analysis was ongoing and inductive in an attempt to identify emergent themes,
patterns and questions. Within this analysis, configurations of causes and attributes were
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compared to identify preliminary causal relationships between public perceptions and
wildlife management systems, in an effort to explain diversity within public policy
decisions. Finally, findings were validated through: (1) the use of the triangulation method
for data collection—using data obtained from various sources, (2) checks for alternative
explanations, (3) discussion of findings with teachers, students and colleagues, and (4)
comparison of findings with existing theory (Maxwell 1996, Yin 1994). Although I did
attempt to validate my findings by checking my explanations against others’
interpretations, these findings represent my interpretation of the data. According to the
interactionist framework, there is not one objective reality regarding environmental issues;
rather, there are many subjective ones. Consequently, this thesis presents one subjective
interpretation of the wildlife policy within the Rocky Mountain region, specifically elk
farming.
As the literature in the previous section suggests, the following conditions need
to be considered in a study of elk farming: political, ecological, economic, socio-cultural.
In order to understand political conflict, both the historical and contemporary dynamics of
a struggle must be addressed (Bryant 1992). Similarly, since the conditions that exist at
the local, regional and international level affect a viewer’s perception of elk, a comparison
may provide themes that are important to understanding the dynamics of the elk farming
controversy at different scales (Bryant 1992). This study presents a historical and
comparative analysis of Rocky mountain wildlife policy, with a focus on the interactions
between the public contexts surrounding wildlife and the development of wildlife
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management systems. The analysis was conducted as an exploratory case study (Yin
1994) with the intention of identifying patterns of associations that lead to the
development of different policy decisions regarding both wild elk and bison management,
and the management of farmed elk within the Rocky Mountain region.
First, a historical review that focused on the above factors of bison and elk
management systems was conducted. The goal of this initial review was to provide insight
into how the development of different wildlife management systems affects the way
different publics view wildlife species, and vice versa. The associations identified within
this analysis provided the basic frameworks for the interpretation of the public perceptions
and interpretations of elk farming within the Rocky Mountain region. This interpretation
formed the second phase of research, which was designed to assess the current ecological,
economic and socio-cultural conditions associated with elk farming. An in-depth analysis
of the development of game farm policy was then conducted focusing on Montana as a
case study This stage of the project was designed to facilitate an exploration of the
struggle that occurs within the political system to be represented in public policy decisions.
I have chosen to focus primarily on the historical review of game farm legislation for the
15 year period between the 48* Legislative Assembly, 1983, and the 55* Legislative
assembly, 1997. I initiated an in-depth review"* in 1983 because game farm statutes were

"*“In-depth review ” refers to the following: (1) a review of the laws approved
during each session; (2) a review of House and Senate bills that were introduced during
each session; and (3) a review of committee hearings and testimonies presented for each of
the introduced bills, in order to provide an analysis of (a) legislative intent and (b) why
certain bills were approved or killed.

18

substantially revised during this legislative session/ In addition, legislative records prior
to the 1970s were donated to the library; in turn, it is 'spotty' as to how complete they are
(Reference Librarian, pers. com. 1998a). ^ Elaborate committee minutes (including
committee hearings and testimonies) have been kept since only the late 1970s. According
to the reference librarian at the State Law Library, committee minutes did not exist prior
to the 1950s. Current Montana policy decisions and subsequent elk management systems
were then compared to the broad framework of elk farm policy within the region
(Colorado, Idaho, Wyoming, Canada), with the goal of identifying regional trends.
Finally, the socio-political implications of various elk management systems, as revealed
through policy outputs, were then addressed within the framework of the current context
surrounding Rocky Mountain bison populations.

^ According to Doug Sternberg, a paralegal from the Legislative Council (Helena)
who provided legislative council for the drafts of numerous introduced game farm bills,
the policy framework that currently governs game farming in Montana was developed in
1983 (Sternberg pers. com. 1998).
^ The State Law Library (Helena) only has the complete text of House and Senate
bills introduced since 1975 (Reference Librarian, pers. com. 1998b) Although the
Mansfield library has copies of the text of introduced House and Senate bills dating back
to 1943, elaborate committee minutes are required in order to conduct a complete
historical review of game farm legislation. In addition. Senate and House bills introduced
during 1943-1973 are not indexed; in turn, it is very difficult to access this information.
After a cost-benefit assessment of the amount of effort required to assess such a small
amount of information, 1 have decided to initiate the intense historical review in 1977.

PARTI
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF WILDLIFE POLICY WITHIN NORTH AMERICA’S
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION
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Since the 1800s, the fate of American wildlife has been determined by a series of
political issues played out within a general public context of greater or lesser sympathy for
wildlife. This context consists of members of society defining and redefining their
resource concerns and values, which reflect both cultural notions as well as material
wants. According to Tober (1981. xvii-xviii and xii),
“Although the general regulatory structure [regarding wildlife policy] derived from
English experience, its particular content depended heavily on cultural heritage, on
the distribution of political power, on the disposition of the courts, and on the
configuration of wildlife populations. . . [T]he specific articulation of wildlife policy
issues depends critically on the unique features of wildlife and on the manner in
which these features have, in the past, constrained the policy process.”

In an effort to address these issues, the following section (Chapters 4-7) traces the
development of bison and elk policy within the United States in the context of how politics
affects management decisions and knowledge claims. This historical and comparative
review of Rocky Mountain wildlife policy provides a framework for the subsequent
analysis of contemporary Rocky Mountain game farm policy.

CHAPTER 4

POLICY FR-A\LEWORK A PERIOD OF UNBRIDLED RESOURCE USE

Wildlife populations, such as bison and elk, were once abundant throughout
North America. Estimations of the great bison herds, which roamed prior to the arrival of
the Europeans, vary from 60 million to 150 million [figure 5] (Rorabacher 1970).
Historically, the Plains Indians viewed elk and bison as principle resources - “

every

scrap of the [bison] carcass was used for practicality, and the buffalo spirit for
religion”[figure 6] (Jennings & Hebbring 1983:331). In turn, most Native American
tribes employed complex wildlife management systems in order to ensure the availability
of these resources.
Figure 5: Map of Historic Bison Herds (National Bison Association 1998)
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Figure 6: Traditional Native American Uses for Bison
(National Bison Association 1998)
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Buffalo jumps were a harvesting method frequently employed by the Indian
hunters. Hunters would herd the animals over a cliff by initiating a large enough
commotion to cause the buffalo to stampede. These jumps would supply as many as 100
bison per kill, and the same jump would be used every two to three months (GTA Journal
1982 as cited in Jennings & Hebbring 1983). In addition to the scheduled jumps, early
buffalo hunters would make mass kills during the early winter, allow the animals to freeze.
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and then remove parts as needed (Friscon pers. com. as cited in Jennings & Hebbring
1983). Indians were also able to kill large numbers of elk. According to Chase (1986),
Crow women would often wear dresses adorned with 700 elk teeth. Since only two teeth
(the ivories) were taken from one animal, 350 elk were killed in order to make one dress
(Chase 1986). Finally, Indians employed fire as a management technique. They would set
fires to concentrate game, making it easier to kill (Chase 1986). In addition, Indians
managed wildlife habitat by transforming forest areas into grasslands (i.e. burning reverses
natural serai succession) to support greater bison and elk populations (Chase 1986).
These and other complex management systems had been employed by Indians
since the Ice Ages, thus highlighting the flawed perceptions of the early European
explorers and settlers who described North America as a ‘vast wilderness’. This
perception changed, however, as the settlers expanded westward. “The Western
movement expressed and developed national ideals concerning freedom, equity and the
right of every individual to pursue material prosperity with whatever natural wealth the
land could be made to yield" (Dana & Fairfax 1980:3). In order to understand the power
relationships between the various ‘communities of interest’ (political interest groups)
during this time, it is necessary to explore the contexts within which the terms ‘freedom’
and ‘equity’ are framed. First, the notions o f ‘freedom’ and ‘unbridled resource use in the
pursuit of material prosperity are framed within the context o f ‘public domain’, or land
managed in common. The existing property rights established among the various Indian
tribes, inhabiting this area, were not legitimated within the new nation’s perception of
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these lands. Second, the Western mind-set, as described by the above quotation, framed
the term ‘equity’ within a context that referred only to equity among white settlers.
In 1620, the Plymouth colony was established in North America. From the
colonialist perspective, this new land was a cornucopia of natural diversity and wealth, and
thus represented economic opportunity. Dana and Fairfax (1980) noted that Britain’s
oppressive conservation policies forced upon the struggling colonialists probably
contributed to the revolt.’ Following the American Revolution, the United States acquired
approximately 1,804 million acres of land through cessions, purchases and treaties. In
turn, the first century of social, political and economic history in the United States was
shaped by decisions regarding the use and disposal of the public domain (Dana and Fairfax
1980).
The disposition era, the time period characterized by the transfer of public land to
settlers (i.e. Homestead Act of 1862), was a period of waste and destruction. Policies
were directed at conserving resources in response to specific needs and shortages. Land
and other natural resources were not considered valuable because they were av ailable in
such abundance. Therefore, no policies were in place to regulate their use or facilitate
their conservation. Rather, the emerging policies were designed to raise money and
facilitate the orderly development of the country, particularly the West, by settlers (Dana
and Fairfax 1980). These policy decisions were shaped by an array of factors, including:

’ For instance, in 1626 Plymouth colony forbade the sale or transport of any timber
out of the colony (Dana and Fairfax 1980). Similarly, the Broad Arrow Policy of 1691
reserved for the Crown all trees that could be used as masts for ships within the King’s
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physical resource availability, society’s perception of the environment, the material
demands of a developing nation, the primitive state of technology, and the period’s
prevailing economic and institutional systems (Dana & Fairfax 1980).
Although the new settlers perceived the new nation to be a cornucopia of natural
wealth and diversity, this was not the reality. This is exemplified in the historical accounts
of the over-exploitation of North American wildlife populations. For instance, within the
period between 1800 and 1890, fi’ee-roaming buffalo in North America were reduced from
60 million to 20 wild buffalo (Rorabacher 1970). This has been described within the
literature as a “holocaust”, and “the greatest national tragedy” This ‘tragedy’ unfolded
slowly throughout the nineteenth century, accelerating after the civil war Based on a
critical investigation of American history and attitudes (Rorabacher 1970), there were
three primary reasons for the initial destruction of bison populations.
The first reason is the development of American civilization (Rorabacher 1970).
Upon settlement, farmers and ranchers were intent on reproducing the agriculture of
Northern Europe, which is based on grains, sheep and cattle. However, since their small
herds of domestic livestock were too valuable to be slaughtered, these settlers relied on
subsistence hunting. Once the settlers became agriculturally successful, wild bison became
a nuisance. In turn, frontiersmen often killed large numbers of bothersome and often
destructive buffalo without reservation (Rorabacher 1970). Secondly, large numbers of

navy and merchant marine (Dana and Fairfax 1980).
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buffalo on the Great Plains tended to encourage exploitation (Rorabacher 1970). Many
frontiersmen headed West in search of economic opportunity; therefore, as long as there
were economic markets for buffalo products (particularly meat), they were killed. In
addition, the large numbers of bison inhabiting the Plains states seemed to limit any selfimposed restrictions on the number of bison killed by any individual (Rorabacher 1970).
Finally, the physical character and nature of the buffalo contributed to their decline
(Rorabacher 1970). Bison are slow-moving animals with poor eyesight. In addition,
buffalo often formed herds numbering in the millions. Professional hunters usually fired
directly into the herd and often killed one hundred or more bison at a time (Rorabacher
1970). Finally, the American government operated within a policy framework that
encouraged the exploitation and subsequent destruction of the buffalo to facilitate the goal
of Indian subjugation. Columbus Delano, the Secretary of the Interior under President
Grant, contended that the Plains Indians could be easily subjugated by the federal
government if bison, their basic food source, was completely removed from the Great
Plains (Rorabacher 1970).
After the civil war, the bison slaughter in the western United States became
increasingly intense and complicated (Rorabacher 1970). Market hunting became
increasingly popular among western settlers. According to Rorabacher (1970), this was
primarily a result of two technological advancements: the completion of a network of
railroads connecting the eastern and western U.S., and the discovery of a tanning process
for converting bison hides into commercially valuable leather. The most obvious and
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direct result of the railroad construction was the killing of bison to feed railroad workmen
and clear paths for rails to be laid (Rorabacher 1970). Once the Union Pacific railroad
was completed, the number of people willing and anxious to travel west greatly increased.
In addition, many railroad workers were left stranded on the plains when their work was
done. As a result of the proximity of large bison herds, many of the disillusioned
adventurers joined the increasing number of professional hunters in killing bison to provide
for their livelihood (Rorabacher 1970). Since the newly established railroads provided a
stronger link between the East and West, trade was greatly facilitated and new markets
were established to sell western products (Rorabacher 1970). A second market niche that
was captured by the railroads was the sale of special excursions, during which passengers
were given the opportunity to shoot from the windows of a standing train into the midst of
a nearby bison herd (Rorabacher 1970). No part of the slaughtered animals was used.
Finally, with the discovery of the tanning process, the hide constituted nine-tenths of the
buffalo’s total value; the meat, hair, horns, etc., constituted the remaining one-tenth
(Rorabacher 1970). Hides increased in value from virtually nothing to between $1.00 and
$3 -00 each (Rorabacher 1970). So eager were professional hunters in acquiring hides that
they were wasteful in their killing and use of buffalo. Ninety-nine percent of all the
available meat from the slaughtered buffalo was wasted (Rorabacher 1970). According to
Jennings and Hebbring (1983:332), documented reports of the commercial hide hunting
decades state, “

you could walk for miles on the carcasses [buffalo] without ever

touching the ground.” Homesteaders also sold bison bones to fertilizer plants in the East

during the difficult first agricultural season. “Newspapers tell of bone-piles many feet
high, many feet wide and a half a mile long beside the [railroad] tracks” (Jennings &
Hebbring 1983.332).
In the early 1870s, sizeable elk populations still existed; however, “[these]
populations attracted the attention of hide hunters who were in the process of finishing off
the buffalo at the time” (Picton and Picton 1975). According to Chase (1986 15), “[i]n
1870, game animals seemed to be disappearing overnight. . . [E]ven elk was soon to be
numbered among things of the past.” Although elk were once abundant throughout North
America, their numbers were substantially reduced by the late 1800s (Chase 1986).
Thousands of elk were hunted in the 1880s and 1890s for their teeth (ivories) (Chase
1986). The ivories were then sold to make watch fobs for members of the Benevolent
and Protective Order of Elks (B .P.O.E.), for as much as $100 each (Chase 1986, Bartlett
1985). “[T]he remainder of the [elk] carcass was left to the elements” (Bartlett 1985:317).
Elk were also hunted for their hides, which were sold for $2.50 to $3.00 each (Bartlett
1985).
Another factor that contributed to the decline of wildlife populations was the
hunting pressures placed on these animals by the Native Americans. With the arrival of
European settlers in the West, the Indians were introduced to a new economic system
(Rorabacher 1970). Soon, many joined in killing wildlife for profit, a previously unheard
of reason. “Once Indians acquired horses and guns, they began to enormously influence
animal populations” (Chase 1986:102). It is important to note, however, that the overall
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impact on wildlife populations from Indian killings were probably much less detrimental to
their survival than the white man’s blatant carelessness and misuse of wildlife (i.e. sporthunting escapades from railroad cars). Initially, both the white and Indian hunters were
able to pursue these activities without disturbing each other However, as wildlife
resources grew scarce Indian-white tensions rose, with the Indians struggling to protect
their traditional hunting grounds (Rorabacher 1970).
According to Rorabacher (1970), an Indian hunter killed the last buffalo in the
region (i.e. Western United States). Many Indian troubles were sparked by the
destruction of the bison, and were further exasperated by the fact that Indians had aided in
the destruction of one of their primary resources in return for various European, ‘civilized’
supplies (Rorabacher 1970). Indian-white tensions continued to rise as it became
increasingly obvious that there was no longer a place for the Indians in the ‘new nation’.
“Indians found it difficult to understand why an Indian should be hanged for shooting a
settler’s cow to feed his starving family while the settler could shoot hundreds of the
Indian’s ‘cattle’ for fiin’’ (Jennings and Hebbring 1983:332).
Finally, the growth of the cattle industry and the expansion of the railroads
introduced various diseases into the Western region ( Picton and Picton 1975).
Overexploitation of wildlife populations by hunters is frequently cited as the primary
reason for their decline; however, “ . it is equally possible that new diseases were
introduced into the wildlife population, spread like wildfire and contributed to the decline”
(Picton and Picton 1975:8). In reality, the decimation of the once abundant herds of
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North America was probably a result of a combination of factors; hunting pressure, habitat
encroachment, and disease transmission.
In conclusion, this period of unbridled resource use, in an effort to obtain
material prosperity and subjugate Indians, was framed within the context of the ‘public
domain’, or land managed as open access. Within this property rights regime, each white
settler was considered equal and, thus, had the freedom to exploit the land and resources
however he saw fit. (I use ‘he’ because females were not considered equal within
European context.) According to the theory known as the ‘tragedy of the commons’,
which applies to open access land, "[fjreedom in a commons [open access] brings ruin to
us all" (Hardin 1988:354). Thus, it follows that a wild species that has market value is
subject to over-harvesting when the property rights to it cannot be legitimately asserted
and enforced (Meffe and Carroll 1994). Not only did the settlers and the American
government ignore the Indian systems of customary property rights, which changed land
and wildlife from common resources to open resources, but the government’s system of
land disposal and the Western mind-set also predisposed these lands and resources to
exploitation.

CHAPTER 5

POLICY FRAMEWORK. RESOURCE PROTECTION

Natural resources had to become valuable before the nation could be convinced
of the need to conserve them. In order for this to happen, they had to be recognized as
scarce. In other words, “[b]efore that could occur, settlers and developers had to subdue
and even destroy much of the continent’s natural bounty” (Dana and Fairfax 1980:33).
Dana and Fairfax (1980) found that for the first half of the nineteenth century, resource
policy was primarily government-defined and government-led. Various ‘communities of
interest’ arrayed themselves around the accepted leadership of government agencies and
supported their programs. The development and direction of resource policy in the late
1900s, however, has been defined by the demands of interest groups. Growing public
concern regarding the protection of our nation’s resources marked the years between
1870 and the early 1890s. A national movement, fueled by the emergence of a new set of
land values, developed in the late 1800s to preserve a portion of our national resources by
withholding land from use altogether (Dana and Fairfax 1980). In 1872, Congress
enacted legislation to reserve two million acres of land in Montana, Wyoming and Idaho
for ‘park’ purposes. “The reservation of Yellowstone could be viewed as the major
departure point from the disposition orientation of public land policy” (Dana and Fairfax
1980-44).
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In January of 1889, Dr. William Homaday, then chief taxidermist of the
Smithsonian Institute, reported 534 bison in the United States (Jennings and Hebbring
1983). Only 285 of the total 534 bison were wild, with 200 of the wild buffalo estimated
to be in Yellowstone Park (Jennings and Hebbring 1983). Similarly, within 50 years after
settlement. Rocky Mountain elk populations were nearly extirpated (Bunnell and Hancock
1985). “The elk herds which had inhabited the rough and timbered country along the
rivers, when the white men arrived, were eliminated during the 1800s. By the 1900s the
elk populations were reduced to their areas of strongest habitat, the mountains” (Picton
and Picton 1975:11). However, it is important to note that the population bottleneck
experienced by North American elk populations was not as extreme as it was for the
bison.
As bison and elk numbers decreased throughout the Plains, Yellowstone
provided a much-needed refuge for the remaining animals. However, in terms of habitat
quality, it could not compare with the lower, surrounding valleys” (Chittenden 1895 as
cited in Chase 1986). “A large plateau straddling the continental divide, seemed too high,
cold and uninviting to keep most game animals” (Chase 1986; 14). According to Rush
(1932), numerous government explorations were sent into Yellowstone National Park and
their accounts describe minimal numbers of available wildlife. In 1873, Theo B.
Comstock, a noted geologist who was also interested in wildlife, advocated the desirability
of Yellowstone as a wild animal reserve; however, he stated that animals would need to be
introduced and preserved (Rush 1932). Initially, wildlife was most abundant at lower

elevations, probably because the mountains did not contain a superabundance of widely
distributed food sources (Rush 1932). However, as hunters and settlers moved west of
the Missouri, the majority of the big game remaining between the Mississippi Valley and
the Pacific Coast retreated into the mountains (Nelson 1917 as cited in Rush 1932.12).
By 1878, game animals became more abundant within Yellowstone (Rush 1932). “As the
period 1870-1878 coincides with the last great killing on the plains, it seems quite likely
that the surviving animals retreated more and more into the mountains, especially in the
summer, to escape slaughter” (Rush 1932:16).
Although the reservation of Yellowstone was a great step forward in terms of
resource policy, it was not a government commitment to resource management. The
notion of a ‘national park system’ was not even mentioned in Congress (Dana & Fairfax
1980). Furthermore, the legislation that existed usually imposed small fines, with mostly
ineffective civil means of enforcement (Rorabacher 1970). Since the government did not
enforce their property rights, Yellowstone National Park was seen as a de-facto open
access resource. “It is notable that governments did little - and did it a little too late - to
protect the buffalo” (Jennings & Hebbring 1983:334). The Congressional majority was
not swayed by the pleas for the protection of the buffalo for three reasons: lack of factual
information regarding the slaughter, general lack of interest and concern for the buffalo,
and general fear that the preservation of buffalo would result in the perpetuation of
tensions between Indians and whites (Rorabacher 1970). In turn, Yellowstone became a
"poachers paradise’ for both bison and elk hunters.
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According to Captain William Ludlow of the U.S. military, the whole-sale
destruction of game within the borders of Yellowstone National Park was underway in the
mid 1870s (Bartlett 1985). As many as 4,000 elk had been killed by skin hunters during a
single winter, with as many as 200 elk slain in a single herd (Bartlett 1985). “Between
fifteen hundred and two thousand elk had been slain during the winter of 1874-75 within a
radius of fifteen miles of Mammoth Hot Springs.

and the carcasses were left in the

snow to feed the wolves or decay in the spring” (Bartlett 1985:34). It was also reported
that local hunters would chase deer and elk out of the park with dogs and slaughter the
graceful animals at their leisure (Bartlett 1985). According to Bartlett (1985 317),
“Poaching increased in the late 1880s and 1890s. Near extinction of the buffalo
raised the selling price of a mounted buffalo head to $500. The growing
membership in the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks cost many a
Yellowstone (as well as Teton) elk its life. . ”
During the winter of 1893-1894, poachers killed 116 of the remaining 136 wild buffalo in
Yellowstone Park (Rorabacher 1970). Thus, only 20 buffalo remained within the borders
of Yellowstone by 1894. Although elk were also heavily poached, Yellowstone offered
enough of a safe-haven for these animals that the herds were able to prosper According
to the 1891 report from the Yellowstone Park Superintendent, “The elk [had] increased
enormously and most conservative estimates place their number at 25,000. . . .Their
continuance in the Park is assured, and their overflow into adjoining territory will furnish
abundant sport for the hunter” (Rush 1932:17).
In 1878, Congress appropriated $10,000 in monetary aid to protect, preserve and
improve Yellowstone National Park, with the first federal law to protect wildlife on
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federal lands implemented in May 1894 (Rorabacher 1970, Bartlett 1985). Grover
Cleveland enacted legislation that made it illegal to kill any animal, except in life
threatening situations, within the confines of Yellowstone National Park (Rorabacher
1970, Bartlett 1985). Conviction was punishable by a $1,000 fine, imprisonment, or both
(Rorabacher 1970, Bartlett 1985). Unlike the previously unsuccessful system of civil
enforcement, these laws were enforced by the United States military. “Yellowstone, after
1894, was quite secure” (Bartlett 1985:321).
Charles Jones, a confirmed conservationist and owner of a private buffalo herd,
influenced Congress to appropriate funds for the acquisition of additional buffalo
(Rorabacher 1970). In 1901, Congress appropriated $15,000 for the Yellowstone bison
(Chase 1986). The additional bison were purchased from already existing privately owned
bison herds. Buffalo were now valuable in the eyes of Congress, since they represented an
investment. As a result, the government became more committed to their conservation.
Theodore Roosevelt, an avid hunter and conservationist, also played a major role
in the institution of federal wildlife protection programs during his Presidency "After 40
years of westward expansion accompanied by a growing awareness of resource waste and
depletion, the new nation embarked on a series of bold new initiatives in resource
management” (Dana & Fairfax 1980:69). One of the major wildlife events of the
Roosevelt era was the passage of the Lacey Act of 1900, which prohibited interstate trade
in wild animals and birds that were taken or held in violation of the state laws from which.
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or to which, they were shipped (Dana & Fairfax 1980). The Lacey Act laid the foundation
for active federal involvement in wildlife conservation.
Traditionally, state governments have been responsible for wildlife. This legal
tradition originated in England, and was adopted by the states after the American
Revolution. States were granted authority similar to that of a king, and thus held game in
trust for their citizens. Although the states have primary authority over wildlife, the
Constitution also provides the federal government with an authoritative role in wildlife
management. This Constitutional grant of authority has its basis in three principle sources:
the power to make treaties with foreign countries, the power to regulate interstate
commerce, and the power to control wildlife on public lands when such control is exerted
in the paramount interest of the U.S. citizens [property clause] (Dana & Fairfax 1980).
A second major event during this era was the initiation of a national system of
game reserves, which were supplied with nucleus herds of bison from private ranches. The
establishment of the Yellowstone reservation as a land management policy, and the future
success of the Yellowstone buffalo herd, set a precedent for the creation of additional
wildlife refuges. In the early 1900s, the American Bison Society (ABS) was formed to
urge Congress to take action. By working directly with the federal government to re
establish the U.S. buffalo population, the ABS worked to fulfill its mission of permanent
preservation and increase of the American bison. Teddy Roosevelt persuaded Congress
to establish the Moiese Wildlife Refixge in Montana in 1908 (Jennings & Hebbring 1983).
Also, in an effort to preserve the low number of wild pureblooded bison in the U.S., the
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Senate put forth a Senate Bill 6159 (Rorabacher 1970) in 1908 that called for the
establishment of a national bison range on the Flathead Reservation

The original herd of

34 buffalo was purchased from owners of private herds (Rorabacher 1970).
Had it not been for the private ranchers, who ultimately restocked the herds in
the United States and Canada, the buffalo probably would not have survived (Jennings &
Hebbring 1983). The majority of the buffalo herds in the United States today originated
from privately-owned herds that were established between 1860 and 1910 (Rorabacher
1970). Initially these herds were established by capturing a portion of the remaining ffeeroaming bison. Preservation and the symbolic nature of the bison were the primary
motivators for herd ownership, since the market for bison and bison products had
dramatically declined with the establishment of formal conservation policies (Rorabacher
1970). In the early 1900s, however, a market for live bison developed as a response to the
conservationists’ encouragement for additional privately owned bison herds (Rorabacher
1970). As a result, an increased number of people were, and continue to be, motivated to
raise bison explicitly for economic gain.
Although Yellowstone provided a much-needed refuge for both bison and elk,
the successful management of each species rested on different premises. As previously
mentioned, bison numbers within Yellowstone National Park dropped to 20 animals after
the final harvest in the winter of 1893-1894 Since these numbers were so low, the
Yellowstone bison population needed to be restocked in order to re-establish a viable
population. Historically, game ranching has been touted as the savior of wild bison
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because bison populations were re-stocked by private ranchers. Dwindling elk
populations, on the other hand, were managed much differently “The lesson of the buffalo
haunted many people and the number of game protectionists [preservationists] was on the
increase” (Picton and Picton 1975.14). Since elk numbers never reached as critical a point
as the bison, wild populations were able to recover from the bottleneck. Unlike the bison,
which relied on ranched animals to supplement existing populations, early North American
elk populations were able to retain their status as ‘wildlife’ The implications associated
with this important distinction will be addressed in the following chapters (Chapters 6 and
7).

CHAPTER 6

POLICY FRAMEWORK: THE CURRENT PUBLIC CONTEXT

It is important to note that within the ‘environmental’ movement,
preservationists and conservationists adhere to many different frameworks and policy
agendas. This difference was not detectable during the late 1800s because both
preservationists and conservationists functioned under the assumption that,
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essential first ingredient of proper wild lands policy was the retention of wild land by the
government” (Dana & Fairfax 1980:45). However, conflicts arose after the ‘common
ground’ was won. The preservationist ideology emphasized federal land reservations as a
means to preserve areas of natural beauty from use. The conservation movement, on the
other hand, emphasized the efficient management and ‘wise use’ of natural resources
within reserved areas.
"The period between 1898, when Pinchot took charge of the Division of Forestry
and 1910, when he was dismissed from his position as the head of the Forest Service, is
considered to be the ‘Golden Era’ of American conservation history” (Dana & Fairfax
1980:69). Although Teddy Roosevelt functioned as a preservationist with regards to
wildlife policy, the major focus of the time was on the ‘wise use’ of our natural resources
for the benefit of both present and future generations. According to Roosevelt and
Pinchot, economic, social, aesthetic and moral considerations would determine ‘wise use’
(Dana & Fairfax 1980). The conservation ideology is exemplified by the Forest Service
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slogan, adopted by Pinchot, “the greatest good, for the greatest number, for the longest
time” (Dana & Fairfax 1980:72).
Though the preservationist movement is usually associated with John Muir, its
roots are in the transcendentalist movement (i.e. Thoreau and Emerson). The
preservationist ideals are reflected in the National Parks movement and subsequent
creation of the National Parks Service in 1916. The purpose of the Park Service was,
“[t]o conserve the scenery and natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to
provide enjoyment of same in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations” (Frederick Law Olmstead as cited in
Dana & Fairfax 1980 109). Another interesting contrast between the Park Service and the
Forest Service, as land management agencies, is that the Park Service asserted broad
authorities to regulate wildlife within the National Parks early in its history.
Early policies regarding bison and elk management focused on preservation,
rather than conservation. For instance, refuges were set aside and stocked with nucleus
bison and elk herds. “The magnitude of the bison’s survival as a symbol seems almost to
exceed its survival in actuality” (Pettinga 1985:1). The last remaining wild bison herd is in
Yellowstone National Park, with the rest confined to some degree. The following section
will provide an analysis of the current controversy surrounding Yellowstone’s migratory
bison and elk herds. This analysis will be used to assess wildlife policy, and subsequent
management systems, in an effort to determine the current ‘public context’ surrounding the
American bison, elk, and other wildlife.
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Yellowstone National Park

Each park is established through separate legislation; however, the National Park
Service has remained the guardian of all the parks. Although Yellowstone, America's first
national park, is viewed as a symbol of modem society’s commitment to the preservation
of our ‘wilderness’, the Park Service is obligated to both preserve its lands and provide for
public enjoyment. This dual mission and the resulting policy mandates have been a source
of confusion and criticism for many years. Currently, the Park Service manages
Yellowstone wildlife and habitat under a policy of "natural regulation’ The following
section will explore the Park Service’s policy o f ‘natural regulation’ in Yellowstone, and
the controversies surrounding this type of management. The impact Park Service
management decisions on surrounding communities and neighboring landowners within
the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem (Montana, Idaho and Wyoming) will also be
examined. Additionally, a comparison of state and federal policies governing the
management of wildlife that roam beyond the park’s boundaries shall be studied.
During the first fifty years, the National Park Service pursued a policy of intense
management for both wildlife and recreation. According to Chase (1986), the fledgling
agency wanted to attract tourists by displaying elk and other big game as their showpiece.
Since the park area was not originally stocked with game, park officials did everything
within their powers to increase the number of elk and bison in the park. For instance, a
buffalo ranch was constructed inside the park where buffalo were bred, fed and branded -
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elk were also fed and park ofiBcials chased straying elk back into the park (Chase 1986).
In addition, the Park Service adopted policies and programs to exterminate all predators.
As a result of such intense management, the number of elk in Yellowstone
increased dramatically. According to the 1909 Yellowstone Park Superintendent’s report,
“[a] conservative estimate would place the number of elk in the park between 30,000 and
40,000" (Rush 1932:20). Given the rise in wildlife populations, many animals were forced
to migrate from the park in search of food by 1911 (Rush 1932). These winter migrations
often caused considerable damage to haystacks, fields and fences on the ranches near the
park (Rush 1932). “The increased [elk] populations . . brought an open conflict between
individuals pursuing their separate ideals of wilderness, America and the cattle industry"
(Picton and Picton 1975 19).
Although all of these efforts were in place to increase the number of big game,
elk, in particular, had reached a high point from which it soon began to decline.
Environmental groups were outraged by the policy of predator extermination, and in 1934
demanded that an investigation be conducted. Based on a study completed by Rush
(1932), elk numbers were too high and, in turn, elk were overgrazing the range; bison
numbers, then at 1,000, were also concluded to be large enough. Thus, “.

it was

management policy, not predation, that was killing animals and eliminating wildlife species
in Yellowstone" (Chase 1986). In turn, park managers realized that they would have to fill
the void created by the departure of Indians and predators (Chase 1986). During the
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period between 1934 and 1968, Yellowstone’s management policy focused on the
maintenance of smaller herds.
Reduction and control of the Yellowstone elk herd was accomplished by three
methods; sport hunting outside park boundaries; live-trapping of elk and the subsequent
shipment of these animals to any state that applied for them [figure 7]; and culling elk
Figure 7: Destinations of Live Elk Shipments from Yellowstone National Park from
1892-1967 (Thomas and Toweill 1982)
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herds within park boundaries (Bartlett 1985). “Over a period of 27 years (1934-1961) the
National Park Service killed 8,825 animals by shooting, dispensed with 5,765 by livetrapping, while hunters harvested an estimated 40,745 from the northern herd which had
grazed beyond park boundaries" (Bartlett 1985:385). Although intensive actions were
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taken by the National Park Service to control the burgeoning elk population, 10,000 elk
constituted the Northern Yellowstone elk herd in 1961-1962 (Bartlett 1985). In turn,
“[t]he Park Service took strong measures, killing 4,283 of the beasts, which were then
processed and distributed as food to Indian communities, while 850 more were eliminated
by hunting outside the park, or by live-trapping or normal winter kills” (Bartlett
1985.385).
Although wildlife management policy was tied to recreation in the sense that park
officials wanted to attract tourists, the Park Service also employed additional recreation
management policies. According to Dana and Fairfax (1980), the Park Service was
primarily viewed as a single-use agency. Consequently, its survival was tied to public and
congressional attitudes toward recreation. Since this period was dominated by
‘conservationist’ theory, park recreation policies and programs were based on the
conservation theory of ‘wise use’ modified to fit the special circumstances of the parks
(Lowry 1997). During the post-World War II era, millions of affluent and mobile
Americans looked to recreation as a way to occupy their leisure time. In 1956, the park
Service responded with the implementation of Mission ‘66, a ten-year rehabilitation and
development program (Wirth 1980:237 as cited in Lowry 1997).
The 1960s were characterized by a rise in environmental consciousness at a
national level and a resurgence of post war debates involving conservationists versus
preservationists, which culminated in preservationist theory gaining the moral highground. The environmentalists became the main constituency of the Park Service and.
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thus, had a profound impact on policy development. “To the surprise of the park
managers, the old policy had become a victim of a revolution in the ways in which
Americans viewed nature,

a fundamental shift in what was believed to be the purpose of

the parks” (Chase 1986 41-42).
The Wilderness Act of 1964 reminded Park Officials that their business is
partially preservation, and if they wanted to save ‘their land’ from transfer to wilderness,
they needed to reduce their emphasis on mass recreation and look toward protecting the
resources (Dana & Fairfax 1980). Additionally, many prominent environmental authors
and scholars taught that since humanity had caused most of nature’s problems, perhaps the
best thing to do was to do nothing at all. As a result, the public became much less tolerant
of the Park Service’s policy of "direct reduction’ (Chase 1986).
Hunters were also upset with the current policy of "direct reduction’, because
they wanted to have the opportunity to hunt excess wildlife (Chase 1986). By 1967, the
elk herd was multiplying rapidly, and the Park Service announced that it would eliminate
600 elk by direct reduction (Bartlett 1985). This infuriated local sportsmen, who had not
been consulted in advance by the Park Service (Bartlett 1985). It is difficult to identify
why local sportsmen, who harvest over 100,000 game animals per year, were so angered
by the Park Service’s decision to eliminate a mere 600 elk. However, Bartlett (1985:385386) offers the following explanation:
“It had something to do with the people, and something to do with hunting. And it
involved a regional resentment against some individuals in the Service.
And in
those parts, hunting elk is almost a rite of passage into manhood. . .[T]here are a
lot of concerned citizens in the nation who resent arbitrary decisions by a federal
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agency Park officials proceeded with ‘Operation Elk Kill’,
Service received the hunters’ wrath.”

[In turn,] [t]he

Given the emotionally charged nature of the controversy surrounding the Park Service’s
policy, one could say that the National Park Service was caught between a political rock
and a biological hard place (Chase 1986).
In 1968, Yellowstone park officials adopted a policy o f ‘natural regulation’ This
management policy rested on a commitment to the preservation of an entire ecosystem,
not just an individual species, and the use of natural processes to regulate wildlife
populations (Chase 1986). As previously stated, there are many controversies
surrounding this policy o f ‘natural regulation’. The first set of criticisms focus on the
language used in the development of this policy. The second set focuses on whether
‘natural regulation’ is a scientifically or politically based policy. Finally, the last debate
revolves around the impacts of this policy on neighboring communities and landowners
within the ‘Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem’.
In order to expand upon the first set of criticisms surrounding the policy of
natural regulation’, the following section will focus on the questions:
1234-

what is wilderness?
does wilderness exist?
what is natural?
what is meant by natural regulation?

Wilderness is defined by the environmental movement as, “the last remaining place where
civilization, that all too human disease, has not fully infected the earth” (Cronon 1996).
However, this is not an accurate depiction. There is not a place in this country that can be
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labeled as ‘untrammeled by man’, since Indians have been living on and managing land in
the United States since the Ice Ages. Regardless of the fact that such a place does not
exist, wilderness has been defined into existence and man has been written out of "original
America’. According to Cronon (1996), the removal of the Indians to create an
‘untrammeled wilderness’ is a reminder of the fact that wilderness is nothing more than a
social construct. Chase (1986 46) states that, “ [t]he language of the Wilderness Act.
made it possible to believe that there was still wilderness to save .

and to believe that

the way to manage it was to leave it alone.”
This leads to another question; What is natural? If the Indians have managed the
land and wildlife for centuries, how can park officials argue that their policy o f ‘natural
regulation’ is indeed natural? As a result of this new focus within the environmental
movement, scientific theory was replaced with romanticism. Therefore, Yellowstone’s
policy o f ‘natural regulation’ was not scientific policy; rather, it was an attempt to make a
scientific virtue out of a political necessity (Chase 1986). A marketing report from the
1970s noted that the word ‘natural’ was the most popular word in America; thus, "natural
regulation was a triumph of packaging. . . . [i]t was a policy containing nothing artificial”
(Chase 1986:70).
This brings us to the next question; How is an ecosystem defined? ‘Natural
regulation’ is the commitment to the preservation of an entire ecosystem. However,
according to the First World Conference on National Parks held in 1962 {as cited in
Chase 1986 42), “few of the world’s parks are large enough to be in fact self-regulatory
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ecological units.” In 1983, James Flynn - the director of Montana Fish Wildlife and Parks
- stated, “our most paramount objection to the natural regulation philosophy

is that the

basis from which it was initiated is totally lacking in sound ecological documentation”
(Chase 1986:85). “Already in its 112 year history, a historian can detect the influence of
the pulsation of national attitudes, the swinging of the pendulum, as it is sometimes called,
upon park destiny .

’’(Bartlett 1985:394).

Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem

Today, the Yellowstone ecosystem is described as the ‘Greater Yellowstone
Ecosystem’ [figure 8} because neither the wildlife, nor the natural features are confined to
the National Park boundaries (Patten 1991). The ultimate controversy surrounding
"natural regulation’ rests on the question: How can a ‘total environment’ be preserved
when those wildlife species that wander past park boundaries are managed according to an
entirely different set of management policies? The current bison/brucellosis controversy
highlights how Yellowstone’s policy o f ‘natural regulation’ impacts the surrounding
communities and neighboring landowners within the "Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem’, as
well as how the state and federal policies operating within this ‘ecosystem’ impact
Yellowstone’s policy of "natural regulation’.
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Figure 8: Map of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem
(Keiter and Boyce 1991)
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Yellowstone’s policy of'natural regulation’ and subsequent management
practices worried the local ranchers, as well as the livestock industry, at both the state and
federal level. This is due to the fact that bison carry brucellosis, a disease that causes cattle
to abort. It was feared that increased wildlife numbers in the park would also increase
forage competition, thus causing the bison to wonder beyond park boundaries in search of
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food, and possibly infecting a state’s population of domestic livestock. More specifically,
the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem states could lose their brucellosis free status.
Between 1967 and 1981, the Yellowstone bison herd grew from 400 to 2,000
and, subsequently, some bison began leaving the park (Chase 1986). In 1996,
Yellowstone’s free-ranging buffalo herd included 4,000 animals (Satchell 1996). Since
trapping was inconsistent with the park’s policy, the state was responsible for wildlife that
ventured beyond park boundaries. Because public policy represents an equilibrium
between various interest groups, the current public perception of bison and other wildlife
within the ‘Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem’ can be determined through an examination of
federal and state wildlife policies.
As previously stated, the federal government manages wildlife on national parks
and wildlife refuges, and the states are responsible for managing wildlife on state and
private lands. However, in 1962, Congress ruled that the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USD A) had authority over all ‘members of the animal kingdom’ with contagious diseases
(Keiter 1997). The USD A s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is
currently responsible for regulating brucellosis among domestic livestock. Therefore,
APHIS is an important political player within the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.
APHIS divides various states into categories, ranging from disease-free to quarantine,
based on disease prevalence in domestic cattle. Interstate shipment and vaccination costs
and regulations are less for states with brucellosis-free status. Presently, APHIS is in the
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final stages of a $3 .5 billion aggressive national campaign to rid the country of brucellosis
among domestic livestock (Knox 1997, Keiter 1997).
Currently, the ‘Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem’ states (Montana, Idaho and
Wyoming) are classified as brucellosis free, and livestock interests have expressed concern
about losing this status. Not surprisingly, state livestock officials endorse APHIS’
eradication policy. Until recently (1962) state wildlife officials within Greater
Yellowstone had authority over animals outside park boundaries (Keiter & Froelicher
1993 as cited in Keiter 1997). However, due to APHIS, this no longer is the case.
Although Wyoming still manages bison as wildlife (Wyo. Statute. Ann. § 23-1-901(c) as
cited in Keiter 1997), Montana and Idaho have split jurisdiction between wildlife and
livestock officials, giving livestock officials sole jurisdiction over diseased bison (Mont.
Code Ann. § 87-1-216(a), Idaho Code § 25-618 as cited in Keiter 1997) [figure 9].
Figure 9: State Wildlife Authorities in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem
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Since bison are managed as wildlife in Wyoming, public hunts are used to control
migrating bison (Wyo. Statute. Ann. § 23-1-901(c) as cited in Keiter 1997). Livestock
officials in both Montana and Idaho, on the other hand, are statutorily authorized to
remove or destroy diseased bison (Mont. Code Ann. § 87-1-216(a), Idaho Code § 25-618
as cited in Keiter 1997).
It is interesting to note that current policy regarding brucellosis among bison, like
Yellowstone’s policy o f ‘natural regulation’, resulted from the political balancing of
interest groups, rather than from objective scientific evidence. There has never been a
single documented case of bison transmitting brucellosis to cattle in a natural setting
(Peacock 1997). However, a controlled experiment, conducted at Texas A&M
University in 1990, has shown that bison can transmit brucellosis to cattle if the two
animals are corralled together for several weeks (Davis et al. 1991 as cited in Keiter
1997). Many wildlife biologists feel that this represents a highly unlikely occurrence,
especially on lands outside Yellowstone’s western boundary, because cattle do not graze
these areas until June, when no bison would be present (Peacock 1997).
Although the Texas A&M experiment bases its conclusions on a highly unnatural
and manipulated setting, APHIS cites this case as evidence for its aggressive brucellosis
eradication policy and subsequent programs. In Montana and Wyoming, federal courts
have ruled that wild bison can transmit brucellosis to livestock (Keiter and Froelicher 1993
as cited in Keiter 1997). Montana’s chief veterinarian, Clarence Siroky, feels that
although the chances of transmission are remote (he likens the risk to that of getting
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struck by lightening), it would have such economically disastrous consequences for the
state’s cattle producers that any risk is unacceptable (Peacock 1997). This further
highlights the highly political nature of APHIS' brucellosis strategy
Regardless of whether the current brucellosis eradication strategy is scientifically
based, it is the current policy, and it is the reason for the slaughter of Yellowstone bison
both inside and outside the park. The current Interim Bison Management Plan has been
developed as a settlement to a lawsuit filed by the state of Montana. The lawsuit was filed
against the National Park Service and APHIS, charging that the Yellowstone bison herd
was being mismanaged, and that the threat of brucellosis transmission to livestock was
being ignored (Wilkinson 1997). The interim plan states that bison that stray beyond the
northern boundary of the park are to be either shot, or captured, tested and slaughtered
(Keiter 1997).
Throughout the development of the bison/brucellosis controversy, the Park
Service has remained committed to its policy o f ‘natural regulation’. However, in light of
the current interim plan, NPS is required to go against it’s preservationist obligations and
participate in the slaughter of these bison. This interim plan, costing $370,000, is in place
until a long-term bison management plan and environmental impact statement can be
developed. The long term plan is being developed by the Park Service, the US Forest
Service, and Montana Departments of Livestock and Fish, Wildlife and Parks and has been
in the works for many years; the EIS was out for public comment when Montana filed the
lawsuit in 1995 (Jensen 1997).
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The Yellowstone bison herd is further threatened by APHIS’ proposed
regulations to gain jurisdictional control over all of the bison (Keiter 1997). As previously
stated, APHIS, under the Secretary of Agriculture, has federally granted authority over all
diseased wildlife. Since both Montana and Idaho have transferred a share of authority
from wildlife officials to state livestock officials, the channels of power in regard to the
management of wild bison have shifted in the livestock industry’s favor, thereby leaving
the door open for APHIS’ new regulations. These proposed regulations would require
NPS to implement an immediate test and slaughter program for all Yellowstone bison
(Senate Bill 745 1996 as cited in Keiter 1997).
Even though many more elk test positive for brucellosis than bison, relatively
little attention has been given to the issue of brucellosis in elk populations (Keiter 1997).
This highlights the inconsistencies within the regional brucellosis policy. For instance,
although the Secretary of Agriculture has federally-granted authority over all diseased
animals [figure 10], within the Greater Yellowstone states, wildlife officials have sole
jurisdiction over elk

In other words, elk populations continue to be managed as wildlife,

while Yellowstone bison are managed as livestock to an extent. In addition, the
brucellosis regulations proposed by APHIS do not apply to elk (Keiter 1997). Finally,
under Wyoming compensation law, ranchers with cattle herds that have been infected with
brucellosis from elk, not bison, can maintain a claim against the state (Wyo. Statue. Ann. §
23-1-901, Parker Land and Cattle Co. v Wyo. Game and Fish Comm. 1993 as cited in
Keiter 1997).
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Figure 10: Federal Wildlife Authorities in the Greater Yellowstone
Ecosystem
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It is generally understood that a brucellosis eradication policy that focuses solely
on bison is doomed to fail (Thome et al. 1991a, and Dobson and Meagher 1996 both cited
in Keiter 1997). Why, then, has such little attention been given to the issue of brucellosis
among the regional elk population? The answer could lie in the fact that “[e]lk have a
constituency - hunters, outfitters, the tourist industry, and the Rocky Mountain Elk
Foundation” (Peacock 1997). Elk reacted more favorably to human induced habitat
changes than did bison. In turn, elk were able to retain their ‘wildlife’ status and remain an
integral part of the culture within the Rocky Mountain Region. According to Satchell
(1996), elk hunting in Montana and Wyoming brings in more than $100 million dollars a
year. Wild bison, on the other hand, do not have a comparably strong constituency.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION

A historical analysis of bison and elk policy within the Rocky Mountain region
provides a framework for interpreting the public perceptions surrounding bison and elk,
and the interplay between these interpretations and public policy outputs. As a result of
incremental changes in public policy in the early 1900s, the North American bison
population was on the verge of extinction. Public policy changes were incremental due
to the forces of institutionalism and elitism operating within the political system. First,
the government was not quick to change its policy of Indian subjugation, which called for
a drastic reduction in bison numbers. Second, according to Dana and Fairfax (1980),
before a resource can become valuable, or warrant protection, it must be seen as scarce.
Within the newly settled America, resources were not seen as scare; rather, the country
was in desperate need of westward expansion and economic development. Thus, the
disposition era continued until many resources were nearly depleted.
The bison were not saved from extinction as a result of changes in public policy;
rather, private ranchers saved them. Initially, they were kept under preservationist
intentions; however, bison ranching soon became an important economic activity.
Eventually, public policy shifted and areas were set aside for the protection of natural
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all of these populations are confined to a degree. Currently, most of the North American
bison population is privately owned and ranched/farmed. Yellowstone National Park's
bison population is the one of the few remaining free-ranging population in North
America.
The current conflict involving Yellowstone's fi'ee-ranging bison population and the
potential threat of brucellosis transmission provides a means with which to assess the
interplay between the public’s perception of bison and public policy decisions (outputs).
At the federal level, APHIS (USDA) has complete authority over diseased wildlife, and is
currently in the middle of a multi-million dollar campaign to eradicate brucellosis from
livestock. In turn, APHIS has become a major player with regard to the bison situation
with the Greater Yellowstone ecosystem, and has taken an active role in the management
of Yellowstone's diseased bison population. Similarly, at the state level, in both Montana
and Idaho the Department of Livestock and the State Fish and Wildlife Service have split
jurisdiction over all (diseased and non-diseased) bison within the Greater Yellowstone
ecosystem. Additionally, livestock officials in these states are statutorily authorized to
remove or destroy diseased bison.
The current situation, involving the Yellowstone bison and brucellosis transmission,
also applies to elk. In fact, more elk test positive for brucellosis than bison. Under federal
law, APHIS has control over all diseased wildlife; however, they have yet to exert control
over diseased elk populations. Additionally, Montana and Idaho manage Yellowstone's
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migrating elk populations as wildlife (managed solely under state fish and wildlife service).
Why the difference? Unlike bison populations, many individuals and communities within
the Rocky Mountain region have strong symbols and meanings attached to wild elk.
Additionally, these groups often exert higher levels of influence within the political system
(more power).
Public policy represents the point of equilibrium reached during a struggle between
competing interest groups, with policy shifting in favor of those interest groups that yield
relatively higher levels of influence (Dye 1972). As stated in an article in Audubon
magazine,

the underlying power struggle [with regard to the current brucellosis/bison

issue] has been between the agricultural and wildlife agencies; at issue was who
determines the appropriate use of our public lands and who decides the fate of our nations
wildlife" (Wilkinson 1997 41). Thus, an analysis of bison policy within the Greater
Yellowstone ecosystem demonstrates that the organizations demanding bison protection
(mainly grassroots organizations) and those who support the eradication program
(livestock interests) do not have equal access to power within the current political system.
An analysis of elk policy within the Greater Yellowstone ecosystem also demonstrates
this fact, since many powerful communities of place and interest support the protection of
elk (i.e.. Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation, Hunter Organizations, NRA, Outfitters, etc.).

PART II
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC CONTEXT SURROUNDING ELK FARMING
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Although elk are valued as a wildlife species, many farmers and ranchers are also
beginning to recognize their value as an agricultural product. As a result, farmed elk
populations have been growing rapidly [figure 11].
Figure 11: Growth of the Farmed Elk Population in the USA Between 1985-1992
(Renecker 1993a)
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Commercial elk production systems have been embraced by some as a way to stabilize
failing agricultural economies. Those interested in rural development view commercial
wildlife production systems as a means to access a broader range of markets, while
insuring the maintenance of rural, agriculturally-based livelihoods for traditional
agricultural producers (Hudson 1989a, Hudson and Dezhkin 1989). "Alternative livestock
offers a significant opportunity to diversify the agricultural economic base of a state and
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on a broader scale reduce reliance on imports (Rich 1993). However, some doubt
whether elk farming in the United States is indeed a viable industry Elk farming
constitutes an economically viable, short-term diversification strategy for traditional
agricultural producers within the United States; however, the future success of this
industry will likely be affected by public opinion regarding the impacts associated with elk
farming. In addition, those skeptical of game farming argue that future prospects for the
elk industry within the United States are limited due to the presence of a strong animal
welfare lobby, inconsistent and restrictive regulations, and an inadequately developed
infrastructure (Yorks 1989).
As a result of increasingly tight margins in many sectors of the U.S. agricultural
industry, commercial elk production systems have emerged as an alternative to traditional
livestock enterprises. Currently, farmed elk serve a variety of domestic and international
markets, namely breeding stock, velvet antler, venison and private hunting /tourism.
Although successful in other countries, the elk industry is a relatively new and
controversial industry within the Rocky Mountain region. In order to assess the long-term
viability of elk farming within the Rocky Mountain Region, the public context surrounding
elk farming in this region must be understood. In turn, a review of the economic, socio
cultural and ecological factors is presented in the following chapters (Chapters 8-11).

CHAPTER 8

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Private Benefits

The Saskatchewan Department of Agriculture and Food (1996) estimates the
global domestic ‘deer’ population to be in excess of 5 million animals, with the largest
producers being New Zealand, China and Russia. During the last 20 years, elk farming
has become the most rapidly developing commercial production system within the
industry (Hudson 1996). Although game farming in North America has been in
existence for many years, a comparison with the commercial game industries in the above
mentioned countries reveals that North American industries are considered rather
primitive (Yorks 1989). North American systems cater primarily to breeding stock,
velvet and hunting/tourism markets; whereas, countries with more developed production
systems, such as those in New Zealand, focus primarily on farming elk for venison and
velvet markets

Breeding Stock
Breeding stock is currently one of the most profitable markets for commercial elk
According to the March 1997 Minnesota auction results, the average price paid for a
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bred elk cow was $669 This can be compared to a Western Colorado average of $165
per breeding age beef cow (North American Elk Breeders Association 1997b). Eleven
thousand dollars ($11,000) was the average price paid for a mature bull (North American
Elk Breeders Association 1997b). One bull usually breeds 17-20 cows (North American
Elk Breeders Association 1997b). Since the American tradition of public ownership of
wildlife requires that meat and other by-products sold originate outside the local area
(Yorks 1989), the sale of venison and velvet bulls is vital to the continuation of the elk
farming. The market for hunted bulls is also growing, as hunting/tourist markets continue
to expand. In addition, there is a high demand for hunt and velvet bulls with superior
genetics (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1996).
“The world population of farmed deer passed the million mark about 1990 and,.
. could approach eight million by the turn of the century. . .” (Hudson 1996:2). Given
this projection, breeding stock markets are predicted to remain strong. In addition, the
development of new techniques in genetic manipulation will also contribute to the
strength of these markets. However, at some point bred elk populations will reach a level
where the demand for breeding stock will begin to stabilize. The stabilization of breeding
stock markets can occur for the following reasons: (1) government policy shifts can affect
the U.S. elk industry, (2) changing market demands can affect the industry, and (3)
operating game farmers will eventually obtain all of the stock that they require and the
bottom will fall out of the breeding stock market within the U.S.
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Velvet
According to users of traditional eastern medicine, velvet antlers generate a number
of medicinal benefits, such as: the generation of hemoglobin, blood pressure control,
increased lung efficiency, improved muscle tone and glandular functions, sharpened wits,
stomach ulcer relief reduced arthritis inflammation and the easement of old age debilities
(Stoney Ridge 1997). Consequently, the international trade in velvet antler is currently a
lucrative market for elk farmers. According to the North American Elk Breeders
Association (1997a), velvet profits are typically enough to pay for feeding an entire herd
year round.
Korea is currently the largest velvet importer, with imports accounting for
approximately 85 percent of the international market, a value of more than U.S. $1.5
billion (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1996, Hudson 1996) [figure 12].
Figure 12: Official Korean Statistics of Domestic and Imported Velvet
from 1981-1990 (Renecker 1993a)
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New Zealand is currently the main velvet supplier, with exports reaching 450 fresh tones,
followed by the People’s Republic of China (400 tones), the Soviet Union (60 tones), the
United States (20 tones), and Canada (17 tones) (Hudson 1996). The price for velvet has
been extremely volatile over the last 15 years, with prices ranging from $55 per fresh
(green) pound in 1993 to $85 per fresh pound in 1996 (Saskatchewan Agriculture and
Food 1996) [figure 13] In general, bulls increase velvet yields annually, with an average
two-year old producing approximately six pounds of velvet and mature bulls (7 to 8
years old) producing up to 40 pounds of velvet (North American Elk Breeders
Association 1997a). According to Rich (1993:2), “[a] four year old North American elk
will yield about $800 to $1200 each year and continue production through a life
expectancy of more than 15 years.”
Figure 13; Official Korean Floor Prices for Dry Velvet Antler from 19891993 (Renecker 1993a)

Velvet antler typed

Russia (maral deer)
China (maral deer)
New Zealand (red deer)
United States/Canada
Elk
Reindeer

Korean Floor price ($US/kg dry weight)
1989

1990

1993

630
500-630
555

630
500-630
375

480
350

580

530
430

430
350'

' Actually sold for US$ 200/kg dry weight.
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Although velvet prices are known to fluctuate, a producer can control his/her profits
to a certain extent. For example, antler velvet has traditionally been sold fresh, or in a
‘green’ form; however, value adding processing plants (to dry the velvet) are being
developed in various elk farming communities (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food
1996). Processing represents an opportunity to add value to the raw product, for
example, dried antler can bring a premium that is 20 to 30 percent higher than green
velvet (Stoney Ridge 1996). The exporter also benefits from reduced shipping cost, and a
lower risk of spoilage (Stoney Ridge 1996). In addition, elk velvet is sold either through
individual transactions between buyers and producers, or through marketing pools.
(North American Elk Breeders Association 1997a). The development of marketing pools
often result in higher prices for the velvet producer (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food
1996).
With regard to the velvet market, the demand for velvet will continue to increase
as Asian communities become more affluent, and the domestic market grows with more
people turning to holistic medicine (North American Elk Breeders Association 1997a,
Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1996). However, Hudson (1996) asserts that, in
actuality, success of this market is uncertain.* He first notes that “[i]n addition to [the]
growing international supply, Korea, the major importer, seems to be well on [its] way to
self-sufficiency in velvet production” (Hudson 1996). Furthermore, many holistic
medicines are coming under increased scrutiny from the U S. Food and Drug

* This uncertainty is especially relevant at present due to the current Asian

67
Administration (Hudson 1996). Animal welfare groups are also loudly protesting the
‘inhumane treatment' of velvet bulls. To some extent, they have had a significant effect
on this market. For example, as a result of these protests, velveting is not permitted in
Europe (Hudson 1996). Finally, many are opposed to the trade in wildlife products for
medicinal purposes. According to Joe Gutkoski, Vice President of the Montana Wildlife
Federation, “[i]t encourages the consumption of superstitious medicines and expands the
insatiable demand for these foolish nostrums in the oriental market. . . The end product is
the extinction of wildlife” (Gutkoski 1994 14).

Venison
Due to a surge of interest in a variety of culinary meats, as well as in the
avoidance of fats, cholesterol, steroids and antibiotics associated with traditional domestic
livestock, venison markets are also expanding. For example, in 1990, 133 New York City
restaurants sold game meat fTime 1990 as cited in Lanka et al. 1990). “Game meat prices
in markets and restaurants tend to be 50%-100% higher than for comparable domestic
cuts” (Yorks 1989:278). According to the Colorado Elk and Game Breeders
Association, wholesale prices for elk meat currently range from $4 per pound for burgers
to $15 per pound for steaks (North American Elk Breeders Association 1997b). “A 15
month old market male for venison will yield $700-900" (Rich 1993:2).

economic crisis.
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Russia is currently the largest exporter of total venison, while New Zealand is the
largest exporter of farmed venison (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1996). In 1993,
New Zealand earned NZ $126 million through the exportation of 13,000 tones (Hudson
1996). Until recently, the main venison import market has been Europe. However,
interest is currently turning toward a potentially large, although complex, market in the
United States (Hudson 1996). Market demand for farmed venison is also growing within
Pacific Rim countries (Hudson 1996).
In 1990, the total amount of venison produced in the United States was 110
tons, of which 25 tons was farm raised (Judy 1992 as cited in Hudson 1996). Although
the overall size of the North American commercial game industry remains relatively small
compared to traditional livestock industries, the capture of even a small portion of this
market by venison will create a large new market for elk products (Saskatchewan
Agriculture and Food 1996). Currently, 85 percent of the commercial venison available in
the U S. is imported. However, some believe that shifts from velvet and breeding stock
will rapidly increase domestic venison supplies (Hudson 1996, Rich 1993). In other
words, if/when the markets for velvet and breeding stock decline, producers will most
likely shift toward venison production as a long-term market for farmed elk.
Given the predicted decline of breeding stock and velvet markets, many
commercial elk farmers in the United States are relying on increased venison markets as a
means to relieve future economic pressures (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1996).
However, venison is presently produced at relatively low levels in the United States. Two
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of the main reasons for this low level of growth are: currently inconsistent state
regulations regarding the establishment of commercial elk production systems and highly
restrictive regulatory standards governing the trade of game meat (Yorks 1989). For
instance, game farming is currently legal in Montana and Colorado, but not in Wyoming
(Yorks 1989). Additionally, all meat for human consumption must receive ante-mortem
veterinary inspection, as well as satisfy stringent treatment and storage requirements
(Luxmoore 1989). Further hampering practical game ranching is the fact that conflicting
patterns exist among federal, state and local regulations regarding the transport, slaughter
and meat sales from game animals (Yorks 1989). Although it can be argued that the
current restrictions on the trade in game meat will preclude the United States from ever
gaining a foothold in the international venison market, it can also be argued that
regulations will become more consistent and less prohibitive in response to a growing
market.
A second criticism of the United States as a player in the international venison
market is that it lacks a well-developed infrastructure. This absence of a developed
market infrastructure for game meat places a burden on the American elk ranchers trying
to meet market standards. However, as the domestic supply of venison increases an
adequate infrastructure may develop in order to facilitate this growing market. For
instance, New Zealand has developed deer slaughtering facilities in order to comply with
strict U S. regulations on transport, slaughter and meat sales (Luxmoore 1989). The
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USD A has already approved field slaughter procedures for wild ungulates, and it is very
likely that game processing facilities will also develop in the United States (Yorks 1989).

Hunting/T ourism
Given the currently high levels of interest in sport hunting, there has been an
increasing interest in charging fees to hunt game on private land (York 1989). Wyoming’s
Fish and Game Department figures highlight the fact that wild game hunters typically
achieve a 50 percent success rate (Anonymous 1985b as cited in York 1989). This
relatively low success rate, given the high level of emotional and financial investment
required by hunters, indicates a direct inducement to interest hunters in private hunts,
where there is less competition and a better chance of'bagging' a trophy bull (York 1989).
Currently in Montana, wealthy hunters who desire a guaranteed hunt will pay ranchers
$5,000 to$ 12,000 to shoot a trophy elk, or shooter bull, depending on the size (Majors
1994, Rider 1996). Furthermore, ranchers can further increase their profits by providing
such auxiliary services as guides, food and lodging.
The development of the hunting/tourism market within the United States
provides another means for elk ranchers to combat declines in other market sectors.
According to Luxmoore (1989), wildlife based tourism (hunting/game viewing) may be of
greater economic significance than the trade in wildlife products. A 1985 survey
concluded that $1 billion was spent annually on sport hunting within the United States
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(Hudson 1996). Additionally, a 1990 survey conducted by the Montana Department of
Fish, Wildlife and Parks and the U.S. Forest Service determined that wildlife viewing
contributes more than $44 million annually to Montana’s economy (Montana Department
of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1992).
Currently, more than 74,000 out-of-state hunters come to Montana each year
(Anonymous 1996). Montana’s hunting season, which is longer than most nationally, is a
main reason that numerous out-of-state hunters are drawn to the State (Anonymous
1996). According to Karen Zackheim, Montana’s Fish, Wildlife and Parks game farm
coordinator, since shooting on game farms is protected under private property laws, game
farm operators can have shoots of any animals, in any quantity, at any time of the year
(Rider 1996). This information is very promising for game farm operators who cater
primarily to out-of-state hunters. However, ".

although the price per animal is high the

number of participants is relatively low” (Lanka et al. 1990:69).

Public Costs

Current Value of Rocky Mountain Wildlife

As elk farming gains popularity, there is concern regarding the public costs
associated with the devaluation wildlife contributions to Rocky Mountain economies. A
study conducted by the Montana Wildlife Federation’s Grassroots Outreach Project in
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1997 revealed that wildlife contributes $1 7 billion annually to the country’s economy
(Sharpe 1997). A comparison of the economic gain attributable to wildlife in relation to
other major resource based industries ranks wildlife fourth (Sharpe 1997). During hunting
season, wild elk bring in millions of dollars that circulate through Montana and form a
major part of the state’s fall economy (Anonymous 1994a). “The direct impact on the
Montana economy provided by sportsmen alone is nearly 560 million dollars—dollars that
protect wildlife, habitat, and support over 11,500 jobs. . . Another $550 million has been
reported by the Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks coming from wildlife viewing" (Sharpe
1997: 6).
According to an article in Montana Wildlife (Anonymous 1994a: 15), “. . . game
farms [and associated wildlife/environmental threats] have the potential to change
Montana’s wild game populations forever as we know them, and in fact could decimate
them.” Game farm threats include: increased poaching and wildlife thefr, the loss of
significant portions of native herds when traditional migration routes are disrupted by high
fences and exotics out-compete native populations, and the loss of public enjoyment of
wildlife and traditional ways of living (Lanka et al. 1990). For instance, “[hjunting private
land at such a high cost is characteristic of European society where only the wealthy can
afford to hunt” (Satchell 1990 as cited in Lanka et al. 1990:62). An economists would
argue that this is an example of economic efficiency because the person who values the
resource the most is using the resource (Hesseln pers. com. 1998). However, others
would argue that wildlife policy that is based upon economic efficiency is in direct
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opposition to North America’s current system of wildlife management within which
wildlife is held in trust for public benefit.

Game Farm Maintenance and Regulation

Another public cost associated with the game farm industry is the expenditure of
large sums of public to subsidize the industry. Within the Rocky Mountain region, the
regulation of game farms rests on the shoulders of state wildlife agencies [figure 14].
Figure 14: Who Regulates Game Farming in North America? (Lanka 1993)
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The concern stems from the fact that a substantial portion of this agency money is
acquired through the self-imposed taxation of North American sportsmen and women.
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For instance, the Pittman-Robertson Act of 1937 provides funding, standards and
encouragement for state wildlife programs (Dana and Fairfax 1980). "Under this act,
receipts from the federal tax on firearms, shells and cartridges were allocated to the states
on the basis of their size, and the number of licensed hunters. The funds were made
available for research and for the purchase and development of game refuges and public
hunting grounds” (Dana and Fairfax 1980:149). Given the increasing popularity of game
farms, local wildlife organizations have begun to campaign against the divergence of
wildlife allocated funds to the regulation of game farms.
Wildlife agencies are forced to expend funds in order to oversee the day-to-day
regulation of state game farms, including: reviewing permit applications, record keeping,
and increased enforcement workloads to handle both routine facility inspections and
increased incidences of poaching (Lanka et al. 1990). According to Herb Johnson
(1994:3), “[gjame farm administration and supervision, excluding the cost of enforcement,
costs the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks at least $150,000 per year . .
.Yet, game farms generate only about $5,300 in license fees each year." "Hunters who are
not required to purchase state hunting licenses when hunting private game ranches do not
contribute economically to state wildlife conservation programs” (Lanka et al 1990:63).
In addition to these costs, state wildlife agencies also incur major costs when
native wildlife populations are affected as a result of game farm animals. All Rocky
Mountain states set fencing requirements and require disease testing in order to prevent
epidemic outbreaks within native wildlife populations. However, game farm animals
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sometimes escape, resulting in substantial expenditures of public money For instance, the
total cost incurred by the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks during the
1994 tuberculosis (TB) eradication operation, which took place in southeast Montana,
was estimated to be in excess of $24,000 (Anonymous 1994b). “If restitution costs [for
the slaughtered wildlife] were added to the price tag, the full amount of money lost by the
public would probably top $100,000" (Anonymous 1994b: 15). Alberta, where 2600
captive elk were exterminated as a result of a TB outbreak, provides another example of
this issue (Majors 1994). As a result, the Canadian government spent approximately $15
million in compensation (Majors 1994). Finally, “[bjetween 1988 and 1992, the Colorado
Division of Wildlife has spent in excess of $150,000 to control and eliminate feral game
farm animals” (Johnson 1994:3).
A second example of the divergence of wildlife funds to game farm regulation
involves the issuance of new permits and expansions. When a private landowner is
granted permission to fence his property (or additional property, in the case of an
expansion), the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks is legally obligated to
remove wildlife from the impending pasture. For instance, when Len Wallace of Darby,
Montana was granted an extension for his elk farm, the Montana Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks “. . employed helicopters and massive hazing to remove approximately
350 mule deer from the enclosure,. . . the Department estimated that $26,000 in
sportsmen dollars went to getting the expansion online” (Jewett 1997.11). As a result of
the Wallace incident, Montana sportsmen protested. Wallace responded, “[wje’ve been
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feeding those deer for years . why doesn’t the Wildlife Federation reimburse ranchers
who are feeding these critters” (Jewett 1997 11). This response highlights the social
polarization evident within this issue.

CHAPTER 9

ECOLOGICAL FACTORS

Positive Externalities

Traditional western agriculture, including cattle ranching and intensive farming, can be
an environmentally damaging activity. Range condition is an estimate of how close a
particular rangeland is to its productive potential for forage vegetation (Miller 1992).
According to Miller (1992:401), “.. by 1988 about 68% of the country’s [U.S.] public
rangeland was in unsatisfactory condition (poor or fair), 29% was in good condition, and
only 3% was in excellent condition.” According to Rich (1993:1), “[h]ad man the
opportunity to choose a different set of species to domesticate today things might look
very different. There are about 3500 mammals and it was not necessary to choose only
four: cattle, sheep, pigs and goats.” The primary reason why these four animal species
were chosen is that deer resisted genetic changes designed to increase body fat (Rich
1993). During the early years of the agricultural revolution, fat provided food, tallow
for candles, and oil for lamps (Rich 1993). Currently, there are substitutions for this
energy; in turn, there is a movement toward the domestication of native wildlife.
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The Benefits of Ranching Native Wildlife
One positive environmental externality of the elk industry is that it allows for the
practice of a less intensive form of agriculture. Given the current environmental
conditions, many feel that there is “ a need to achieve an agriculture that is in harmony
with nature” (Rich 1993:2). In order to achieve such an agricultural system, "man will
need to domesticate many of the inviting species native to a given region and utilize them
within that natural environment” (Rich 1993:6). Since native wildlife populations have co
evolved with their environment, they are better adapted to their environment than
traditional livestock species.
Within the Rocky Mountain region, cattle can make environmentally sound and
efficient use of the land for only seven months out of the year (Rich 1993). During the
winter months, cattle are often housed and fed because they compact wet pastures (Rich
1993). This compaction damages the land, drainage and water tables (Rich 1993). Elk,
on the other hand, can utilize pastures for the full year (Rich 1993). Since elk are better
adapted to this regional ecosystem, cause less damage to winter pastures and their feed
requirements decrease in the winter (Rich 1993).

The Employment of Grazing Succession

Increased grazing efficiency is another positive environmental externality
attributable to a combination of cattle and elk farming . “Common-use grazing [making
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use of grazing succession] is the practice of stocking two or more large herbivores,
domestic or wild, on the same pasture or range area. . . .[C]ommon-use grazing generally
results in more efficient use of the forage resources, because different herbivores have
different habit and forage preferences” (Rich 1993:4) [figure 15] East Africa, which has a
Figure 15: Grazing and Rum inant Patterns of Selected Species of Deer, Domestic
Sheep and Cattle (Rich 1993)

CERVIDAE GRAY 1821
CoAC«fitrat« S«l«etDr« *—'
— ..—..................—
i "

c la ssifie d a s morphophysiologicol
Ruminant Feeding Types ( Hofmann,T993 )
Interm ediate

i C

nÉ»ac #e##*aW# MW e lk m) —(

A A jL L m i

««lactlv*

fit»

a-A.a a k A

####»$
mmm ##Wel.

80

great diversity of large wild herbivores, also boasts the highest territorial grazing efficiency
(Nelson 1984 as cited in Rich 1993 :4). Additionally, studies have shown that periodic
cattle grazing helps to remove accumulated old growth, thus improving the nutritional
value of forage on elk winter ranges (Anderson and Scherizinger 1975, Jourdonnais 1985
as cited in Frisina and Morin 1991). Although the United States pioneered the concept of
multi-use grazing, these techniques are utilized mostly in Africa, Australia, New Zealand,
China and Russia (Rich 1993). According to Rich (1993:2), “[i]nstead of being a leader in
balancing the demands for sensitivity to our environment, we are watching the rest of the
world forge ahead.”

Negative Externalities

Although elk farming can be classified as a less intensive form of agriculture,
there are many environmental problems associated with this industry. The negative
environmental externalities include: game farm escape, and the subsequent threats of
disease transmission, hybridization and competition; wildlife habitat fragmentation; and
wildlife theft and poaching. Currently, a debate is raging regarding the likelihood of such
problems. Members of the North American Elk Breeders Association believe that.
“[w]ildlife agencies use animal health, habitat competition and hybridization as political
tools” (Rich 1993:8). However, Joe Gutkoski, Vice-President of the Montana Wildlife
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Federation (1994 14), argues that “it [elk farming] commercializes and privatizes a
publicly owned resource and invites poaching and illegal killing and capture of native
wildlife.

.The sheer scale of the game farming business, the poor husbandry, the illegal

traffic in game animals, the poor enforcement of regulations and the powerful political
lobbies supporting it, will make law breaking and disease spread inevitable.”

Game Farm Escapes

Although it can be argued that compliance with fencing regulations is a sufficient
means to avoid the problems associated with game farm escapes, the experience of many
states and provinces has been that animal escape is inevitable (Lanka et al. 1990).
According to information gathered by the Wyoming Game Farm Review Committee, the
means of animal escape were varied (Lanka et al. 1990). The most reported reasons for
escape were: poor fence maintenance and fence building; weather events such as floods,
wind, drifting snow, and falling trees; vandalism, jumping over or crawling under the
fence, people turning animals loose, and animals destroying a fence (Lanka et al. 1990).
According to an article published by the Montana Wildlife Federation, Montana’s
Department of Livestock Veterinarian, Clarence Siroky, has stated that, “[w]ith 3400
acres, you can’t keep a fence up all the time” (Anonymous 1994b: 15). “In essence,
Siroky’s statement is an admission that game farm animals will escape and co-mingle with
wild herds” (Anonymous 1994b: 15). Once a farmed animal escapes, the associated
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problems become regional wildlife threats. The following quote from an article in
Montana Wildlife illustrates the far-reaching effects of game farm escapes: "There are
persistent reports that exotic species have escaped from a farm in southeast Montana, and
are roaming in the wild Pryor Mountains; some say that exotics have moved across the
Montana border into Wyoming—a cruel twist to that state’s aggressive, pro-active efforts
to eradicate such a possibility" (Anonymous 1994a: 16).

The realities of disease transmission

“Of major concern when considering the introduction of animals (native or
exotic) is the possibility that diseases and/or parasites may be transported to the new area
with those animals” (Smith 1982 as cited /w Lanka et al. 1990:13). According to a review
of game farm literature, “[t]he introduction of animals into new areas has resulted in the
importation of disease into these new locations” (Lanka et al. 1990 13). Dr Karl Johnson,
the man who named the Ebola virus and chronicled its effects, believes there is “no
question” about whether Game farm diseases threaten Montana's wildiife populations
(Jewett 1996a: 13). In Johnson’s opinion, “[wje’re in for it. . . I think we’re starting to do
the same kinds of things that got chickens, cows and ourselves into trouble. We’re
gathering very many in smaller places” (Jewett 1996a. 13).
Contrary to Johnson, the Montana Department of Livestock’s veterinarian,
Clarence Siroky, does not believe that there is a problem. According to Siroky, “There

are a lot of things that go into making a disease work besides the fact that its out there”
(Jewett 1996a: 13). However, members of the Wyoming Game Farm Review Committee
feel that game farms impose an unduly high risk (Lanka et al. 1990). “Epidemics may
occur where new animals are introduced to an area, where new infectious agents are
introduced, where environmental conditions change, or where animal populations undergo
some stress” (Lanka et al 1990:13). Additionally, certain diseases may become more
prominent than they normally might be in the wild because confined settings foster the
transmission of disease (Lanka et al. 1990). “The relative ease of rapid transportation of
these animals also facilitates dispersal of disease” (Lanka et al., 1990:21). Finally,
“[cjontact between farmed animals and wild ones through the fence will spread disease.
Rodents scurrying in and out of game farms will [also] spread disease” (Gutkoski 1994 1).
Red Deer/Elk have been documented as being a host species to the following
diseases: Meningeal Worm, Liver Fluke, Cartoid Artery Worm, Tuberculosis, Johne’s
Disease, Leptospirosis, Brucellosis, Malignant Catarrhal Fever, Blue Tongue, Epizotic
Hemorrhagic Disease, Rabies, Chronic Wasting Disease/Bovine Spongi Form
Encephalopathy, and EBR (Lanka et al. 1990). Additionally, “[n]ew diseases or diseases
previously not known to occur in wildlife continue to be discovered. . .It is very easy for
new diseases to be introduced into the state unintentionally” (Dr. Elizabeth S. Williams
pers. com. as cited in Lanka et al. 1990:22).
Most states have regulations in place to monitor the interstate movement of elk
in order to control disease. However, not all of the current testing technology is reliable.
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According to Lanka et al., “[pjrocedures for testing livestock do not always provide
definitive diagnosis for native wildlife and exotic species” (Lanka et al. 1990:18).
“Infected animals may not show symptoms or give positive results on diagnostic tests. In
some cases, it takes a long time for a pathogen to develop before symptoms appear"
(Lanka et al. 1990.25).
Additionally, not all states test for each specific disease. For instance, testing in
Montana is designed to protect domestic animals from brucellosis^ and tuberculosis
(Lanka et al. 1990). However, current tests are not 100 percent reliable, since they are
designed for whole herd testing (Majors 1994:2). With regard to traditional livestock
herds, the USD A is currently in the midst of a tuberculosis and brucellosis eradication
program. “Introduction of these diseases into livestock via the importation of non
domestic ruminants . . . would be a tremendous setback and expense for these programs”
(Dr Elizabeth S. Williams pers. com. as cited in Lanka et al. 1990:22). According to
Dave Majors, Montana Wildlife Federation President, “Montana’s ranching community has
shown great concern about the possible transmission of Brucellosis from Bison wondering
from Yellowstone National Park; they should be just as concerned about the threat from
game farm animals" (Majors 1994:2).

^ I will not discuss Brucellosis transmission in this section, since I have thoroughly
reviewed it in Chapter 6.
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Finally, Montana does not test all shipments of non-domesticated animals; nor
does it test for wildlife diseases not commonly associated with livestock (Lanka et al.
1990). For instance, Montana does not test for meningeal worm, bluetongue or
anaplasmosis (Lanka et al. 1990). Until recently, elk farmers would sell diseased wildlife
to Canadian game ranchers as healthy animals using Montana as the state of origin (Lanka
et al. 1990). As a result of problems with disease, Canada has recently closed its borders
to interstate shipments of animals.

Tuberculosis

Tuberculosis (TB) is a serious disease of wild animals caused by a slow-growing
bacteria, Mycobacterium bovis (Lanka et al 1990). This disease is mainly present in
farmed elk populations and is spread by “ mutually grooming open sores and by dropping
contagious saliva, feces and urine in crowded, penned areas" (Anonymous 1994a: 15).
Although most states test imported elk for TB, the testing procedures for non
domesticated animals are not generally reliable (Lanka et al. 1990). Moreover, the
bacteria is resistant to environmental conditions (Lanka et al. 1990). For instance, some
species of the bacteria may remain in soil and litter for four years or longer (Lanka et al.
1990).
Many game farms in New Zealand and elsewhere have experienced problems
with TB (Lanka et al. 1990). The Government of Alberta recently killed about 2600
captive elk in response to a TB outbreak, and spent $15 million in compensation (Majors
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1994). The infected elk were traced back to a game farm north of Yellowstone National
Park (Majors 1994). This finding concerned many wildlife officials in Montana.
According to Mitchell Essey, senior staff veterinarian for the USDA’s Animal and Plant
Inspection Service (APHIS), “[n]o one knows how we'd control it [TB] if it got into
herds like those in Yellowstone National Park. The potential ramifications are almost
inconceivable” (Anonymous 1994a; 15). A second incident of TB transmission occurred in
Hardin, Montana. In December of 1993, a free ranging mule deer was diagnosed with TB
(Anonymous 1994c:4). According to officials, the infected deer had contracted the TB
from the Elk Valley Game Farm, which had been quarantined because of TB infected elk
(Anonymous 1994c: 4).
Since game animals frequently escape from captivity, the transmission of TB to
native elk, domestic livestock, and humans poses a serious threat associated with elk
farming (Lanka et al 1990, Anonymous 1994a). According to Keith Annue, Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, TB exists in many wildlife species (Anonymous
1994c). “In San Francisco they found it [TB] in ground squirrels. In England it has been
found in badgers. In New Zealand it was found in brush-tailed opossums” (Anonymous
1994c: 4).

Dr. Siroky, Montana’s Department of Livestock Veterinarian, feels that

although game fences cannot be maintained without escapes, TB is not generally as
contagious as the common cold transmission requires a dense population of animals
(Anonymous 1994c).
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However, many game farm oppositionists are not willing to take the chance
According to an article in Montana Wildlife, “[i]f TB gets loose in wild herds, disease
transmission may be unstoppable—an uncontrollable wave of death moving across the state”
(Anonymous 1994a: 15). Since animals infected with TB must be destroyed, in order to
prevent further transmission, a TB outbreak in native populations could result in the loss of
a large amount of wild elk. According to the Wyoming Game Farm Review Committee,
" . .it would be a tragedy and a tremendous waste of resources to attempt to
eliminate or greatly reduce those herds. Public outcry over severe herd
reduction would be tremendous. . . . [Finally,] [sjuch control would have to
be paid from public funds, and there could be a tremendous loss of public
recreational opportunities by such a reduction ” (Lanka et al. 1990:38).
TB also poses a threat to domestic livestock and humans. Montana’s
Tuberculosis free status, which it has held since 1977, “is a major underpinning of the
industry’s and state’s economic viability; if lost, the cost to the livestock industry of the
state of Montana will be in millions of dollars” (Anonymous 1994a: 15). Montana would
loose it’s TB free status if only one cow was infected. Additionally, TB transmission to
humans presents an equally concerning threat. Although Siroky believes that, “

the

chances of a hunter catching TB from infected game animals is more difficult than winning
the Powerball lottery”; Montana Wildlife Federation president, Dave Majors, feels that
“Siroky’s comments are irresponsible and contradicted by a number of experts”
(Anonymous 1994b: 15). According to Majors, “[t]he fact of the matter is, no hunter
should be put at risk of catching TB no matter what the odds” (Anonymous 1994b: 15).
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Malignant Catarrhal Fever

“Malignant Catarrhal Fever has become one of the most significant diseases in the
deer farming industry" (Reid and Buxton 1984, Reid et al. 1985, Beatson 1985a, Van
Reenen and Innes 1985, Oliver et al. 1985, McAllum et al. 1982, Wilson et al. 1983 all
cited in Lanka et al. 1990:32). Malignant Catarrhal Fever (MCF) is a fatal viral disease
that affects both domestic and wild ruminants, including cattle (Lanka et al. 1990). The
disease is commonly found in two forms, wildebeest MCF and sheep MCF (Lanka et al
1990). The virus that causes the sheep MCF, which is the type most often found in
cervids, has not yet been identified (Lanka et al. 1990).
Although the mode of transmission is not well understood, close association
among animals fosters the disease (Plowright 1981 ût5 cited in Lanka et al. 1990).
However, since the causative virus has not been identified, sheep MCF is extremely
difficult to diagnose (Lanka et al. 1990). In turn, there is no suitable means for screening
imported animals for MCF (Lanka et al 1990). In addition, “[tjhere does not appear to be
any practical way to control the disease once it is introduced” (van Reenen and Innes 1985
as cited in Lanka et al. 1990:34). According to the Wyoming Game Farm Review
Committee, “[pjroblems with this disease . . .justify banning the importation of non
domestic ungulates into Wyoming" (Lanka et al. 1990:34).

89

Chronic Wasting Disease/Mad Cow Disease

Another disease associated with game farming is Chronic Wasting Disease. Once
infected, animals waste away as the disease destroys the animal’s coordination, leaving it
unable to stand (Carrel 1998). “The disease is one member of a family of rare and
mysterious brain illnesses called TSE that kill by eating microscopic holes in the brains of
their victims” (Carrel 1998; 1).

There is currently no way to test for Chronic Wasting

Disease in wildlife; rather, its occurrence must be demonstrated post-mortem (Lanka et al.
1990). Although captive herds seem to facilitate the spread of the disease (Thome pers.
com. as cited in Carrel 1998), "little is known about how Chronic Wasting Disease is
spread among deer and elk, let alone whether other species can be infected” (Carrel
1998:2).
Chronic Wasting Disease is similar to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE),
or Mad Cow Disease (Lanka et al. 1990, Jewett 1996b: 6), another form of the TSE
illness (Carrel 1998). Mad Cow Disease recently resulted in the decimation of British
domestic cattle herds and a greatly depressed beef industry (Jewett 1996b, Carrel 1998).
“The disease caused near panic in Britain since being linked by a government report there
to 10 fatal cases of brain disease in humans” (Jewett 1996b:6). Given the fact that Mad
Cow disease was transmitted to humans, many people are concerned about whether
Chronic Wasting Disease can be transmitted to humans. John Pape, a epidemiologist with
the Colorado Department of Health, states that although the evidence suggests that
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Chronic Wasting Disease is not transmittable to humans, nobody really knows (Carrel
1998).
Recently, Chronic Wasting Disease has been identified in deer and elk in three
Western states: Colorado, Wyoming and South Dakota (Carrel 1998). “

[T]he disease

infects 5 percent of the deer and approximately 1 percent of the elk in northeastern
Colorado and southeastern Wyoming” (Carrel 1998:1). Although Chronic Wasting
Disease was first detected in Colorado game farms 31 years ago, the current rate of
infection seems to be excessively high (Carrel 1998).
In January of 1996, Chronic Wasting Disease was discovered on a game farm in
Saskatchewan, which had imported the infected elk from South Dakota (Jewett 1996b).
“This incident highlights ongoing problems associated with game farms and the
transportation of potentially infected animals across state and international boundaries in a
relaxed regulatory context” (Jewett 1996b:6). Although there are currently no reports of
Chronic Wasting Disease in Montana, “[t]he potential is out there that this disease could
find its way here” (Aune pers. com. as cited in Jewett 1996a: 13). According to Montana’s
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, Chronic Wasting Disease could have enormous
impacts on Montana’s elk herds (Aune pers. com. as cited in Jewett 1996a). “ What we
have to do is evaluate just how important is our elk resource to this state
com. as cited in Jewett 1996a: 13).

” (Aune pers.
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Meningeal Worm

The Meningeal Worm is a parasite found in the meningeal covering of the brain
of white-tailed deer, that causes fatal neurological disease in deer and other native
ruminants (Lanka et al. 1990, Richards 1995). The life cycle of the parasite is as follows
meningeal worm larvae are shed through the feces of their hosts, the larvae then develop
into their infective stage within a variety of snail and slug hosts, infected snails and slugs
are then inadvertently eaten by vertebrate hosts, the meningeal worm then travels to the
cranium where they mature (Lanka et al. 1990). Currently, the only way to detect
meningeal worm is in post-mortem tests (Samuel 1987 as cited in Lanka et al. 1990).
Attempts to detect the worm in feces have proven inadequate (Lankester and Haute as
cited in Lanka et al. 1990). In addition, there are no practical means to control this
disease, since intermediate hosts are widespread and there are no drugs available that kill
adult worms (Samuel and Gray 1988 as cited in Lanka et al. 1990).
Since several intermediate species inhabit the Rocky Mountain Region and there
are no definite tests for detecting meningeal worm, many are concerned about the
potential risks associated with this disease (Chamberlain and Jones 1929, Henderson 1924,
1936, Samuel 1987 as cited in Lanka et al. 1990). Alberta has currently banned the
importation of wild ungulates in fear that meningeal worm would be brought into the
province (Stevenson 1988 as cited in Lanka et al. 1990). Additionally, “Montana
currently discourages the importation of white-tailed deer from eastern states for fear of
importing meningeal worm” (R.H. Bird pers. com. 1990 as cited in Lanka et al. 1990.26).
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Although Montana has regulations in place to prevent the transmission of meningeal
worm, these regulations are insufficient because Montana does not test imported animals
for Meningeal Worm (Dr. Owen James pers. com. 1990 as cited in Lanka et al. 1990).
This presents a major problem because eastern white-tailed deer are often brought to
intermediate sale areas in states such as South Dakota (R.H. Bird pers. com. 1990 as cited
in Lanka et al. 1990). In turn, it is strongly suspected that Meningeal Worm is present in
some game farms holding imported white tailed deer (R.H. Bird pers. com. 1990 as cited
in Lanka et al. 1990).

Johne’s Disease

Johne’s Disease is caused by a slow-growing, highly resistant bacteria, M.
paratuberculosis, and it is “probably as important to the livestock industry as is
tuberculosis” (Thome et al. 1982 as cited in Lanka et al. 1990:39). The disease is spread
through infected feces, inadvertently consumed by ruminants (Thoen and Johnson 1981 as
cited in Lanka et al. 1990). The organism may persist in the environment for several
months (Thoen and Johnson 1981, Thome et al. 1982. Chiodini and Van Kruiningen 1983
as cited in Lanka et al. 1990). Once contracted, this disease causes enteritis in domestic
livestock and wild ruminants (Thoen and Johnson 1981, Thorne et al. 1982 as cited in
Lanka et al. 1990).
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“Like tuberculosis, Johne’s Disease is very difficult to confirm, and is virtually
impossible to eradicate or control” (Thoen and Johnson 1981 as cited in Lanka et al.
1990:39). Although Johne’s Disease is mostly transmitted in captive settings, it does
appear that wild populations are capable of dispersing and maintaining these bacteria for
years (Lanka et al. 1990). It is therefore possible that free-ranging ruminants may serve as
a reservoir for the disease (Lanka et al. 1990). “Once established, it is virtually impossible
to eliminate this disease because of the persistence of the organism and the potential for
contamination of large areas (Thoen and Johnson 1981 as cited in Lanka et al. 1990 .41).

The effects of hybridization and competition

Although game farmers must adhere to fencing regulations, some states and
provinces have banned the importation of all exotic species because of game farm escapes
[figures 16,17 and 18], If farmed exotics are able to interact with native populations,
hybridization, and subsequent genetic deterioration of wild stocks, and habitat competition
pose causes for concern [figures 19 and 20], Consequently, “[sjcientists and resource
managers have long recommended that no exotics be introduced until adequate study is
made of the potential impacts (Craighead and Darsmann 1966, Bohl 1968, Bump 1968,
Zeedyk 1980, Rangel-Woodyard and Simpson 1980. Dickinson and Simpson 1980,
Barrett 1980, White 1986 as cited in Lanka et al. 1990:46). Members of the Wyoming
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game farm review committee highlight the fact that few evaluations have been completed
regarding the impacts of exotic species on habitats and native wildlife populations.
Figure 16: Fencing Stipulations and Incidents of Escape (Lanka et al. 1990)
FENCING
STIPULATIONS

ESCAPES
FROM ENCLOSURES

METHODS
OF ESCAPE

HUNTED
WHEN ESCAPED

Arizona

No specific
requirements

Unxnom

Unknown

Unknown

C alifo rn ia

Yes

Yes

No

Colorado

Yes

Yes

Montana

Yes

Yes

Nebraska
Nevada

No
No

Unknown

Poor fence maintenance
Fence height inadequate
Poor fence maintenance
Flood destroyed fences
Vandalism
Poor fence maintenance
Weather event
Vandalism
Unknown

Unknown

Yes

Poor fence maintenance

Unknown

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Poor fence management
Flood; tree across fence
Vandalism
Swimming
Turned loose

No

Oregon

Yes

Yes

South Dakota
Texas

No
No

No
Yes

STATE

New Mexico
North Dakota

Crawled over fence
Inadequate fencing
Unknown
Poor fence maintenance
Poor fence building

Yes

No

No

Unknown
Unknown
Yes and No

Weather events
Jumped over fence
Washington

No

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Alberta

Yes

Yes

Destroyed fence

No

Jumped over fence
Weather event-wind
B r it. Columbia

Yes

Yes

Weather events

No

Problems with gates
Manitoba

No Regs

Yes

Animals went through fence
Unknown

No

Saskatchewan

Yes

Yes

Crawled under fence

No

Elk destroyed fence
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Figure 17: The Regulation of Exotic Species in Western States and Provinces
(Lanka et al. 1990)

STATE

PtIVATE OUNERSHIP OF
NATIVE WILDLIFE LEGAL

PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
OF EXOTICS LEGAL

LEGAL
DESIGNATION

REGUUTING
AGENCY

Arizona

Tes

Yes

W ildlife

S ta te W ildlife Agency

Cal ifo m ia

NO

Yes

W ildlife

S ta te W ildlife Agency

Colorado

Tea

Yes

Captive
W ildlife

S ta te W ildlife Agency

Montana

Tea

Yes

Livestock and
W ildlife

S ta te Livestock Board
and W ildlife Agency

Nebraska

Yes

Yes

Livestock

No Regulations

Nevada

Yes

Yes

Exotic W ildlife

S ta te W ildlife Agency

New Mexico

Yes

Yes

WiIdlife-Came
Animals

S tate W ildlife Agency

North Dakota

Yes

Yes

W ildlife

S ta te Livestock Board
and W ildlife Agency

Oregon

Yes

Yes

Non-indigenous
species

S ta te A gricultural species
Dept.

South Dakota

Yes

Yes

Livestock

S ta te Livestock Board

Texas

Yes

Yes

Livestock

S tate Livestock and
Animal Health Board

Utah

No

No

Zoological
Animals

S tate W ildlife Agency
S ta te Dept, of
A griculture
S ta te Dept, of Health

Washington

Yes

Yes

Not C lassified

Neither

A lberta
Yes
B r it. Colunbia Yes

No
Yes-Bovids
No - Cervida

Fish & W ildlife Div.
W ildlife Agency

Manitoba
Saskatchewan

Yes
Yea

Exotic
Bovids-Not
w ildlife
Carvids-wiIdlife
Hot C lassified
Livestock-Came

Yes
Yes

No Regulations
Dept. Food and Ag
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Figure 18: Genetic Testing Requirements for Elk and Red Deer in Western
North America (Lanka 1993)

JURISDICTION

Pre-Import
Tests

Alberta
British Columbia
Arizona
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
New Mexico
Oregon
Utah
Washington
Wyoming

YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
YES

Import Red
Deer or Hybrids

Test Animals
In-State

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO

Figure 19: Branches of the Family Cervidae that can Hybridize (Renecker 1993b)

RED DEER

ELK
ASIAN
WAPITI

PERE DAVIDS
DEER
RUSA
SAMBAR
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Figure 20: Management Costs and Control of Exotics (Lanka et al. 1990)

UNO PAYS COST
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IS CONTROL

METHOD Of
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RECAPTURE

11KELT

CONTROLLED IT STATE

SUCCESSfUL

CONTRa

CONTROL

COOPTO

A rizo n a
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No

Yes

Yes

H unting
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Unknorar
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Yes

Yes

unknown

Dart g t n I

unknown

Yes
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h u n tin g
C olorado
Montana

Chafer ( c o u r t

N e l ic o p t e r tim e

H ig h ly

c a s e p en d in g )

manpower

m tik e ly

OuDer

IWtnoMi

G e n e r a lly n o t

Yes

No

H in tin g

IRrknown

Yes

Yes

Not on

N m tin g

Uhknour

Yes

P u b lic

Break Even

Yes

r e co r d
Nebraska

Unkno*ai

UNuioiai

Depends o f lo c a 

Yes

Yes

his^ting

t i o n and t e r r a i n
Nevada

Ho p o l i c y

Unkno»ei

Very s lim

Yes

No

H urting

unknown

Unknown

New M exico

Owner (n o t

Unknotfi

Not l i k e l y

Yes

No

H urting

Man d a y s;

Unknorar

s e t in law)

» 2 ,5 0 0 p er
animal t o
hurt aouded
from h e l ic o p t e r

North D akota

No p o l i c y

Sa.059.80

U s u a lly n o t

Not a d d r e ssed

N/A

N/A

Unknowr

V a r ie s

Oregon

No la w /r e g s

N/A

No

Yes

No

P u b lic

No c o s t

No

h u r tin g ,
some
r e c a p tu r e s
South Dakota

Okner

Unknowi

Depends on

Yes

N/A

H urting

unknown

Unknoiar

No

N/A

Dart g ur

None

Yes

s it u a t io n
Texas

Oa>er

Ur*no»ai

U n lik e ly

Net gun
Utah

Owner

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

W ashington

N o th in g in

N/A

No e x p e r ie n c e

No p o l ic y

No p o l i c y No p o lI c y

Manpower &

Unknoiar

A lb e r ta

Owier

UnknoMi

L ik e ly

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

B r i t . C o lu d )ia 0»aier

Unknown

Depends on

Yes

No

P v b lic

Unknown

Yes

M anitoba

Oiater

Unknown

No e x p .

None

No ex p .

No e x p .

No e x p .

No e x p .

Saskatchew an

W i ld l if e

Unknown

UrknoMi

No

Only w ild

Unknown

Unknown

Unknoiar

N/A

r e g u la t io n s

equipm ent

s p e c ie s

a g en cy

h u r tin g

h orses

European red deer is the counterpart to North American elk. According to
Dave Majors of the Montana Wildlife Federation (1994:3), “[sjeveral game farm operators
intentionally cross-breed red deer and elk to produce an animal with ‘hybrid vigor’; which
are cheaper, gentler, and more adaptable to diet than pure elk.” However, captive
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populations of animals often become inbred over subsequent generations (Benirschke
1985, Schreiber and Matem 1989 as cited in Lanka et al., 1990). In turn, those animals
are more likely to carry deleterious genes, which may influence the success of the
hybridized populations established in the wild (Benirscke 1985, Schreiber and Matem
1989, Stowe and Schribner 1989 as cited in Lanka et al., 1990). Although the technology
to detect the presence of red deer genes exists, the test is “most reliable in first generation
offspring of a cross. . . .The test becomes increasingly less reliable with each succeeding
crossbred generation” (Majors 1994:3).
With regard to farmed exotic species, many wildlife managers are concerned
about the possible genetic deterioration of native populations. According to a computer
model developed at the Wildlife Division of the Colorado Fish and Game, if 10 red deer
were introduced into a heard of 500 wild elk, 95 percent of these elk would be genetically
altered (Anonymous 1994a). "Biologists readily acknowledge that such crossbreeding
could forever alter wild elk populations.

[T]he herd would be mongrels, they wouldn’t

be elk anymore” (Anonymous 1994a: 16). According to Challies (1985 as cited in Lanka
et al. 1990), red deer and elk crosses have resulted in the reduction of a proportion of
New Zealand’s elk population . Within Montana, genetic tests of Avon area elk
conducted during the fall of 1993 revealed two elk cross breeds, and a likely hybrid
(Anonymous 1994a). Additionally, exotic European red deer escaped from a game farm
in 1994 and crossbred with Montana’s pure elk herd (Anonymous 1994a). Fortunately,
this situation was controlled. However, Rich Clough, the Region 2 supervisor of the
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Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, believes that there may come a time
when cross-breeding spreads beyond anyone’s control (Anonymous 1994a).
With regard to habitat competition, introduced exotic species often utilize the
same habitat niches as native populations. In turn, “[ijntroduced exotic animals may
compete with native wildlife and livestock for forage, water and other habitat
components" (White 1986 as cited in Lanka et al., 1990:45). Secondly, exotic species are
generally adaptable to different habitat conditions (Mann and Putman 1989a, 1989b;
Mungall 1978, Smith 1977 as cited in Lanka et al., 1990). According to Hoffman,
“[rjuminants can adapt to changes in diet by changes in their stomach morphology"
(Hoffman 1985 as cited in Lanka et al., 1990:49). As a result, exotic species that utilize
the same habitat as native wildlife populations also increase competition. Finally, in
addition to dietary competition, exotics, which have higher reproductive capacity than
native wildlife, will exert habitat pressure (Lanka et al., 1990). According to Short and
Harrington, red deer and elk hybrids calve earlier and may be more resistant to disease
(Short 1985, Harrington 1985 as cited in Lanka et al., 1990). Herb Johnson (1994:3), a
Montana Wildlife Federation board member, believes that “[ejxotic species in feral
situations often out-compete native animals for forage and breeding rights”. Members of
the Wyoming game farm review committee liken the introduction of exotics to the
opening of Pandora’s box (Lanka et al. 1990).
According to the Montana Wildlife Federation’s Vice President, Joe Gutkoski
(1994:14), “[e] scape of game farm animals is inevitable. They will establish feral

populations in the wild that will require large amounts of money to control them.” As
previously stated, a good portion of the costs are borne by state wildlife agencies. Finally,
our current native wildlife has co-evolved with the terrain, vegetation, water and climate
over a period of several thousand years (Lanka et al., 1990, Gutkoski 1994). The
introduction of exotic ungulates has the potential to disrupt the balance that supports our
native wildlife (Lanka et al., 1990, Gutkoski 1994).

Wildlife Habitat Fragmentation

Approximately 80 percent of U.S. wildlife (excluding Alaska) depend upon
unprotected, private, agricultural land for their survival (Henderson and O’Herren 1992).
In 1985, nearly one-third of the nation’s 679,000 commercial family-run farms with annual
sales of $50,000 to $500,000 had significant financial problems (USDA 1985 as cited in
Guynn & Steinbach 1987). Given such economic hardships, many commercial family-run
farms are being forced to look to real estate markets in an effort to fray indebtedness. In
Montana alone, the area in suburban tracts increased from 36,501 acres in 1963 to
289,876 acres in 1973, a 790 percent increase (Henderson and O’Herren 1992). By 1980,
48 percent of prime farmland and 33 percent of farmland of statewide importance has been
subdivided into 20 acre lots (Missoula County Subdivision Inventory Report 1980 as cited
in Mailboroda 1993). According to Oliver (1996), in 1996 less than half of private non
corporate acreage in Missoula County was in parcels greater than 80 acres.
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Loss of habitat, which often results in both an overall decrease in the amount of
habitat and discontinuity in the distribution of the remaining habitat, is probably the most
important cause of species extinction in recent times (Akcakaya et al. 1997), One of the
arguments for game farms is the fact that it allows for economic diversification within
traditional agricultural systems and, therefore, enables landowners to avoid having to sell
their property to developers. However, one must recognize that an eight-foot game-proof
fence, which keeps animals from critical habitat, is as damaging to some migrating wildlife
populations as a subdivision (Kahn 1993). “In some ways they [habitat loss from gameproof fences] may be more severs because such habitats are totally lost to native ungulate
use” (Kahn 1993:500). For instance, “[a]n impassable wove wire fence kept antelope from
reaching traditional winter range . . . during the winter of 1983-1984 Winter mortality in
this herd was estimated between 3000-5300 antelope” (Moody 1983 as cited in Lanka et
al. 1990:80). Additionally, habitat fragmentation can increase the susceptibility of certain
wildlife populations to hunting pressure (Akcakaya et al. 1997).

Wildlife Poaching and Theft

As previously mentioned, one of the public costs associated with game farms is
the loss of public wildlife as a result of increased poaching and theft. Valerius Geist, a
leader of the game farm opposition movement, believes that placing a monetary value on
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dead wildlife and wildlife parts will jeopardize wildlife conservation (Geist 1988). “Any
time you have private enterprise involved in commercialization of wildlife you create the
infrastructure for laundering poached wildlife and a legalized setting for moving wildlife"
(Terry Grosz pers. com. as cited in Lanka et al. 1990 72-73). Increased poaching of
wildlife whose parts are sold commercially has been evidenced in a number of wildlife
species. Additionally, “[t]he demand for velvet antlers resulted in poachers entering
national elk refuges, parks, and forests to kill elk in early summer for the antlers only”
(Clawson no date as cited in Lanka et al. 1990 73).
In response to Geist's arguments, economists would argue that the creation of
legalized markets for privately owned wildlife products may actually decrease wildlife
poaching. According to economic theory, people respond to incentives. "Consumer
demand for a wild species commodity affects both the price received for the product and
the quantity and quality of the product harvested" (Freese 1998 48). Based on a simple
supply and demand curve, prices increase when the demand for a particular product is
greater than the supply. Thus, in the absence of legalized markets, high prices resulting
from an unmet demand will increase the incentive to poach. Through the establishment of
legalized markets, the supply of a particular wildlife product is able to meet - or exceed the demand. In turn, prices fall and the incentive to poach is diminished.
In addition to price-based incentives, various property right regimes also effect
the incentive structure surrounding the trade in wildlife products. According to Freese
(1998), the private ownership of natural resource creates incentives for people to act for

1Ü3
the common good. Steven Landsburg (1993) argues that the situation regarding the over
harvest of elephant ivory was simply the result of the fact that no one owned the
elephants. "The demand for beef is far greater than the demand for ivory, but cattle are
not threatened with extinction. The key to the difference is that the cattle are owned"
(Landsburg 1993:81). Recent experience in Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe and South
Africa, has demonstrated that property rights can be an effective means of preserving
resources (Freese 1998, Richardson 1994). "Giving local people an economic interest in
the survival of elephants (as opposed to an interest simply in harvesting illegal ivory) might
better, and more cheaply, preserve herds than outright prohibitions on killing" (Richardson
1994-4).
Although the creation of legalized markets for privately owned wildlife products
may decrease the incentive for poaching, it may also result in an increased amount of
wildlife theft from native populations. For instance, in May 1994, Kenneth Killom, the
proprietor of the Big Bull Elk game farm near White Sulphur Springs, Montana, was cited
for falsification of government documents and theft of wild game (Jewett 1996a).
According to an article \n Montana Wildlife, “[h]e [Killom] had doctored required
paperwork to create a phantom herd of elk, and then stole wild elk to get his game farm
numbers up to the size he was reporting” (Jewett 1996a: 13). Another case of wildlife
theft was settled in 1997, when “[o]ne of the most notorious game farms in Montana was .
. ordered by the courts to shut down its operation” (Anonymous 1997:6). Welch Brogan
has operated his game farm in Corwin Springs, Montana since 1946, and has often been
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called the grandfather of the state game farm industry (Anonymous 1997) Recently, the
Montana Supreme Court revoked Brogan’s game farm license because the Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks had discovered that he stole wild elk and placed
them within his game farm enclosure (Anonymous 1997). According to an article in
Montana Wildlife, “[h]is [Brogan’s] outright thievery of publicly owned wild animals
makes him a dubious model for an industry with a sad track record” (Anonymous 1997.6).
Given that this type of wildlife theft is already a concern, it seems logical that in the
absence of an increase in enforcement the amount of theft will increase as the numbers of
operating elk farms increase.

CHAPTER 10

SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS

Hunting Ethics and Traditional Public Hunting

As previously mentioned, game farm owners often market guaranteed trophy hunting
opportunities. Although such activities often result in a substantial income for game farm
owners, many hunters feel that this type of hunting is unethical and sets the stage for
increased public opposition to the tradition of hunting. “In 1989, approximately 16
million hunters or 7 percent of Americans bought hunting licenses to take part in what is
now considered a right of citizenship in this country” (Satchell 1990 as cited in Lanka et
al. 1990; 61). According to a 1980 survey of hunters. 43 percent hunted primarily for
meat, 37 percent hunted for sport and recreation, 11 percent hunted to be close to nature,
and 9 percent hunted to be with family and friends (Kellert 1980 as cited in Lanka et al.
1990). This study also revealed that : 85 percent of the American public approves of
hunting for meat, while 62 percent disapprove of hunting game mammals for recreation
and sport and 80 percent disapprove of trophy hunting (Kellert 1980 as cited in Lanka et
al. 1990). According to the members of Wyoming’s game farm review committee,
“[gjiven the declining interest in, and growing opposition to hunting, hunting practices
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which are detrimental to the image of hunters, and the fiiture use of harvest as a
management tool should be discouraged” (Lanka et al. 1990:64).
With regard to hunting ethics, many hunters find the act of hunting within a
closed area “extremely repulsive” (Majors 1994:2). The Boone and Crockett club,
founded in 1887, requires that hunters sign a fair chase statement in order to qualify a
trophy (Lanka et al. 1990). The statement is as follows: “To make use of the following
methods shall be deemed as unfair chase and unsportsmanlike, and any trophy obtained by
use of such means is disqualified from entry hunting game confined by artificial barriers,
including escape-proof fencing; or hunting game transplanted solely for the purpose of
commercial shooting” (Lanka et al. 1990:63). Private fee hunting within enclosed game
farms does not allow for a fair chase; rather, “...this is about as sporting as driving into a
livestock feed lot and shooting a steer” (Majors 1994:2). According to Hal Herring
(1997 4), a writer for High Countiy News, “[tjhis is trophy hunting 1990s style: safe, fast
and expensive.”
An article \N\t\àn Montana Wildlife describes one Montana Elk rancher’s hunting
operation as, “...a matter of taking the client out to a pasture in his pickup and allowing
the client to shoot whichever bull he chooses” (Majors 1994:2). Earl Butler, a one-time
foreman at the Big Velvet Ranch in Darby, Montana, left the ranch because, “[he] is a
hunter, and what they do up there is not a hunt” (Herring 1997:4).
“Butler tells of guiding one ranch client who refused to leave the cab of a
ranch pickup until the elk he wanted to shoot was driven on the road at close
range. Another client shot a bull elk in the lungs, but didn’t kill it. For
reasons Butler has never understood, the man refused to kill the animal with
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a follow up shot. The elk staggered down a hillside to the ranch fence beside
a public road, where it stood before passers-by, blood spraying from its
nostrils with every breath for 20 minutes before collapsing” (Herring 1997 4).
Len Wallace, the proprietor of the Big Velvet Ranch, argues that private fee hunting
is no different from hunting anywhere else, since all animals are confined to some degree
by highways, cities and rivers (Herring 1997). However, many hunters and hunting
organizations do not agree with Wallace’s logic. In their opinion, game farm trophy
hunting operations are not only repulsive, but they also pose a threat to North America’s
tradition of public hunting (Gutkoski 1994). “In addition, this type of activity provides the
anti-hunter with material to use in their campaign to eliminate our opportunity to hunt”
(Majors 1994:2). Greg Tolleston, a writer for Xhs Missoulian, states that “we should not
hesitate to condemn this type of activity and distance ourselves from it” (Majors 1994:2).
According to di Montana Wildlife article, “[t]he spin-offs from problems related
to the [elk] industry have the potential to change the culture of Montana wildlife and
hunting as it has been for decades” (Anonymous 1994b: 15). Many hunters and hunting
organizations are not only concerned with the negative images associated with trophy
hunts on game farms, they are also concerned with disease. For instance, our country’s
public wildlife asset can easily be turned into a human health hazard by an outbreak of
tuberculosis (Gutkoski 1994). “Think of the scenario of the public hunter, not purchasing
a[n] elk or hunting permit because he is fearful of catching tuberculosis” (Gutkoski
1994 1). In 1989, hunters spent $517 million on self-imposed taxes (Satchell 1990 as
cited in Lanka et al. 1990), which are then used to finance wildlife research and
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management as well as habitat acquisition and improvement (Lanka et al. 1990), In turn,
game farms not only pose a threat to the tradition of public hunting in North America,
they also compromise the future of wildlife conservation and management

Animal Welfare Issues

A second cultural factor influencing the public context surrounding game farming
is that the velvet process, which is currently the primary economic market for farmed U.S.
elk, is considered inhumane by many animal welfare activists. “The hideous deantlering of
male animals in the velvet panders to our most basic instincts” (Gutkoski 1994 14).
Similarly, Valerius Geist questions why bestial cruelty to game farmed elk is endorsed in
order to fatten the profits of whorehouses in Seoul, Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Tokyo
(Williams 1998). In response to the claims made by animal welfare activists, many elk
farmers argue that velveting is no more inhumane than any of the other things people do to
livestock, since the bulls are thoroughly anesthetized (Williams 1998). However, animal
welfare activists state that the means employed to anesthetize these animals are ethically
questionable.
In order to prepare a bull for the deantlering process, he is led down a narrow
chute where hydraulic vices tighten around the bull's head and body (Herring 1997).
Since Asian buyers complain that drugs contaminate the velvet, electricity is used to
immobilize the animal (Herring 1997). Electrodes are attached to the bull’s lip and anus.
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and a current is directed through his body (Herring 1997). A tourniquet is then tied where
the antler meets the skull, and the antlers are amputated with a handsaw (Herring 1997).

Social Construction of Wild Elk
According to Lanka et. al. (1990), many Rocky Mountain residents claim that their
perception of the value of wildlife and the wild places that support them is often very
personal. “Wildlife is a way of life . . It permeates our thinking, coloring the way we
handle jobs, homes, and families” (Lanka et al. 1990:84). With regard to elk, many
Rocky Mountain residents have a strong social construction of elk as a symbol of
“wildness, freedom and intellect” (Anonymous 1994a: 15). In turn, they are opposed to
the images associated with farmed elk populations. “Networks of fenced pastures, filled
with penned wildlife, that were ffee-roaming only a generation ago, diminishes their
nobility ” (Gutkoski 1994:14). According to an article \n Montana Wildlife,
“[t]he animal is prized, revered, and respected because of its strength,
adaptability, but mostly because of its intellect. Montana’s herds are pure and
wild; wildlife enthusiasts view then animal in almost mythical terms. See an
elk, and excitement quickly gives way to silence, as the mere act of watching
this magnificent animal stirs one’s personal bridge to nature in ways unique to
outdoor experience. That’s why for many the penning of elk for commercial
purposes violates the sanctity of the animal’s being” (Anonymous 1994a: 15)

Given this highly emotional portrayal of wild elk herds, it is inevitable that communities of
place -and interest that identify with elk will oppose public policy outputs that result in the
denigration of this animal’s integrity.

CHAPTER 11

DISCUSSION

Based on a review of product information and market trends, the short-term
prospect for the elk industry seems very promising. Elk farming appears to constitute a
viable option, at least in the short-term, for ranchers and rural communities seeking to
diversify their economic base. Since breeding stock and velvet markets are currently
providing very high profit margins, the short-term prospects for the elk industry seem
very promising (Hudson & Burton 1993). Although both breeding stock and velvet
markets will eventually stabilize, hunting/tourism and venison currently represent
untapped U S. markets with a strong potential to yield high future profits. However, the
true test of economic viability will come when the numerous government subsidies that
are currently provided to the elk industry are removed. In addition, the future success of
this industry will likely be affected by public opinion regarding the ecological,
economic, and socio-cultural impacts associated with elk farming. Thus, when assessing
the long-term viability of the elk industry, the aforementioned impacts must be carefully
evaluated.
Although game farming provides a less intensive and more efficient means of
agriculture, it is evident that game farms pose a threat to native wildlife populations.
First, given the ineffectiveness of the testing technology available for disease control and
the close association between farmed and wild elk populations, many believe that game
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farms present an unduly high risk of disease development and transmission. When infected
farmed animals escape, they become a threat to the health of native wildlife populations,
as well as domestic livestock and humans. “Unfortunately, there are no sure means to
control or eradicate these diseases once they occur in an area. Many disease carmot be
effectively treated once the disease enters free-ranging wildlife" (Thome et al. 1982 as
cited in Lanka et al., 1990:25). According to the members of the Wyoming Game Farm
Review Committee, “[tjhe only way to protect wildlife is to be sure these diseases aren’t
brought into the state. Given the inefficiency of control, this is an unacceptable risk
(Samuel 1987 as cited in Lanka et al., 1990:25) to the state’s wildlife resources and
livestock herds” (Lanka et al, 1990: 24-25).
Wildlife supporters are also concerned with increased habitat fragmentation.
Even though economic diversification may spare large tracts of land from subdivision,
game farms contribute also to habitat fragmentation. First, game farms are required to
employ game proof fences. In turn, unlike traditional cattle ranches, game farms create a
barrier between native wildlife populations and critical habitat. Second, the success of
game farms is affected by market fluctuations. Therefore, the tract of land is only spared
as long as the elk products are economically favorable.
Finally, there is a concern regarding possible increases in levels of poaching/theft
as a result of game farms and the creation/reinforcement of wildlife markets. Valerius
Geist (1988:16 and 21), a leading opponent to the game farm industry feels that,
“[cjurrent efforts to legalize retail trade in wildlife . . will destroy the basic policies by
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which North America’s system of wildlife conservation operates.. The lack of legal
markets in game is probably responsible in North America for a fairly effective, cheap and
civil system of wildlife protection.” On the other hand, economists argue that the creation
of legalized markets for privately owned wildlife products will actually reduce the pressure
placed on wild stocks through the removal of incentives for poachers. However, the
reduction in wildlife poaching may be mediated by an increase in the numbers of live elk
that are stolen from native wildlife populations.
Although elk farming represents a viable short-term economic diversification
strategy for the private rancher, it can be argued that the majority of costs associated with
this industry are borne by the public. First, elk play a pivotal role in the culture and
economy of many Rocky Mountain communities. In turn, there is a strong opposition to
the game farm movement within the Rocky Mountain Region. Given the currently high
value of Rocky Mountain wildlife, many people are opposed to game farming. The
millions of dollars that wildlife contributes to Montana’s economy clearly indicates the
importance of maintaining free-ranging, native populations of wildlife not just for hunting,
but for the millions of people who visit Montana to view its wildlife. Additionally, “[sjport
hunting in the United States is a multi-million dollar business. . With sport hunting of
free-ranging wildlife, economic benefits are spread throughout the economy and less
concentrated in the hands of a few individuals” (Lanka et a! 1990:79-80). According to
Geist (1988), the commercialization and privatization of wildlife will reduce the public’s
interest in wildlife, because it will be concentrated in the hands of a wealthy minority for
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their exclusive use. Many wildlife enthusiasts and hunters are also concerned about the
threats to native populations and the divergence of wildlife allocated funds. Additionally,
most hunters are strictly opposed to private fee hunting, and are concerned about its use
by the anti-hunting movement. Finally, members of the animal welfare lobby, which was
responsible for the European ban on velvet, are waging a campaign against the U.S
industry

PART III
RESEARCH FINDINGS
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As previously stated, historical accounts of game farming extend into antiquity
According to the journals of early Canadian explorers, North American settlers quickly
recognized the favorable disposition of moose, and domesticated them for use as draft
animals (Moodie and Kay 1976, Syroechlovsky et al. 1989 as cited in Renecker 1993a).
In 1905, an extension pamphlet originating from the U.S. Biological Survey gave details
of wildlife husbandry (Haigh 1993). Although game farming has a long history within
North America, of game farms within the Rocky Mountain Region initially developed in
response to the near extinction of U.S. wildlife populations in the late 1800s. These game
farms were designed to raise wild or semi-domesticated animals for release (Brown et al.
1994). For instance, "[tjhe genetic roots of plains bison populations were largely derived
from 54 calves that were caught and raised by .

private individuals" (Renecker

1993a:18). According to Renecker (1993a: 19), “[tjhis historical event was of great
consequence in the conservation of the species and delivers a message about the role of
the farmer in wildlife management.”
Currently there are approximately 41,330 individual cervids that are
commercially raised in the U.S., with elk farming occurring in 16 states (Renecker 1993a).
Five states allow pure (not red deer or hybrid) elk farming, while seven permit game
farming under a grandfather clause (Renecker 1993a). Although estimates concerning the
actual number of captive elk within the U.S. vary, Renecker (1993a) believes that there
were 20,000 captive elk located on 500-700 game farms in 1992. Most elk stock on U.S.
game farms originated from surplus animals, which were translocated from Yellowstone
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National Park between the period of 1892-1967 (Rich 1993, Renecker 1993a). “For
instance, figures from 1966-1967 indicate that a total of 1538 wapiti [elk] went to Indian
bands, ranches and private citizens in several states" (Robbins et al. 1982 as cited in Haigh
1993:67).
Although there were a few laws and regulations in place prior to 1990, game
farming became a legally recognized industry in Montana in 1917, most governments only
began to look at the game farming industry since that time (Lanka 1993, Brown at al.
1994). One of the main debates surrounding the regulation of U S. game farms focuses on
which government agencies should handle the regulations.
"Part of the debate over jurisdiction over wild resources is simply a
question of turf. Wildlife agencies are protective of their territory and
there is a long-standing history of antagonism between departments of
agriculture and wildlife, nowhere more than in North America. Hence
the schism that occurs today on the subject of game ranching. Wildlife
agencies perceive the animals as captive wildlife, agriculturists view them
as alternative livestock.” (Haigh 1993:67).
Within the Rocky Mountain Region (both the U.S. and Canada), game farm regulatory
authorities vary. Wildlife agencies govern game farming in Wyoming, while agricultural
officials have sole jurisdiction over game farms in British Columbia; there is combined
jurisdiction in Alberta (mostly agriculture), Colorado, Idaho and Montana (Lanka 1993).
In addition to disparity between the states and provinces regarding the regulatory
authorities governing game farms, there are also concerns regarding the facility design,
importation and exportation regulations, and record keeping (Croonquist 1993). A survey
of 15 western states and four Canadian provinces found six recurrent concerns
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surrounding game farming: (1) escape, (2) transmission of disease, (3) hybridization, (4)
social and habitat competition, (5) costs of control and enforcement, and (6) potential
impacts on public hunting (Lanka et al. 1990). According to Lanka (1993), the current
trend in Rocky Mountain game farm regulation is to tighten management restrictions.
However, Lanka notes that ". . . the protection of the West’s irreplaceable wildlife
resources is only as secure as the regulations of the weakest state” (Lanka 1993 45). The
implications associated with the game farm industry are both regional and international;
thus, highlighting the importance of a comprehensive assessment of game farm
regulations. Such an assessment will not only provide insight into successfiil management
systems, but will also help identify areas of potential conflict, which may have a
tremendous impact on the future success of game farming as a regional and international
activity

CHAPTER 12

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF MONTANA GAME FARM POLICY [ELK]

Game farming became a legally recognized industry in 1917, by the 15^
Legislative Assembly of Montana (Brown et al 1994). Although attempts were made to
design regulations to govern this industry, they were vague and general in nature (Brown
et al. 1994). Session Law, Chapter 173, Section 84, 1917, made it lawful for any person
to engage in stocking, capturing, raising and owning any of the wild animals or birds of
the State of Montana in a privately owned or leased, and entirely enclosed, game
preserve. In order to operate such a business, the prospective game owner was required
to pay a $25 license fee to the State Fish and Game Commission, the governing agency
Once a preserve was established, a game owner was allowed to sell privately owned
game; however, a $5 fee was required for each sale of wild animals.* Section 85 of the
1917 Session Law also established penalties for misdemeanors and felonies under this
Act.
During the 16*** Legislative Assembly in 1919, existing game farm laws were
amended to strengthen monitoring practices and increase the accountability of game
farmers (Brown et al. 1994). Session Law, Chapter 200, Section 1, 1919, deemed it
lawful for any person(s), company, or association, upon payment of a $5 annual license

' The fee for the sale of wild birds was $1 00.
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fee, to engage in propagating, owning and controlling wild game birds and game animals
of the State of Montana. In addition, a prospective game farm owner was required to file
an application with the State Fish and Game Commission stating the location of the farm
and the game species proposed to be raised. Under the 1919 Session Law, capture
permits limiting the number of game birds or quadrupeds obtained for founding stock
were also established. Another amendment to the 1917 Session Law stated that game
breeders could sell, transfer or dispose of privately owned game without restriction.
However, in order to prevent the short-term over-exploitation of wildlife commons under
the guise of game farming, a game owner could not sell any quadruped of the product of
such game farm for a period of three (3) years (Brown et al. 1994). Finally, an annual
report of such game business was required.
During the 1921 and 1923 Legislative Assemblies, game farm statutes were not
amended. Session Law, Chapter 173, Section 84, 1917, as amended by Session Law,
Chapter 200, Section 1, 1919, was included in the 1921 version of the Revised Codes of
Montana (RCM) (RCM 276-3777). Similarly, Session Law, Chapter 173, Section 85,
1917, which was not amended during the 1919 Assembly, was included in the 1921 RCM
(RCM 276-3778).
Game farm legislation was revisited during the lO*** Legislative Assembly in 1925,
and was amended in several ways. The first amendment under Session Law, Chapter 192,
Section 31, 1925 made it lawful to also propagate, own and control fur-bearing animals.
Although fur farm operators were held to the same regulations as game farmers, certain
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fur-bearing animals, which were captured as foundation stock, were subject to the same
tax as their pellets. A second amendment under the 1925 Session Law required that a
game or fur farm applicant show that the proposed location was fenced. This change was
initiated in an effort to prevent the intermingling of wild and privately owned animals.
Thirdly, the three year waiting period that was required prior to the sale of captive animals
was revoked. However, a game or fur farm operator was required to report each sale to
the State Game Warden, in addition to the submission of an annual business report.
Finally, Session Law, Chapter 192, Section 31, 1925 established penalties for trespassing
within a permitted, enclosed game or fur farm.
Between the period of 1925-1933, three Legislative Assembly sessions were
conducted; however, game and fur farm legislation was not substantially amended. During
the 23^“* Legislative Assembly, 1933, the 1925 Session Law was amended in one area.
Session Law, Chapter 73, Section 1, 1933 revoked the $5 annual license fee. Game and
fur farm regulation was not further amended during the 1935 Legislative Assembly, and is
incorporated in the 1935 RCM (RCM 308-3777 and 3778).
The 1935 RCM was not further amended until the 30* Legislative Assembly in
1947. Session Law, Chapter 120, Section 1, 1947 was drafted in an attempt to rectify
problems associated with previously vague regulations, and the lack of a specific mandate
stating the enforcement responsibilities of the State Fish and Game Commission (Brown et
al. 1994). First, any person(s), firm, company or corporation was required to procure a
State game or fur farm permit before engaging in the business of operating such a farm.

Additionally, Session law. Chapter 120, Section 1, 1947 noted that only responsible
parties who fenced their farms with State Fish and Game Warden approved fencing
material would be issued operating permits. The 1947 Session Law also opened game and
fur farms to complete inspection by the State, and stated that game and fur farm permits
would be renewed if an annual report was filed by January 31 documenting the number
and species of animals on hand prior to January 1, on January 1, and the number and
species of animals pelted, bought or sold during the year

Finally, Session Law, Chapter

120, Section 1, 1947 classified trespass violations as misdemeanors.
Following the 1947 RCM, game farm legislation remained unchanged until 20
years later, during the 40“’ Legislative Assembly, 1967. The 1967 Session Law, and the
subsequent RCM (RCM 26-1201—originally RCM 3777)", excluded migratory game
birds from private ownership, propagation, or control. In addition. Session Law, Chapter
43, Section 1, 1967 required that the skins, pelts or products of beaver and marten were
tagged. These tags cost five (5) cents each, and were purchased from the State Fish and
Game Commission.
The 1947 RCM was further amended in 1969 and 1971. Session Law, Chapter
130, Section 1, 1969 defined roadside menageries and zoos, and required that they were
controlled and regulated by the State Fish and Game Commission. This section also
outlined the regulations that governed such operations. Session Law, Chapter 78, Section

" The RCM, which was published during this time period, is classified as the 1947
RCM. However, the 1947 RCM was published in volumes over a period of time; in turn,
the 1967 amendments are included in the final version of the 1947 RCM.
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1 also amended the 1947 RCM in 1971 This section excluded buffalo from other game
animals, which were governed under the 1947 RCM (RCM 26-1201--originally RCM
3777). Section 26-1201 of the 1947 RCM was also amended in 1977 However, these
amendments functioned to clarify existing definitions within the legislation; substantive
changes were not made during the 45“*Legislative Assembly. These amendments were
incorporated into the 1947 RCM as the 1977 supplement (RCM 26-1201). During the
46**’ Legislative Assembly in 1979, the State Fish and Game director was renamed as the
State Fish, Wildlife and Parks director. This change was also incorporated into the 1979
RCM (RCM 87-4-403).
A great deal of controversy began to surround game farming in the early 1970s
as public opinion regarding this industry became increasingly polarized (House Fish and
Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 4, 1983). The most controversial issues were: (1)
game farm escapes and the subsequent transmission of disease transmission to native
wildlife populations, domestic livestock, and humans, (2) the fragmentation of native
wildlife habitat as a result of game farm fences, and (3) the moral and ethical issues
surrounding the ownership of wild animals (Brown et al. 1994). This controversy
culminated in a lawsuit between the Department of Fish and Game and the Big Horn
Game Ranch in 1977 (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 4, 1983).
As a result of increasing problems with the game farm industry, a very
controversial bill was introduced during the 47“*Legislative Assembly. According to Ed
Smith, a member and chairman of the Senate Fish and Game Committee in 1981, “[t]his
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ended up in a free-for-all between the Fish, Wildlife and Parks and the game farm
operators. After hours and even days of deliberation, our committee could see there was
no way of resolving their differences. What we did was table the bill and directed the Fish,
Wildlife and Parks Department, the game farm operators, and the Department of
Livestock to get together, work out the differences, and come back to the 1983 session
with a bill” (Senate Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 7, 1991 1). Thus, the
charge of the game farm task force was to develop legislation that clarified game farm
regulations and assigned agency jurisdiction (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes,
Exhibit 4, 1983).
Based on the recommendations provided by the Game Farm Task Force, Senate
Bill 448 was formed and introduced into the 48* Legislative Assembly by Senators Lane,
Towe, E. Smith, Boylan, Christien, Fuller, Galt and Mazurek. Senate Bill 448 repealed
existing game farm law (M C A. 87-4-401 through 87-4-405) and established a new
framework for game farm regulation within Montana.

Under SB 448, the following

animals could be privately owned: caribou, bear^'’, mountain lion, white-tailed deer, mule
deer, elk, moose, antelope, mountain sheep or mountain goat or any other cloven-hoofed
ungulate as classified by the Department of Fish and Game*'*. In order to obtain a game

Senate Bill 448 also addressed game bird and fur farms.
This was amended to read 'black bear' in 1985 (SB 371).
*'* Senate Bill 448, section 3, states that the Department of Fish and Game has
primary jurisdiction over game farms; however, game farm licensees must also comply
with Department of Livestock regulation, which address disease concerns (Senate Fish
and Game Committee Minutes 1983).
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farm license, a potential operator was required to submit an application providing a legal
description of the land'\ the species of animals to be raised, the source of the foundation
stock*^, a description of fencing plans, and information demonstrating that the applicant is
responsible (SB 448 1983). Upon receipt of an application, a representative from the Fish
and Game Department was to inspect the premise and, if acceptable, issue a nontransferable license for an initial fee of $100*’ (SB 448 1983).
Once a game farm license was granted, an operator was required to attempt the
removal all wild animals from the premise at his/her expense (SB 448 1983). If the
operator was unable to remove all of the wild animals, a Fish and Game representative
attempted to either trap the animals or scheduled a public hunt on the premise (SB 448
1983).** If these attempts were also unsuccessful, any remaining animals became property
of the game farm operator (SB 448 1983). Once an animal was considered private
property, "[t]he licensee [could] acquire, breed, grow, keep, pursue, capture, kill, use, sell
or dispose of the game farm animals and their progeny in any quantity, at any time of the
year, and in any manner, as long as he [she] [complied with the requirements.

" (SB 448

*■ According to SB 448, the premises must be owned or leased by the operator.
*^ Under SB 448, the capture of public wildlife for use on a game farm is
prohibited; therefore, foundation stock must be purchased from other game farms.
17

The annual renewal fee was $25 (SB 448 1983). These fees were to be placed
in a fund reserved for the costs associated with game farm regulation (SB 448 1983).
18

The administrative costs associated with the public hunt are borne by the
operator (SB 448 1983).
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1983 6)/^ Although hunting was allowed on game farms, the licensee was required obtain
a game farm shooting permit and a tag ($ 15/tag) from the Department of Fish and Game;
however, game farm hunts were not required to comply with the normal Fish and Game
license (SB 448 1983). With regard to game farm escapes, a licensee was to notify the
Fish and Game Department immediately and make every reasonable effort to recapture the
animal (SB 448 1983). "If the escaped animal cannot be recaptured within a reasonable
time, it becomes property of the state" (SB 448 1983 9).
Since the game farm task force created SB 448, the bill was widely supported within
the Senate Fish and Game Committee Hearing (Senate Fish and Game Committee Minutes
1983). The only concerns that were raised dealt with specific language within the bill, but
not the overall intent of SB 448. Thus, SB 448 unanimously passed the Senate with the
stipulations that amendments would be drafted. The amended version of SB 448 passed
the House Fish and Game Committee with 13 'yes' votes and was incorporated into the
1983 M C A (87-4-406 through 87-4-423).
In 1991, Montana’s game farm industry was rapidly expanding. In turn. House Bill
556 (HB 556) was introduced into the 52"** Legislative Assembly (1991). Missoula
Representative Bob Ream, who sponsored HB 556, classified game farming as an industry
in need of control. He felt that neither the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks nor the
Department of Livestock had a good handle on this industry. According to Ream, HB

However, records must be kept for the transportation of live animals or the
disposal of dead animals (SB 448 1983). These figures must be included in an annual
report, and the actual records must be maintained for three years (SB 448 1983).
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556 was developed in order to help stop illegal trade in wildlife, the transmission of
disease, and the problems associated with the introduction of exotic species. In order to
accomplish these goals, HB 556 revised existing game farm statutes (1989 MCA 87-4-401
through 423) in the following manner (1) restricted the importation of certain species of
game farm animals; (2) revised the law regarding game farms and game farm animals,
including the identification, transportation, and inspection of game farm animals and
reports required of game farm licensees; (3) increased penalties for violations; and (4)
required individual importation permits and health certificates for game farm purposes.
In total, 12 visitors^** provided testimony in support of HB 556 during the 1991
House Fish and Game Committee Hearing, while 1 visitor^* provided testimony stating
that he was opposed to HB 556. In addition, thirty-three visitors^^ attended the committee

^°Those visitors who provided testimony in support of HB 556 were: one (I)
representative from the Department of Livestock, one (1) representative from the
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, three (3) game farmers, one (1) representative
from the Montana Elk Breeders Association, one (I) representative from the Montana
Audubon Legislative Fund, one (1) representative from the Montana Wildlife Federation,
one (1) representative from the Montana Chapter of North American Elk, one (I) National
Geographic author/researcher, and two (2) unknown.
Garth Isbell, a game farm operator
The 33 visitors present represented the following interests: 12 game farm
owners, one (1) member of the executive board of directors of the North American Elk
Breeder Association, one (I) representative from Montana Elk Breeders Association, one
(2) representatives from the Montana Chapter of North American Elk Growers, one (I)
representative from a cattle company, one (1) representative from the Montana Wildlife
Federation, one (1) representative from the Sun River game park, one (I) representative
from the Montana Retail Association, one (I) representative from Montana Fish, Wildlife
and Parks, one (1) representative from the Department of Livestock, one (I)
representative from the Montana Audubon Legislative Fund, one (1) representative from
the media, and nine (9) who did not identify their aflSliation.
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hearing on HB 556.^^ Of these 33 visitors, 23 supported HB 556, three (3) were
undecided, six (6) were unaccounted for, and one (1) was opposed to HB 556 because he
felt that it paralleled existing laws.
Pat Graham, Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, was one of the people who
presented testimony to the House Fish and Game Committee supporting HB 556.
According to Graham, 1991 game farm statutes could not adequately handle the growing
interest in game farming (traditional and exotic species) in Montana and other western
states and provinces. Graham outlined the primary concerns with the game farm industry
as follows; (1) interbreeding between exotic animals and native wildlife, which could have
irreversible effects on Montana’s native wildlife; (2) competition between exotics and
native species for limited wildlife habitat; (3) disease transmission between game farm
animals and native wildlife and livestock; and (4) the illegal capture, transportation,
breeding and sale of highly valued wildlife, such as elk.^"* In his opinion, “[t]he provisions
of HB 556 provided significant improvements to safeguard Montana’s native wildlife”
(House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 11, 1991). Individual identification,
as required under HB 556, would not only help if game farm animals mixed with native

All of the visitors did not provide testimony, most signed a checklist stating
whether they supported or opposed HB 556.
According to Pat Graham (FW&P), there are cases on record regarding the
illegal capture of wild elk dating back to the 1970s (House Fish and Game Committee
Minutes, 1993).
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wildlife, but would also help prevent the illegal capture of elk.^^ In addition, HB 556
required a quarantine period for diseased game farm animals, in order to alleviate the
threat of disease transmission. Finally, HB 556 clarified that criminal and civil statutes
may be assessed in addition to, or instead of, revoking a license. The 1989 MCA provided
only for the revocation of a license for failure to operate a game farm according to law,
which had proven to be a problem in the prosecution of some violations (House Fish and
Game Committee Minutes 1991).
Constance J Poten, who researched the illegal trade in wildlife in America for
National Geographic also presented testimony in support of HB 556. According to Poten,
"

it’s become clear that the elk farm industry is by far the most lucrative of businesses

that exploit wildlife parts, and that a significant reason for the tremendous profit margin is
the illegal capture and transport of wild elk” (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes,
Exhibit 15, 1991).

Montana has become the center of illegal activity, supplying elk to

other states and Canada. For instance, in January 1991, an Alberta rancher was caught
smuggling illegally captured elk fi’om Montana^^ In addition, “Sonny” Welch Brogan, a
Montana game farm operator^’ whose ranch is situated within an elk migration route, has

Graham cited the fact that people killed native elk and attached game farm tags;
thus highlighting the importance of individual identification (visual identification or lip
tattoos).
Several of these elk escaped into the wild, and at least two of the remaining elk
were found to have tuberculosis.
Brogan is known as the father of the game farm industry, and is a major player in
the elk industry. For instance, Brogan shipped two 747 plane loads of elk to Korea in the
early 1980s, and supplied newly developing Canadian game farmers with foundation stock
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often been found holding more elk than his records cover

“A common practice is to

exaggerate the actual number of elk a ranch has, so that when wild elk are trapped, they
will be covered by papers. And no wonder When a legal, domestic elk costs $7,000 a
head, the temptation to acquire free elk is hard to ignore, especially when penalties are
minimal.” (House Fish and Game Committee, Exhibit 15, 1991). As of 1991, Brogan had
not been charged with wildlife theft because the law requires that the rancher be caught in
the act of capture. Once contacted by Game Wardens, Brogan would return the illegal elk
back to the wild; this has caused additional problems because Brogan’s privately owned
elk have been infected with tuberculosis since 1989.^*
Poten also mentioned other concerns associated with game farming, such as
interbreeding between exotics and native wildlife populations and disease transmission.
“ [T]he profits from an industry that has so many potential
impacts on wild herds—owned and supported by the public—
don’t really look like profits anymore. The odds against game
farms make then look like a poor bet when the $25 million
dollar hunting industries of Wyoming, Idaho and Montana are
threatened, as they are now by the tuberculosis scare, and the
money spent for land to protect elk in the wild becomes
money gambled away.. . Montana needs to carefully consider
the potential of having to subsidize an industry based on high
risk ventures.” (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes,
Exhibit 15, 1991).

(House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 15, 1991).
It is known that Brogan had at least 80 illegally captured wild elk, which
intermingled with the diseased herds prior to release (House Fish and Game Committee
Minutes 1991).
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Finally, Poten provided a comparison between Montana’s game farm policy and other
Rocky Mountain States highlighting that Wyoming and Washington State have recognized
the problems associated with game farms and outlawed them, while Colorado has severely
restricted them. With regard to HB 556, Constance labeled it as, “ . a sound beginning
for cutting the losses” (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 15, 1991).
Within the introduced version of the bill, section seven (7) restricted the following
species; (1) all Eurasian red deer unless surgically sterilized, all Eurasian sheep and goats
in the subfamily Caprinae unless surgically sterilized, and (3) white-tailed deer from east of
the 100th meridian in North Amenca^®. However, game farmers, who presented
testimonies before the House Committee on Fish and Game, stated that they were
opposed to the regulations imposed on the importation of exotic species under the
introduced version of HB 556.^” In turn, HB 556 was amended and restrictions were not
placed on specific animals. Under amendment A, the governing agencies (MFWT and
DOL) were allowed to place restrictions on the importation of certain species. High risk
species were to be determined through a scientific investigation of the associated threats
to wildlife or livestock.

White-tailed deer were to be prohibited in order to prevent the transfer of
meningeal worm, which is found in eastern white-tailed deer.
30

These testimonies accounted for two of the total five, which were presented.
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A second contentious section within HB 556 dealt with penalties. House Bill
556 section five (5) states that, “

a person who violates this part or a rule adopted

under this part is subject to a fine of not less than $5,000 or imprisonment in the state
prison for not less than 1 year, or both” (bill text, 1993:5).^* However, it was argued that
these penalties were excessive; in turn, amendment B was proposed. Amendment B stated
that, “ . . .a person who violates this part or a rule adopted under this part is subject to a
fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 1 year, or
both” (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit lOB, 1993:1).^^
Finally, amendment C addressed the identification of game farm animals, and
altered the original requirement for individual identification under the introduced version
of HB 556 (section 2). This amendment required ‘ownership’ identification, rather than
‘individual’ identification. “This amendment gained mixed support with concerns over the
eflScacy of existing identification technology” (Brown et al. 1994; 11). In particular.
Representative Bob Ream stated that he, “ . does not support amendment C until
identification technology is improved” (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes,
1991-6).
The final decision of the House Fish and Game Committee was to pass HB 556
as amended. However, during the executive session on HB 556, there was further
discussion regarding amendments A (exotic species), B (penalties), and C (animal

These penalties were in addition to the revocation of a game farm license.
These penalties were in addition to the revocation of a game farm license.
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Identification). Both amendments A and C were adopted by the committee; amendment B
was altered to read, “ . a licensee who violates this part or a rule adopted under this part
is subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than 1 year, or both" (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, 1993 10).^^
Once the amended version of HB 556 passed the House, a second hearing was
held within the Senate Fish and Game Committee. During this time, many game farmers
expressed that they had not been adequately informed about HB 556 prior to its
introduction. In turn, a large percentage of the game farming community attended the
Senate hearing and strongly voiced their opposition to this controversial bill. Additionally,
those game farm representatives who did support HB 556 during the House hearing were
upset that the committee passed HB 556 without all of the amendments (Senate Fish and
Game Committee, Exhibit 10, 1991). Bob Spoklie^'' stated that game farmers agreed to
support HB 556 during a meeting held between Ream^^ and the House Fish and Game
Committee prior to the hearing because it was understood that the amendments would be
acknowledged—this was not the case.^® Similarly, Ellen Schubarth, who raised exotic
animals, noted that “[ujpgrading game farm violations fi"om a misdemeanor to a felony is
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These penalties were in addition to the revocation of a game farm license.

Game farm owner and representative for both the North American Elk Breeders
Association and the Montana Elk Breeders Association who presented testimony in
opposition to HB 556 during the Senate hearing.
Bob Ream sponsored HB 556.
Amendment B was altered before HB 556 was passed by the House committee.

133

inequitable justice. Fact: there is no jail time and only minimal fines for the crime of
involuntary manslaughter” (Senate Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 18,
1991:2). These comments highlight the fact that game farmers feel they are being treated
unfairly - targeted - by the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks.
As a result of the controversy surrounding HB 556, game farmers and game farm
representatives provided testimonies stating that this bill was not well researched and
requested that HB 556 be tabled until the next legislative session. Ed Smith, a former
legislator who sponsored SB 448 in 1983, stated that,
“. . a game farm has the right to operate in Montana the same as I do in my
cow/calf operation, as long as they keep their animals enclosed, and they keep
wildlife fi'om entering those enclosures. ... Many of these people that are in this
business have found as I have, that you cannot survive just raising grain, so they
have gone into raising exotic animals to supplement their farm income” (Senate Fish
and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 7, 1991:2).

He also stated that he felt HB 556 was poorly written, and suggested that HB 556 be
tabled so a committee could organize and draft new legislation for the 1993 session.
According to Bob Spoklie, “[t]his will give the game operators an opportunity to work
with all agencies involved; the Livestock, Fish and Game, and the Department of
Revenue^’ time to introduce sound legislation to govern our industry” (Senate Fish and
Game Committee, Exhibit 10, 1991:2).

The taxation of game farm animals was also a contentious issue during this time.
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Overall, 38 visitors^* attended the Senate hearing on HB 556. Of these 38
visitors, five (5) supported HB 556 while 33 were opposed^^ In addition, three (3)
visitors provided testimony in support of HB 556

while 10 stated that they were

opposed"**. Those visitors who provided testimonies in support of HB 556 highlighted
exotics (interbreeding and competition), disease transmission, and the illegal capture of
wildlife as reasons for increasing the regulation of the game farm industry On the other
hand, those who provided testimonies in opposition to HB 556 noted the private economic
benefits of game farming as an economic diversification strategy in areas where traditional
agriculture and/or resource extractive industries were in decline. It was also felt that many
of the amendments to the existing laws were already covered by other regulatory agencies
(Senate Fish and Game Committee, Exhibit 10, 1991).

The 38 visitors represented the following interests: 28 game/exotic farmers, one
(1) representative from the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, one (1) representative
from the Montana Audubon Legislative Fund, one (1) representative from the Department
of Livestock, one (1) representative from the Montana Wildlife Federation, one (1)
representative fi'om the Montana Farm Bureau, one (1) representative from the Montana
Elk Breeders Association, three (3) visitors represented themselves, and one (1) was
unknown.
It is interesting to note that the visitor fi'om Montana Wildlife Federation
opposed HB 556.
'*'* Those visitors who provided testimonies in support of HB 556 include a
representative from the following organizations: the Department of Fish, Wildlife and
Parks, the Montana Audubon Legislative Fund, and the Montana Farm Bureau.
"** Those visitors who provided testimonies in opposition of HB 556 include: a
former legislator and game farm supporter, seven (7) game farmers (2 raised exotics), a
representative fi'om the Montana Elk Breeders Association, and a representative from the
Department of Livestock.
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In addition to the personal testimonies provided by visitors, outside information
was also presented. For instance. Bob Ream provided a letter from Dr Valerius Geist—
who Ream considers to be an expert on the pitfalls of game farming. Within his opening
paragraph. Dr Geist stated, “[a]s we now see daily, game ranching is so destructive, and
costly to the public purse, the livestock industry, the interests of our native people and to
public health, that it is best to return to the proven principles and ban ALL trafficking in
dead wildlife” (Senate Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 1, !991:1). He then
highlighted points that he felt should be included in game farm legislation: (1) it should be
illegal to keep non-native subspecies of native species, improved versions of native
wildlife, and exotics; (2) outlaw the transport of designated dangerous wildlife across the
state; (3) insure that the taxonomy you use is valid and can be verified, or enforcement
becomes a problem; (4) prohibit importation of any game farm stock from areas with
known, serious diseases; (5) the law should stipulate that the game rancher be insured to
cover potential problems with diseased and escaped animals; (6) exclude certain wildlife
items from sale, in particular all trophies, all products from bears, as well as all velvet
antlers and products derived therefrom; (7) there should be provisions for controlling the
laundering of illegally acquired game; and (8) there should be provisions for making fence
maintenance mandatory. Dr. Geist concluded his letter with the following statement,
“To allow game ranching is to strip from wildlife the policies that have protected it
for 75 years and allowed a modest recovery. These protective policies are: a
prohibition on private ownership of wildlife; outlawing markets in dead wildlife (fur
excluded); allocating ALL wildlife for consumption by law, and prohibiting the
frivolous killing of game animals. With game ranching we dismantle what three
generations before us have built up to successfully protect our wildlife. I wish I
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could say something good about this industry!” (Senate Fish and Game Committee
Minutes, Exhibit 1, 1991:3).

In response to the letter from Geist, Bob Spoklie introduced a letter from J C
Haigh, a professor from the University of Saskatchewan, who discounted Dr Geist’s
theories. First, Prof. Haigh pointed out that there has never been a reported case of TB in
wild wapiti in North America. Additionally, Haigh questioned why cattle infected with TB
should be considered any less of a threat to wildlife than farmed wapiti? Haigh also noted
that, in certain instances, exotics are not more susceptible to disease than native North
American species. “I cannot agree with Dr. Geist that wapiti in North America are likely
to be a ‘cesspool’ of disease if they are managed properly” (Senate Fish and Game
Committee Minutes, Exhibit 13, 1991:2).
Information was also provided from a recent Game Ranching Symposium held in
Boise, Idaho. During this symposium it was noted that, “. . regulations to govern the
game farm industry are inadequate to protect the livestock industry, the game ranching
industry, and wildlife resources in most jurisdictions in western North America” (Senate
Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 3, 1991:2). In turn, it was resolved that: (1)
wildlife agencies should cooperate with state veterinarians, agriculture agencies, and
public health agencies to develop comprehensive regulations to govern captive wild and
exotic animals, (2) each state and province should adopt standards for disease testing, and
(3) certain species should be banned from importation'^^.
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The species that were identified were the same as those proposed in HB 556,
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In an effort to repeal HB 556 section seven (7), which dealt with the restriction
of exotics, an article highlighting the benefits of raising elk and exotics in Texas was
presented. Within this article it was stated that if Texas game farmers could capture 40
percent of the existing venison market, “we’re talking about 7.5 million dollars in direct
income to the grower and about 32 million dollars in total economic impact to the state of
Texas” (Senate Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 9, 1991:3). Additionally,
“[t]he Exotic Industry ought to be, by the end of the decade of the 90s, a Billion dollar
industry in Texas” (State Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 9, 1991.3).
In order to legitimate elk farming, on the whole, articles were introduced which
explained the process of de-antlering and the medicinal properties associated with antler
velvet. In addition, Brogan"*^ presented an article discussing tuberculosis in humans. The
article, entitled The TB Panic Is Nothing to Panic Over, stated that tuberculosis was
extremely difficult for humans to contract.
Upon completion of the Senate hearing, HB 556 was discussed and amendments
A (exotic species), B (penalties), and C (animal identification) were adopted. Thus,
House Bill 556 passed in both the House and the Senate as amended, and became state
law in 1991'*^

excluding Afiican antelopes.
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Owner of Cinnabar Ranch in Montana and a TB infected elk herd, which he
shipped to Colorado and Alberta.
44

HB 556, as amended, was incorporated into the 1991 MCA (MCA 87-4-401
through 424).
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Although 1983 game farm legislation (MCA 87-4-408) cited the Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks as having primary jurisdiction over game farms, it
also required compliance with all applicable laws and rules administered by the
Department of Livestock. However, “[f]rom 1920-1991 game farming was primarily a
Fish, Wildlife and Parks licensing activity until the disease outbreak of 1991 when it
rapidly became a legislatively mandated, shared responsibility between the livestock and
wildlife agencies” (Ferlicka, 1 9 9 3 : 5 9 ) . In November 1990, Alberta officials reported that
a Montana elk, which had been transported, had died of tuberculosis (Ferlicka, 1993).
The original herd of farmed Montana elk were tested, because they were a potential risk to
the domestic cattle industry, and the infection was confirmed in these elk (Ferlicka, 1993).
In addition, it was determined that the source of the original TB infected Montana elk was
Nebraska (Ferlicka, 1993). In January 1987, “Sonny” Welch Brogan"*^ purchased elk from
a game farm in Nebraska, which were then transported to both Alberta and Colorado
(Thome, 1993). In May of 1991, TB was also confirmed in the elk that were shipped to
Colorado (Thome, 1993).
This controversial outbreak**’ led to the extensive testing of all Montana game
farm cervid herds (Ferlicka, 1993). Although the majority of the 84 large game farms'**

**^ HB 556 section 1(2) inserted language concerning compliance with laws and
rules relating to marketing, inspection, transportation, and health.
**^ See the testimony given to the House Fish and Game Committee by Constance
J. Poten, during the 1991 committee hearing on HB 556,.
**’ In addition to the livestock threats posed by Brogan’s infected elk herd, the
Cinnabar Elk Farm posed serious threats to the health of native elk populations. Brogan
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were free of tuberculosis, a small percentage of herds were identified as TB infected
(Ferlicka, 1993). These herds were either voluntarily depopulated, or quarantined as
infected until repeated tests or new technology determines that no TB is present (Ferlicka,
1993). As a result of these events, the USD A sponsored a series of guidelines regarding
the handling of TB infected cervids and TB standards for interstate movement of game
farm cervids in commerce (Ferlicka, 1993). Given the geographic expanse of the potential
ramifications of disease transmission, the guidelines quickly lead to a national consensus
on the issue (Ferlicka, 1993). According to Dr. Don Ferlicka, Montana state veterinarian,
“[wjere it not for the 1991 TB outbreak, we may not have seen the rapid evolution of
statutory game farm regulation that we did and we might not have seen the rapid maturity
of the game farm industry into an industry deserving of the public trust, as we did”
(Ferlicka, 1993:61).
Although Dr. Ferlicka believed that the game farm industry was deserving of
public support, there were many activist groups who felt otherwise. In turn, 1992 was a
politically important, conflict filled year for the game farm industry (Brown et al. 1994).
As previously stated, the 1991 MCA (MCA 87-4-408) granted both the Department of
Fish, Wildlife and Parks and the Department of Livestock broad regulatory authority,
which was to be further clarified through the adoption of agency administrative rules. As

has a history of mixing wild and privately owned elk populations, and his ranch sits on the
migration route of the Northern Yellowstone Elk herd (the largest migratory elk herd in
the United States).
Montana game farms with cervids numbering approximately 1,500 elk and
several hundred deer (Ferlicka, 1993).
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required under HB 556, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks initiated an
effort to update game farm rules and statutes (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes,
Exhibit 3, 1993). This effort culminated in the joint adoption of new rules by both MFWP
and DOL, which was viewed as

. the first step in providing needed protection for

Montana wildlife resources and the livestock industry” (House Fish and Game Committee
Minutes, Exhibit 3, 1993; 2).
In order to gamer input from the public sectors involved in this issue, the rule
making process included open public hearings; however, game farm industry supporters
argued that they had been denied a fair opportunity to participate in the rule making
process (Brown et al. 1994). Given the rising tensions between the game farm interests
and the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, and the underlying threat of
litigation. Governor Stan Stephens appointed a working group on game farms, which
represented diverse interests'*^, “ . to address major game farm issues; to try to come to
an agreement on how to address them; and develop legislation to be presented to the 53'^'*
legislature” (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 3, 1993:2).
The product of the working group's consensus building deliberations was House
Bill 338, which was introduced by Representative Bob Ream, during the 53^** Legislative

Wayne Phillips (Governor’s Office). Jack Salmond and Jim Hagenbarth (Board
of Livestock), Bill Fraser, who was replaced by Cork Mortensen (as Executive Secretary
of the Department of Livestock), Elaine Allestad and Bill Stratton (FWP Commission),
Pat Graham (deputy director, FWP), Les Graham and Ward Swanser (Montana Game
Breeders Association), Dave Majors (Montana Wildlife Federation) and Bob Ream (State
Representative). Personnel fi’om FWP and DOL served as staff to the working group.
(House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 4, 1993).
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Assembly (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibits 1, 3, and 5, 1993). There
were 102 game farms^° in Montana in 1993, with 24 application per year being processed,
and the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks were concerned over about 10 percent of
the operations (Senate Fish and Game Committee Minutes, HB 338 hearing, 1993 4 and
5). According to Mortensen’s testimony^*, HB 338 addressed the concerns of the
regulatory agencies involved as well as maintained the viability of the game farm industry
(House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 1, 1993). It was believed that this
Act provided both agencies the tools necessary to effectively regulate the game farm
industry; the game farm industry benefited from the establishment of clearly defined
minimum operating standards (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibits 3 and
5, 1993).
According to the bill text, as supplemented by the 1993 House Fish and game
Committee Minutes regarding the House committee hearing on HB 338 (House Fish and
Game Committee Minutes, Exhibits 3 and 5, 1993), HB 338 divided the proposed
amendments to existing game farm statutes^^ into 15 sections. Section one (1) defined
specifications for a game farm. Under section one (1), shooting tag licenses were replaced

The breakdown was as follows: three (3) farms raising pronghorn antelope,
three (3) farms raising Barbary sheep, seven (7) farms raising black bear, 55 farms raising
elk, 10 farms raising fallow deer, three (3) farms raising mouflon sheep and hybrids, 13
farms raising mountain lion, 13 farms raising mule deer, one (1) farm raising musk oxen,
one (1) farm raising Russian boar, six (6) farms raising sika deer, and eight (8) farms
raising white-tailed deer.
51

A member of the governor appointed working group.
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1991 MCA 87-4-401 through 424
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with a DOL issued inspection certificate in order to conform with DOL inspection
procedures and avoid the misuse of game farm shooting tags to harvest wild animals.
Section two (2) defined penalties and the seizure of illegally possessed animals. Section
three (3) updated application procedure for licenses, and provided that the Department of
Fish, Wildlife and Parks could determine that the preparation of an EIS was required
under the Montana Environmental Protection Act (MEPA). Section four (4) clarified
licensing and fencing criteria and requirements. Section five (5) increased the annual game
farm license fee to $200, while section six (6) defined criteria for license transfers. Section
seven (7) required that individual game farm animals be marked with both a Department of
Livestock approved ear tattoo, indicating ownership, and a Fish, Wildlife and Parks tag,
facilitating individual identification. Section eight (8) required adherence to DOL
procedures regarding the transportation and sale of game farm animals, and section nine
(9) revised requirements governing the sale of game parts, meats and byproducts. In an
effort to rectify long standing problems with existing record keeping and recording
requirements, section ten (10) required the submission of game farm reports three times
per year.^^ Under section 11, Fish, Wildlife and Parks was required to coordinate the
regulation of game farms with the Department of Livestock. Sections 12 and 13
established procedures for the revocation of a game farm license; it was also stated that a
game farm operator may be held financially liable for the costs of restoring any damage to
native wildlife. Section 14 granted the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks the

Under 1991 MCA 87-4-417, game farm reports were only required to be filed
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authority to deny or condition a game farm license in order to protect public safety (i.e., if
the owner intends to harvest animals by shooting). Fish, Wildlife and Parks could also
deny or condition a license if the location of the game farm threatens loss or destruction of
seasonal habitat; the blockage of migration routes; or poses an unacceptable threat of
escape, which could result in habitat damage, competition or genetic pollution.^'* Finally,
section 15 provided a license applicant with an opportunity for a hearing in cases of
license revocation, denial of renewal, or denial of a license transfer
In total, nine (9) people provided testimony in support of HB 338.^^ Of the 16
visitors^^ who attended the House Fish and Game Committee hearing on HB 338, 15
supported the Act while 1 person was undecided. Although most visitors supported HB
338, a number of people stated that they would have preferred additional, stronger
amendments. For instance. Bob Ream, the sponsor of HB 338, stated that he felt that HB
338 was a compromise, and several issues were not dealt with due to lack of time or lack

once per year.
The Montana Wildlife Federation, whose “ upmost consideration must be the
protection of Montana’s free roaming native wildlife species,” were particularly pleased
with the revisions included in section 14 of HB 338.
No one provided testimony in opposition to HB 338.
The 16 visitors present represented the following interests; one (1)
representative from the Board of Livestock, three (3) representatives from the Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, five (5) representatives from the Montana Wildlife
Federation, one (1) representative from the Montana Audubon Legislative Fund, one (1)
representative from the Montana Bowhunters Association, one (1) representative from the
Skyline Sportsman Association, two (2) representatives from the Montana Game Breeders
Association, one (1) representative from Anaconda Sportsmen, and one (1) representative
from the Ravalli County Fish and Wildlife Association.

144
of consensus. In addition. Ream noted that his major concern was the level of control
placed on importation of exotic and hybrid species into the state of Montana. Ron
Bennett (Montana Wildlife Federation) felt that the, “ . .language of HB 338 should be
more direct, severe and unquestionable” (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes,
Bennett testimony, 1993). Bennett suggested that HB 338 be modified in the following
manner: (1) increase game farm fees, (2) tighten gate protection regulations, (3) hold
game farm owners responsible for the costs of scientific investigations and the expenses
related to escaped animals, (4) require that broken fences be repaired in 24 hours, and (5)
classify the penalty for operating a game farm without a license as a felony. Similarly, Joe
Gutkoski (Montana Wildlife Federation) recommended that a double fence be constructed
around all game farms, in order to prevent escapes (House Fish and Game Committee
Minutes, Exhibit 7-Gutkoski testimony. 1993). Janet Ellis, a representative from the
Montana Audubon Legislative Fund, requested that game farm fees be increased to a level
where this program could pay for itself (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes,
Exhibit 6-Ellis testimony, 1993). In addition, Ellis requested amendments to HB 338 for
purposes of clarification, in particular, Ellis was concerned with public involvement”
Finally, Tony Schoonen (Skyline Sportsmen Association) requested that HB 338 be
amended to totally phase out game ranching because of the threat of disease transmission
(House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 8-Schoonen testimony, 1993).

“We would like there to be an opportunity for citizens to be able to participate
[in] hearings on any new licenses” (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 6Ellis testimony, 1993: unknown).
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In addition to the composition of HB 338, the governor appointed working
group on game farms also provided testimony regarding game issues requiring future
study (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 4, 1993). These issues include
the following: (1) the separation of game farm licenses into categories, and the
development of a corresponding fee structure; (2) the separation of a shooting license
from a general game farm license, in order to address public safety issues; (3) the
disposition of a base number of wildlife remaining in a new game farm enclosure after all
efforts to remove them have failed; (4) the regulation of antler buying as a deterrent to
trafficking in antlers fi’om illegally taken wildlife; (5) the elimination of client shooting on
game farms

(6) imposing importation restrictions on elk fi’om areas where meningeal

worm is endemic^^, (7) the development of reimbursement programs for TB infected game
farm animals that were destroyed; and (8) the revision of administrative rules regarding
escaped game farm animals and application criteria^*’
Upon completion of the House Fish and Game hearing, HB 338 was discussed
and amended. First, the representative from the Department of Livestock suggested
amending HB 338 to clarify that the DOL, not MFWP, is responsible for the individual
marking of game farm animals. This amendment passed the House. A second set of
amendments, sponsored by the representative from the Montana Audubon Legislative
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Consensus was not possible within the group with regard to this issue.
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Consensus was not possible within the group with regard to this issue.
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The group suggested that this criteria needed to be ‘fleshed out’
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Fund, also passed. These amendments made grammatical changes and clarified
definitions. Finally, in order to help fund the MFWP program. Representative Molnar
proposed and amendment to increase the license fees and allow for a one-time fee of $500
After some discussion, it was decided that this amendment would substantially alter HB
338, and

. allow the compromise to fall apart” (House Fish and Game Committee

Minutes, Executive Action, 1991:8). Additionally, it was noted that fees doubled under
HB 338. The third proposed amendment did not pass.
Once HB 338 passed the House, a second hearing was held within the Senate
Fish and Game Committee. In total, eight (8) visitors attended this hearing. Of these
eight (8) visitors, seven (7) supported^^ HB 338 while one (1) opposed^^ this bill. Janet
Ellis, the representative fi-om the Montana Audubon Legislative Fund, provided support
for HB 338. However, similar to her testimony in the House Fish and Game Committee,
she stated that she was concerned with both the low license fees assessed game farmers
and the limited amount of public involvement in the application process. Ron Bennett
provided testimony stating that he was opposed to HB 338 because, “[t]he laws, as they

Those visitors who supported HB 338 included two (2) representatives from
the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, one (1) representative from the Montana Elk
Breeders Association, one (1) representative tfom the Board of Livestock, one (1)
representative from the Montana Wildlife Federation, one (1) representative fi-om the
Montana Bowhunters Association, and one (1) representative from the Montana Audubon
Legislative Fund.
Ron Bennett, representing himself, Russell County Sportsmen and the Montana
Wildlife Federation, opposed HB 338 because he felt a moratorium on game farming was
necessary In addition to Bennett’s testimony. Senator Devlin presented a letter written by
a game farmer who opposed HB 338 because he felt the required submission of three (3)
reports per year was excessive.
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are presently written, are wonderful for the game farmers but are not in the best interest of
the State of Montana" (Senate Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 5, 1991 1).
Bennett stated that he was opposed to the following sections of the 1991 MCA. (1 )
section 87-4-410, which allows a game farmer to own game animals on his property if
they cannot be captured or shot and has a detrimental effect on Montana’s publicly hunted
elk populations; and (2) section 87-4-419, which states that escaped game farm animals
that cannot be captured become property of the state and makes the state liable for the
damages caused by these animals. He also noted that he felt that the low penalties
established within the 1991 MCA were not sufficient to prohibit trafficking in dead
wildlife. Finally, Bennett stated that Montana sportsmen and women should not shoulder
the costs associated with game farming, when there is no stipulation for game farmers to
bear any of the cost. In conclusion, Bennett stated that “HB 338 is basically a license to
steal®^

HB 338 is bad for the State of Montana and its sportsmen and women, bad for

wildlife conservationists, and bad for ranches of this state. Leaving only the game farmer
to benefit” (Senate Fish and Game Committee, Exhibit 5, 1991:3).
In addition to the personal testimonies presented during the Senate hearing,
informational material regarding game farming in Montana was also presented. According
to the Montana Wildlife Federation, “[ejxisting administrative rules, as well as game farm

Bermett supplied newspaper articles regarding a recent court case involving
“Sonny” Welch Brogan. Brogan was fined $1500 (the maximum allowed by law) for three
(3) violations of game farm statutes: two (2) counts of failing to maintain his fences
properly and one (1) count of illegally capturing more than 80 wild elk for use in his
operation. In a separate incident, a judge declared a mistrial in a case against Brogan, who
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statutes, were not adequately addressing risk factors associated with the growing game
farm industry The need for revised rules became apparent when; (1) elk/red deer hybrids
were imported into Montana by several Montana game farmers; (2) bovine tuberculosis
was detected in five game farm herds; and (3) reports of animal escapes from several game
farms” (Senate Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 1, 1993 unknown). In turn,
MFWP spent 15 months prior to this legislative session reexamining game farm issues.
These issues were explained within a MFWP pamphlet, entitled Regulating Game Farms
in Montana, which was presented during the Senate hearing on HB 338. This pamphlet
provided information on the following topics: (1) Montana game farm operating
standards, (2) game farm questions and answers, (3) a comparison between various
attempts by western states to control game farm animals in the wild, (4) the concern over
hybrid crosses, (5) exotics prohibited from importation into Montana^'*, (6) the potential
spread of disease and parasites, and (7) game farm information sources.
Upon completion of the Senate hearing. Senator Pipinich moved HB 338 be
concurred in. This motion carried unanimously, and HB 338 became state law in 1993
During the 53rd Legislature, the Montana Wildlife Federation introduced a second House
Bill (HB 412). House Bill 412 was a moratorium bill, which failed to make it out of

was tried on one felony count of tampering with public records or information.
These animals include: chamois, tahr. Ibex, Bsrbary sheep, mouflon sheep, oryx
and gemsbok. addax, reedbucks, wildebeests, moose, red deer and crosses, axis deer, rusa
deer, sambar deer, roe deer, and wild species and hyorids in the family Suidae, all species
and hybrids in the family Tayassuidae. The following species were ‘restricted’ due to the
specific health risks they pose: white-tailed deer and caribou.
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committee because it didn’t get the support of the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife
and Parks^^, nor of the sitting administration (Anonymous 1994a).
House Bill 412 was developed to limit the number of game farm licenses that
could be issued by the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks. Under the proposed
regulations, the total number of licenses issued by the Department of Fish, Wildlife and
Parks was not to exceed the number of current licenses

(HB 412 text, 1993:2 and 3).

This limitation would have applied to licenses necessitated by expansion of existing game
farm facilities, but not to transferred licenses (HB 412 text, 1993:2 and 3). According to
the fiscal note, which accompanied HB 412, “[t]he department would experience a
decrease in expenditures of $111,242 per year and a decrease in revenues of $2,000 per
year” (HB 412 text, fiscal note, 1993:1).^’

The Montana Wildlife Federation felt that although biologists and regional
MFWP staff have advocated aggressive measures to curtail game farmers, this advocacy
has been halted at the upper levels of decision making—where less stringent solutions, in
an attempt to achieve a balance between private economies and the public good, are
favored (Anonymous 1994a).
Within the amended version of HB 412 it is stated that the Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks was not to issue a license to any game farm not in existence on October
1, 1993 (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, 1993:1).
According to the fiscal note which accompanied HB 338, “[t]he Department of
Fish, Wildlife and Parks will incur a net cost of $40,403 in FY94 and $13,339 in FY95
the net revenue would increase by $4,950 in FY94 and $5,550 in FY95 (HB 338 text,
fiscal note, 1993:1 ). Within this fiscal note the net cost incurred by FW&P refers only to
personal services and operations, while the fiscal note for HB 412 includes the costs
associated with MEPA compliance EAs and application reviews (HB 412 and 338 text,
fiscal notes, 1993:1).
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In total, 33 visitors attended the House Fish and Game Committee hearing on HB
412. Of the 33 visitors, 17 supported a moratorium on Montana game farms®* while 16
opposed HB 412®^ In addition, seven (7) visitors provided testimony in support of HB
412’®, and six (6) provided testimony in opposition’*
Those visitors who provided testimonies in support of a moratorium on the
licensing of new game farms highlighted the following issues as reasons for concern. (1 )
escaped game farm animals and the subsequent threats posed to native wildlife’^.

®* Those visitors who supported HB 412 included: two (2) representatives from
Skyline Sportsmen, two (2) representatives from Last Chance Audubon Society, two (2)
representative from the Montana Bowhunters Association, one (1) representative from the
Southeastern Sportsmen Association, two (2) representatives from the Montana Wildlife
Federation, one (1) representative for Anaconda Sportsmen’s Club, one (1) representative
from Montana Audubon, one (I) representative from the Friends of Mount Helena, five
(5) citizens, and one (1) sportsman. The total number of representatives does not equal
17 because one person represented more than one organization.
®®Those visitors who opposed HB 412 included: seven (7) representatives from
the Montana Game Breeders Association, five (5) game farmers, one (1) sportsman, and
three (3) citizens.
’®Those visitors who provided testimonies in support of HB 412 included
representatives from the following organizations: Montana Wildlife Federation, Skyline
Sportsmen’s Club, Last Chance Audubon Society, Friends of Mount Helena, Montana
Audubon Council, Anaconda Sportsmen’s Club, Montana Bowhunters Association, and
Southeastern Sportsmen Association. In addition, one (1) person stated that although he
supported HB 412, he felt that game farms should be phased out within the next five (5)
years.
’* Those visitors who provided testimonies in opposition to HB 412 included: one
(1) representative from the Montana Game Breeders Association, three (3) game farmers,
and two (2) citizens.
In addition to the threats posed to native wildlife within a particular state,
regional threats were also noted. For instance, in 1991 “Sonny” Welch Brogan shipped
TB infected elk, which he received from Nebraska, to ranches in Colorado and Alberta.
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livestock’^ and humans’'* (disease/parasite transmission, and hybridization/competition );
(2) the low fees assessed game farmers; (3) the large costs incurred by the Department of
Fish, Wildlife and Parks; (4) the potential impacts of canned trophy hunts on traditional
public hunting’^ and (5) the illegal capture and sale of wildlife’^ According to Dr
Valerius Geist, “[o]ur elk are clearly and presently in danger. If they are to remain
unadulterated, if we are to pass them on to those who follow, as was done for us, then we

Similarly, in 1992 farmed red deer infected with E. cervi were shipped to Ontario for
routine slaughter “All of the red deer arrived safely in Ontario-whereupon 91 escaped”
(House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 21, 1993:6). All of the escaped
animals were eventually captured and killed, but “[i]f any infected feces were deposited,
they will remain contagious through three Canadian winters” (House Fish and Game
Committee Minutes, Exhibit 21, 1993:6).
Mr. Paul Johnson and Ms. Claire Evans noted that “[t]here have been incidents
where tuberculosis has been transmitted from game farm animals to livestock” (House Fish
and Game Committee Minutes, 1993:1, House Fish and Game Committee Minutes,
Exhibit 22, 1993 1). Although this has not yet occurred in Montana, New York and
Pennsylvania have lost their tuberculosis free status. As a result. New York spent
$637,000 in 1992 and $500,000 in 1993
’'* Although it has been stated that tuberculosis is extremely difficult for humans to
contract, “[t]he recent [1991] outbreak [TB] in Alberta quickly spread to farmers, vets,
postmortem technicians, meat inspectors and tanning-plant workers, most of whom were
put on preventative medication but at least one of whom developed the actual disease”
(House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 21,1993:1 ).
“Many hunters believe that canned trophy shoots on game farms will influence
the public’s perception of hunting, escalating anti-hunting sentiment and jeopardizing the
future of traditional sport hunting” (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 22,
1993 1).
According to Dr. Valerius Geist, “[t]o make money from elk you must be able to
sell their parts-venison, velvet antlers, penises, tails and other parts-to the highest bidder.
And with that you create an ‘infrastructure’ of producers, processors, wholesale dealers
and retailers, an ideal situation for laundering illegally killed public elk in the market”
(House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 23, 1993:1).
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need to make sure that elk have large areas of public land to roam and that they are not
threatened with poaching and genetic pollution, diseases and other perils generated by
wildlife ranching” (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 23, 1993 4),
Another sentiment voiced by visitors supportive of HB 412 was the fact that the public
benefits associated with free ranging wildlife outweigh the private benefits accrued
through game farming. It was noted that a profit of five billion dollars is made on the
world market from game farming. On the other hand, 160-270 million North Americans
spend $60 billion annually to participate in wildlife viewing, hunting and fishing, with
50,000 jobs being created per billion dollars expended (House Fish and Game Committee
Minutes, Exhibit 22, 1993.1).
Those visitors who provided testimonies in opposition to HB 412 raised the
following issues: (1) game ranching is a non-polluting, tourism-enhancing, high profit
agricultural industry that helps preserve natural habitat by not disturbing over-worked soil;
(2) game ranchers are not subsidized to the extant that people who rely on grain-growing
alone are subsidized; (3) cattle carry the same diseases as farmed game; (4) hybridization
between exotic species and native populations is unlikely’’; and (5) HB 338, which

” Les Graham noted that “[bjecause of natural herding instincts and natural mating
behavior t he possibility of a loose game farm animals mating to a wild one is SLIM”
(House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 25, 1993.3). However, in 1994
(obviously unknown at the time of the hearing on HB 412) red deer escaped from a game
farm and began cross-breeding with Montana’s pure elk herd ( Anonymous 1994a:l).
Additionally, red deer and elk crosses have resulted in the reduction of a ponion of New
Zealand’s elk population (Challies 1985 as cited in Lanka et al. 1990).
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requires the Department of Livestock to handle health problems, will make game farming
a safe industry
With regard to disease transmission. Les Graham, the representative from the
Montana Game Breeders Association and the former administrator of the Department of
Livestock, noted that “[t]he diseases of concern to native Montana wildlife are already
present in Montana domestic free ranging livestock.

Game farm animals are kept

behind EIGHT FOOT FENCES. Domestic cattle carrying the diseases of concern free
range with Montana wildlife apparently without problem since we have record numbers of
Montana WILDLIFE” (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 25, 1993:3).
In response, the testimonies provided by supporters of HB 412 noted that “[tjuberculosis
testing procedures are less reliable for game farm animals than for the domestic livestock
species for which they were developed. . .[Additionally,] [tjesting procedures and disease
monitoring for nontraditional captive species have not kept pace with emerging disease
risks. Detection methods are virtually nonexistent for diseases associated with wildlife
species” (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Exhibit 22, 1993 I and 2).
Finally, Jack Schubarth briefly traced the history of game farm regulation in
Montana. According to Schubarth, prior to the passage of HB 556 (1991), game farm
regulation was not properly handled by the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks; in
turn, there were many problems with the industry. However, since HB 556 placed game
farms under the partial jurisdiction of the Department of Livestock and treated game
farming like any other livestock group, the problems have been addressed. Schubarth also
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noted that a governor appointed working group, established to address game farm
problems, had developed HB 338, which was also introduced during this legislative
session. This bill required the Department of Livestock to handle health problems related
to the game farm industry,

.making this a safe industry” (House Fish and Game

Committee Minutes, Exhibit 27, 1993:2). “[House Bill] 412 leads you to believe that the
game farm problems have not been addressed. I say they have.

.In Wyoming this type

of legislation was found to be unconstitutional. It did not afford equal rights to all
citizens.

Our very existence hangs on this bill, our livelihood, our right to pursue

happiness” (House Fish and Game Committee, Exhibit 27, 1993:2).
Upon completion of the House Fish and Game hearing, HB 412 was discussed.
Representative Molnar stated that although there were not many things about game farms
that he liked, HB 412 went beyond game farming to a man’s right to use his land as he
sees fit (House Fish and Game Committee Minutes, Executive Action, 1993:10). House
Bill 412 failed to pass the House by a margin of 11 to 5, and was tabled.
During the 54th Legislative Assembly, 1995, three game farm bills were introduced.
Senator Klampe introduced senate Bill 173, which revised game farm laws and placed a
moratorium on the issuance of new game farm licenses. Second, SB 215 sought to
transfer the general administration and regulation of game farms from the Department of
Fish Wildlife and Parks to the Department of Livestock. Finally, SB 389 was proposed in
an effort to clarify the administration and regulation of game farms by the both the
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Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks and the Department of Livestock. Senator Tivet
introduced SB 215, and Senator Don Hargrove introduced SB 389
Senate Bill 173 had four main components: (1) generally revise game farm laws, (2)
place a moratorium on the issuance of new game farm licenses, (3) phase out existing
game farm operations by January 1, 1997, and (4) prohibit the further importation of game
farm animals. According to Senator Klampe's opening statement, " . game farms have
cost Montana a lot of money and spread tuberculosis in wild game" (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995:1). Senator Klampe also noted that
game farms had spread TB to cattle in New York and Virginia (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). "This information was to let the
committee know what was happening in the United States and what could happen in
Montana" (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995:2).
Thirty-seven proponents of SB 173 provided testimony at the Senate hearing’*;
whereas, eleven opposing testimonies were presented’^ (Senate Committee on

Visitors that supported SB 173 include: Jim Richard (Montana Wildlife
Federation), Valerius Geist (Professor of Environmental Studies-University of Calgaiy),
Jim Posewitz (The Hunters Institute), Gayle Joslin (Montana Fish and Wildlife), Billie
Elliot (representing herself). Dale Taliaferro (Department of Health and Environmental
Science), Alan Blakley (attomey-Professor of Law at the University of Montana), Michael
Miller (Colorado Division of Wildlife), Dave Majors (representing himself). Bob Bungi
(representing himself). Bob Lovegroove (Ravalli County Fish and Wildlife Association),
Jim Bradford (Montana Bow Hunter's Association), Dave Campbell (United Bow Hunter's
Association), Janet Ellis (Montana Audubon Legislative Fund), James Kehr (representing
himself), Jue Gutkoski (Gallatin Wildlife Association), Mike Vashro (Montanas Opposed
to Game Farming), Pat Simmons (representing herself), Dennis Frasier (Skyline Sports),
Stan Frasier (representing himself), Herbert Johnson (Montanans Opposed to Game
Farming), Stephen Kelley (Ravalli County Fish and Wildlife), Ed Johns (Russell Country
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Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). Valerius Geist, a supporter of SB
173, stated that imported red deer had infected Canadian cattle with swine brucellosis
(Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). Similarly,
"[a] TB epidemic was believed to be initiated by red deer in New Zealand" (Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995:2). According to Billie
Elliot, a joint owner of game farm property, ". . the fences had been rammed by the
animals trying to get out and the native animals trying to get in" (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995:2). Michael Miller stated that there
were 42 documented game farm escapes within Colorado, and approximately 40 herds
were infected with TB (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995). With regard to property rights issues, which initially surfaced in the 53rd
Legislative Assembly, Alan Blakley, esq. stated that ". . there were no constitutional
violations of SB 173. . .[and] no potential search and seizure problems within the bill"
(Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995:5). Finally,

Sportsman Association), Doug Pollel (representing himself), Tony Schooner (State Lands
Con ), Sam Babich (Montana Auction for Actis), Bill Holdorf (Skyline Sportsmen),
Everette Maxwell (representing himself). Bob Cole (Flathead Wildlife), Art Callan
(representing himself), Jim McDermand (Medicine River Canoe Club). Bill Callaghan
(representing himself), L. F. Thomas (Anaconda Sportsmen), Steve Wilson (representing
himself), Marshall Bloom (representing herself), Doris Miner (representing herself), John
Gibson (representing himself).
Visitors that opposed SB 173 include: Bob Spoklie (Montana Game Breeders
Association), Bill Nyby (Spoklie Elk Farm), Gerri Backes (Montana Game Breeders
Assocdiation), Bruce Barta (Montana Game Breeders Association), Dr. John Smith
(Veterinarian), Loma Frank (Montana Farm Bureau), John Bloomquist (Montana
Stockgrowers Association), Jack Schuberth (Game Farmer), Dennis Iverson (Montana
Game Breeders Association), Senator Larry Tivet, Chancie Ralls (representing himself).
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Bob Lovegroove felt that public property rights and disease free wildlife were more
important than private property rights (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995).
Eleven opponents of SB 173 also provided testimony at the Senate hearing.
According to Bob Spoklie, "there has never been hybrids in the state of Montana and there
never will be" (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing
1995:5).*® Additionally, Spoklie stated that it would cost about $15 million to phase out
game farm facilities, and another $8-10 million for the land and fences (Senate Committee
on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). Dr. John Smith was opposed to
SB 173 because he felt that the disease problem in wild animals was worse than in game
farms (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). Bill
Nyby stated that SB 173 limits economic diversification.
"[I]n today’s struggling economy. .. new business or enterprise should
be encouraged or assisted by the local, state and federal government, not
forced out of business or limited growth. With the depressed grain
markets and the lower cattle, sheep and hog prices, many farmers and
ranchers have diversified into other operations to supplement their
income so they can continue their rural way of living, which they dearly
love" (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995:5).

*®This conclusion was based on the results of state-wide hybridization tests,
which game farmers voluntarily completed (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock
and Irrigation Hearing 1995). According to Spoklie, Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks did
not want this study initiated (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995). However, Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks states that current tests do
not identify all hybrids (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995).
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With regard to the private property rights issue. Bill Nyby believed that SB 173
constitutes a taking (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing
1995). Similarly, Gerri Beckes stated that SB 173 was a "dishonest taking of private
property without compensation for the animals and the business. All game farm animals
were privately owned . . . " (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995:6). Finally, Dennis Iverson also felt that SB 173 was a property rights bill
because it told people that they could not use a part of their property rights as established
by the U.S. Constitution (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995).
Senate Bill 173 missed the transmittal deadline and was tabled the Senate Committee
on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock
and Irrigation Hearing 1995).
Senate Bill 215 had two primary goals: (I) transfer the general administration and
regulation from the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks to the Department of
Livestock, (2) incorporate the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks into the regulatory
process as a member of a game farm advisory council. In total, 93 visitors attended the
Senate hearing on SB 215 Of these 93 visitors, 70 supported SB 215** while 23 opposed
the bill*^. According to Dave Whittlesey, Colorado game farms are managed by this

*’ The 70 visitors who supported SB 215 included: (27) game farmers, (32)
individuals, (1) North American Elk Breeders, (1) Colorado Elk and Game Breeders, (1)
Montana Fence, (1) Montana Veterinary Medical Association, (1) Montana FarmBureau,
(1) Montana Stockgrowers, (1) Montana Game Breeders Association, and (4) unknown.
The 23 visitors who opposed SB 215 included: (1) Montana Wildlife Federation,
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model, and have done quite well (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995). Many supporters of SB 215 stated that game farming was not
consistent with the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Park's mission to regulate, protect
and enhance the state's public wildlife resources, and to manage the hunting opportunities
related to Montana's public game animals (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock
and Irrigation Hearing, Exhibit IE, 1995). Ward Swanser argued that the game farm
industry wanted to be regulated by ". . someone who knows and cares about the industry,
such as the Department of Livestock" (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995:2). He also noted that he did not believe that the approval of a
game farm was major state action, under MEPA, unless it was proposed to be located near
a national park or wildlife refuge (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995).
Additionally, members of the North American Elk Breeders Association claimed that
the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks had been actively encouraging the elimination
of the game farm industry, which resulted in a 10-20 percent decline in industry growth
(Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing, Exhibit 2, 1995 4).
A letter submitted by Kent B. Williams indicated that he was ". . getting out of the game
farm business and elk breeding in particular in part due to the constant state of change
within the state and the uncertainty of the future of the industry. . . Now that the

(1) Madison Gallatin Alliance, (2) Fish, Wildlife and Parks, (1) State Land Coalition, (1)
Anaconda Sportmen, (1) Skyline Sportsmen, (1) Montana Audubon, (1) Prickly Pear
Sportsmen Association, (1) Montana Bowhunters Association, (1) United Bowhunters of
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leadership of the Fish and Game Department has worked the sportsmen and animal rights
people into their agenda I feel as though I am operating a legal 'house of prostitution' and
it will only be a matter of tinlS before some unfortunate situation happens" (Senate
Committee on Agrirtlïture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing, Exhibit 1C, 1995 1).
However, b6th the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks and Glenn Marx*^ argued that
this was not the case. According to the Department df Fish, Wildlife and Parks, "

over

the last three years, we have licensed 41 new or expanded game farms. In addition we
have issued 278 TehWwals of licenses. In that period, not once has an application for a
•galhë'fârm permit been denied. We have documented nearly 2200 hours spent on
permitting activities during the last two years" (Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Hearing, Exhibit 4, 1995:2). Additionally, the Department has
developed a game farm desk reference to assist potential game farm operators with the
permitting process, has hired a game farm coordinator, and has worked jointly with the
Department of Livestock to develop administrative rules (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing, Exhibit 4, 1995). Similarly, Glenn Marx
Stated %Ëf a brochure distributed by the Montana Game Breeders Association noted that
".

in 1994 the game Brëéding industry achieved a 30 percent increase over the previous

year, to just under five million dollars. . ISo game breeders are not only surviving, they are

Montana, (11) individuals, and (1) unknown
83

Policy director on the staff of Governor Marc Racicot.
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thriving" (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing, Exhibit 3,
1995:1-2).
Glenn Marx also highlighted specific reasons why the Department of Fish, Wildlife
and Parks should retain authority in game farm regulation (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing, Exhibit 3, 1995). First, game farm permits
must be reviewed in order to determine whether they destroy critical habitat, block wildlife
migration routes, or pose an undue threat to wild populations as a result of escape and
subsequent habitat destruction and competition (Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Hearing, Exhibit 3, 1995). Second, the Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks is better able to handle the issue of escaped game farm animals, or the
ingress of wildlife into game farms (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing, Exhibit 3, 1995). Third, the Department of Livestock is currently
struggling to control disease in livestock and will be unable to handle wildlife disease,
since it has no prior experience in this matter (Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Hearing, Exhibit 3, 1995). Fourth, the Montana Environmental
Policy Act often requires environmental impact statements with regard to proposed game
farms; however, the Livestock Department does not have enough experience with the EIS
process to avoid lawsuits (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing, Exhibit 3, 1995). Finally, the current legislation, which requires split jurisdiction
between the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks and the Department of Livestock, ". .
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takes advantage of each department's vast yet specific expertise" (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing, Exhibit 3, 1995.4).
According to David Cambell, who provided testimony in opposition to SB 215, the
game farm advisory board would include five people who are directly connected to the
Livestock Board and the game farm industiy, which was not acceptable to the people of
Montana (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).*“
"What was really at stake was the selfish rights of 93 game farmers
versus the people of Montana's public trust in wildlife... if SB 215 was
not tabled, they [Montana Congress] would see a fight in the Senate and
House floors that had not been seen in awhile . game farmers had
finally awoke a sleeping, angry giant which was the people of Montana.
. .. they would start a grassroots campaign against the evils of game
farming. . remember the words 'public initiative'. . . if this bill comes
out of the committee, prepare to hear from the people of Montana"
(Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing
1995:8).

Jim Richards noted that elk and deer are not livestock, they were wildlife that happened to
be raised inside an enclosure (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995). Thus, since game farm animals and the animals that threaten are wildlife,
the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks should regulate game farming (Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). Most of the visitors
who were opposed to SB 215 agreed with this logic, stating that the Department of

*“ This conclusion is based on a representative state-wide survey conducted by the
United Bowhunter's of Montana (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995). The results of this survey indicated, among other things, that 96
percent of Montanans thought that the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks should be
involved in overseeing the game farm industry (Senate Committee on Agriculture,
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Livestock was in the business to promote the livestock industry not to protect wildlife
resources (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).
Senate Bill 215 was tabled in the Senate Committee of Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).
Senate Bill 389 was the final bill introduced during the 1995 Legislative Assembly,
and it was basically a revision of SB 215. The primary intentions of SB 389 were to. (1 )
clarify the administration and regulation of game farms by both the Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks and the Department of Livestock; (2) revise the current regulatory
framework surrounding licensure, fees, importation, inspections and reporting; and (3)
create the game farm advisory council. According to Senator Hargrove, SB 389
represented a combination of sections from SB 173 and SB 215 (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). Under SB 389, regulatory authority
was split between the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks and the Department of
Livestock (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).
Since the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks' primary concerns surround animals
outside game farm fences, they were granted authority to regulate the construction of
fences and handle violations (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995). On the other hand, the Department of Livestock was concerned with
animals inside the game farm fence; therefore, they were granted the authority to regulate

Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).
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disease, quarantine, and transportation (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995).
In total, 18 visitors attended the Senate hearing on SB 389 (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). Of these 18 visitors, 11 supported*’
SB 389 while seven opposed*® SB 389 (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995). There were a number of issues regarding SB 389 that were
addressed during the Senate Hearing.
First, the majority of visitors that provided testimonies noted that the fee stRicture
surrounding game farming should be revised so the operator bears the burden of the
licensing and enforcement costs (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995). Jim Richard also suggested that game farm operators be
required to post a bond, or some form of security to cover the costs of disease outbreaks
(Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 19^5). According to
Senator Terry Klampe, the province of Alberta incurred $16 million in costs as a result of
the TB outbreak, a price that Montana could not afford (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). Under current legislation, these
costs were borne by the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks; thus, hunters technically

*’ The 11 visitors that supported SB 389 included: (1) Senator, (2) Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, (I) Board of livestock, (I) Montana Audubon
Legislative Fund, (5) Montana Game Breeders Association, and (I) individual.
*®The seven visitors that opposed SB 389 included; (1) Senator, (I) Montana
Wildlife Federation, (I) Montana Bowhunters Association, (I) Prickly Pear Sportsmen
Association, (I) Ravalli County Fish and Wildlife Association, and (2) individuals.
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subsidized the industry (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995). Klampe felt that if the committee was confident that SB 389 would
prevent such problems, he did not see a problem with amending this section of the bill
(Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995) Harry
Lafrininiere, from the Ravalli County Fish and Wildlife Association, noted that the
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks was unable to cope with game farm violations
under the current legislation (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995). Finally, Karen Zackheim, the game farm coordinator (MFWP), stated that
"the revenue for FWP in 1994 was approximately $3,050 and the expenditure in 1994 was
approximately $109,649" (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995 16)
With regard to this issue, a motion was made by Senator Pipinich to increase game
farm licensing fees to $1,000 initial and $500 renewal (Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). This motion failed (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). As written SB 389, requires an
initial licensing fee of $200, and an annual renewal fee of $50 (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). However, after much discussion
within the committee, the following motion was carried by an 8 to 1 vote: $200 initial and
$50 annual renewal fees for operators with between 1-20 animals, $300 initial and $100
annual renewal fees for operators with between 21-60 game farm animals, and $400 initial
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and $200 annual renewal fees for operators with over 60 animals (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).
A second contentious issue surrounding SB 389 dealt with the following statement:
"the department may remove the base number of animals [wildlife that is present on the
private property where a game farm is scheduled to be fenced] from the game farm at the
expense of the department" (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995:11). In order to address this issue, a motion was introduced by Senator
Hargrove to alter SB 389 to give the applicant responsibility for removing wildlife from
his property (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).
This motion carried with a 6 to 3 vote (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995). One Senator voted against this motion because he felt that it
should not be the applicant's responsibility to remove public wildlife from his/her private
land, since it is the department's responsibility when hunting issues are involved (Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).
Finally, Senator Devlin moved to amend SB 389 in such a way that all fees collected
would be split between the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks and the Department of
Livestock (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).
Senator Nelson felt that this was fair, since the Department of Livestock would have
additional expenses due to added responsibilities (Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). This motion carried with a 5 to 4 vote (Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995 ).
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Senate Bill 389 unanimously passed the Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation as amended (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995), and was introduced by Senator Tveit into the House Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995). According to Senator Tveit, the bill was introduced because of
"the breakdown of communication between the game farm owners and FWP that dealt
with their overall management of game farm operations" (House Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995:8). Senate Bill 389 also proposed the
creation of a quasi-judicial board, which would serve as an appeal process for game farm
operators (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).*’
In total, 39 visitors attended the House Hearing on SB 389 (House Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).** Of the total 39 visitors, 18*^
provided testimonies supporting SB 389 while four were opposed^®

(House Committee

*’ The quasi-judicial board incorporated five, governor appointed members (House
Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).
** The 39 visitors represented the follwoing organizations: (9) game farmers, (9)
Montana Game Breeders Association, (4) individuals, (1) Montana Audubon Legislative
Fund, (1) Montana Farm Bureau, (1) Montana Wildlife Federation, (I) Senator, (1)
Montana Bowhunters Association, (6) Department of Livestock, (3) Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks, (1) Governor's office, and (2) unknown.
*^ The 18 visitors that supported SB 389 represented the following orgranizations:
(9) game farmers, (5) Montana Game Breeders Association, (1) individual, (1) Montana
Audubon Legislative Fund, (1) Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks, and (1) Montana Farm
Bureau.
The four visitors that opposed SB 389 included: (1) Montana Wildlife
Federation, (1) Senator, (1) individual, and (1) Montana Bowhunters Association.
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on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). There were a number of issues
regarding SB 389 that were addressed during the House Hearing.
The first controversy surrounding SB 389 was the establishment of a quasi-judicial
board (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). Len
Wallace felt that "it would be better for everyone if they [game farmers] had someone to
appeal to, such as a board" (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995:8). However, Governor Marc Racicot did not support the board, which
housed governor appointed members (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995). Similarly, the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks did not
support the creation of a judicial board because there was something similar already in
place (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). Senator
Tveit, in his closing statement, revisited the issue of the judicial board (House Committee
on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). "He said that last fall he was
visiting game farms in his district and discovered [that] 20 months earlier, the Department
of Fish, Wildlife and Parks had a secret raid on one of the game farms" (House Committee
on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995 15). Once again, these comments
highlight the fact that game farmers feel victimized.
The second controversy centered on game farm fees (House Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). According to Janet Ellis, the

A number o f \ isitors did not support SB 389 because they favored a moratorium
on game farming in Montana (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995).
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Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks was overburdened with the costs associated with
game farm enforcement (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1995). Stan Fraiser argued that "

.sportsmen license fees had been paying more

than 90 percent of the costs to regulate game farms" (House Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995:10).
The remainder of the House Hearing on SB 389 focused on the current status of
disease and hybridization with regard to game farms (House Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). First, Pat Graham (MFWP) explained the
situation surrounding the tuberculosis problem in a Big Horn County game farm (House
Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). According to
Graham, TB was found in a mule deer near the game farm (House Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). In turn, 129 big game animals that
surrounded the farm were exterminated (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995). Over 100 of these animals were tested for TB and one tested
positive (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). The
testing was paid for with sportsmen license fees (House Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). In addition, the game farm operator agreed to
destroy his entire herd; however, when tested after the slaughter, not one animal tested
positive for TB (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing
1995). The owner paid the cost of destroying the animals (House Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). According to Bob Spoklie, the
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measures taken by the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks were excessive (House
Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). However, Graham
argued that it is the Department's responsibility to insure the protection of the state's
wildlife resources, which requires strict regulations (House Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). With regard to the escape of red deer in Avon,
Karen Zackheim stated that one of the 13 animals tested showed a hemoglobin typical of
red deer (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).
However, Bob Spoklie also spoke with the veterinarian and was informed that Ms.
Zackheim was only told that there is a possibility that a red deer was present (House
Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995).
On a side note, a third controversial issue regarding the National Bison Range was
aired during the House Hearing on SB 389 (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock
and Irrigation Hearing 1995). Representative Rick lore questioned Senator Terry Kiampe
how SB 173 (moratorium bill introduced by Kiampe earlier in the session) would affect
the future of the National Bison Range (House Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing 1995). Kiampe responded that ". . he was not sure of the type of
operation that existed at the National Bison Range" (House Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995:14).
Senate Bill 389 was then placed in a subcommittee for further review, and
concurred in as amended on March 23, 1995 (House Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1995). The amended version of SB 389, as recorded in
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the Montana Codes Annotated 87-4-406 through 87-4-432, altered the 1993 Montana
Code Annotated (MCA 87-401 through87-4-431 ) in a number of areas. First, MCA 87-4408 delineated agency jurisdiction over game farm administration and regulation. The
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks was granted primary authority over licensing,
record-keeping, fencing, classification of exotic species, and limited removal and
inspection situations (MCA 87-4-408). On the other hand, the Department of Livestock
was granted authority over inspection, transportation, marketing, importation, quarantine,
interior facilities, and health related issues (MCA 87-4-408). Second, MCA 87-4-410(2)
stated, "[bjefore the fence surrounding any land to be covered by a game farm may be
closed, all game animals must to the extent possible be driven from the land by the
applicant, at the applicant's expense and under the supervision of a representative of the
department." Third, the fee scale was adjusted to reflect the number of game farm
animals, with higher fees charged for greater numbers of animals (MCA 87-4-411).
Finally, MCA 87-4-432 was added, creating a governor appointed, quasi-judicial board to
handle game farm appeals.
The most recent Legislative Assembly was held in 1997, during which time Senator
Crippen introduced SB 73 Senate Bill 73 was "[a]n act to protecting Montana livestock,
agricultural interests, and wildlife by modifying the manner in which the fish, wildlife, and
parks commission may restrict the importation AND POSSESSION of wildlife by allowing
the commission to develop a listing, by rule, restricting and regulating wildlife importation
AND POSSESSION. .

(Senate Bill 73 1997 1). According to Crippen, SB 73 provides
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the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks with the authority to establish a review process
regarding imported species (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation
Hearing 1997). "It is an action bill rather than a reaction bill" (Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1997 1). Senate Bill 73 intended to amend
MCA sections 87-5-701-703, 87-5-712 and 87-5-721, which did not incorporate game
farm legislation. (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing
1997). "At first we [Montana Alternative Livestock Producers] were concerned with how
this bill would affect game farms.. . .[I]t was pretty vague.

[t]here was some room in

there as to whether or not we were affected" (Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1997.4 and 5-6). However, proposed amendments and
Department assurance made it quite clear that this bill would not affect game farming,
since prohibited game farm animals are defined within the current statutes (Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearing 1997). Senate Bill 73 passed
the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation but was tabled in the
House (Senate and House Committees on Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Hearings
1997).
Currently, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks is engaged in a
$600,000 environmental impact statement that looks at state wildlife programs, such as
access, recreational opportunities, species and habitat management, commercial uses and
landowner relations with regard to Montana's wildlife resources (Missoulian State Bureau
1998, Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1998). Although the report was
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expected to be completed in 1994, an executive summary was issued in March, 1998
(Missoulian State Bureau 1998, Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1998).
According to Tony Jewett, Montana Wildlife Federation,
"[i]t has to occur right now because the stresses on the historic
cultural contributions of fish and game to the state are bigger now
than they've ever been in the last century, since wildlife was restored
in this state. We are at a threshold time where the public's ability to
enjoy wildlife, as it has historically, is in peril" (Billings 1998:4).
Similarly, Jean Johnson, executive director of the Montana Outfitters and Guides
Association, believe that this type of study is desperately needed in Montana, since "
outside interests are playing a larger role in managing Montana's resources and an influx
of new residents to the state is changing the face of resources" (Billings 1998 .4).
The environmental impact statement proposes five alternatives (Montana Department
of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1998). The remainder of this section will focus on each of the
proposed alternatives as they relate to game farming in Montana. Alternative I represents
the Department's 'no action' alternative, which means that planned programs and service
would continue at approximately present levels (Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife
and Parks 1998). In other words, the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks will continue
processing game farm applications and sharing split authority over the administration and
regulation of game farms with the Department of Livestock (Montana Department of
Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1998). Under Alternative II, the department would play a minimal
role in the governing of the state's wildlife resources (Montana Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks 1998). In turn, the agency would attempt to discontinue its
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involvement with game farms (Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1998).
Alternative III calls for the protection of Montana’s wildlife resources through a systems
approach to wildlife management (Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks
1998). Under this proposed alternative, the department would seek the following
legislative authority. (1) prohibit the permitting of new game farms in an attempt to
protect ecosystem integrity, (2) charge operators for the cost of inspection and licensing
of existing facilities, (3) provide strict enforcement of game farm regulations to counter
the wildlife threats posed by escaped game farm animals, and (4) identify the how game
farms impact ecosystem integrity and consider these factors in permitting decisions
(Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1998). Alternative IV "rests on the
assumption that citizens encourage and expect free markets and interagency cooperation
to play a major role in allocation of wildlife-related opportunities" (Montana Department
of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1998:8). In turn, the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks
would award private sector contracts to provide extension services, which would ensure
safe facility design (Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1998). Additionally,
the department would coordinate enforcement with the Department of Livestock, and the
operators would be responsible for licensing and inspection costs (Montana Department of
Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1998). Finally, Alternative V would require an increase in the
existing level of wildlife-related services provided by the department (Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1998). In order to finance this expansion, the
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department would seek legislation to tax game farms at the commercial rate rather than
the agricultural rate (Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1998).

CHAPTER 13

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MONTANA GAME FARM POLICY

Game Farm Policy within Rocky Mountain Provinces

The Canadian game farm industry developed in response to the success of the
industiy in New Zealand (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998b) [figures 21 and
22] Provincial laws and regulations govern the development of Canadian game farms
(Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 1998a). Alberta and Saskatchewan
represent a substantial proportion of elk production within Canada (Alberta Agriculture,
Food and Rural Development 1998a). Elk, deer and moose farms are permitted in
Alberta under the Livestock Industry Diversification Act (LIDA)

and the Wildlife Act^^.

The Wildlife A ct, which has been amended to allow game farming, defines and protects
the wildlife species within Alberta (Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development

^ LIDA is administered by the Animal Industry Division of Alberta Agriculture,
Food and Rural Development (Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 1998b).
There are two sets of regulations within LIDA, the Livestock Industry Diversification
(Principal) Regulation and the Livestock Industry Diversification (Ministerial) Regulation
(Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 1998b). The principal regulation
governs which species of game animals and what products may be farmed and sold, while
the ministerial regulation dictates the establishment of procedures to control the industry
(Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 1998b).
The Wildlife Act is administered by the Field Services and Wildlife Management
Divisions of the Environmental Protection, Natural Resources Service-Enforcement
(Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 1998b).
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1998b) Under this Act, big game animals can be privately owned; however, the farms
must comply with the regulations set forth in LEDA or the animals revert to wildlife status
(Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 1998b). Additionally, since 1986 it
has been illegal to capture free-ranging wildlife for private use (Alberta Agriculture, Food
and Rural Development 1998b).
Figure 21: Farmed Deer in Canada and USA 1996
(Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c)
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Figure 22: Canadian Elk Herd Estimates (Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural
Development 1998a)

1993
Alberta
Saskatchewan

1994

1995

1996
5,918 7,398 9,250 12,000
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The established procedure for obtaining a non-transferable game farm license requires
an annual fee of $ 100, a successful inspection^"* of the proposed game farm, and the
completion of required status reports (Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development
1998b). According to Alberta's Deer and Elk Procedures Manual (1998b), adult,
newborn , velveted, transported and slaughtered game animals must be registered and
accounted for with the Animal Industry Division. Only permitted game farm operators
can legally possess entire antlers, and antlers must be identified immediately after they are
removed (Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 1998b). LIDA also

The purpose of the inspection is to ensure that the land is privately owned and
constructed according to regulation (Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development
1998b). For instance, fences must be seven to eight feet high (Alberta Agriculture, Food
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incorporates provisions regarding the humane treatment of game farm animals, particularly
within velveting operations (Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 1998b).
Additionally, the slaughter of game farm animals must be conducted at a plant that has
been approved by the Minister, and reported (Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural
Development 1998b).
As a result of the recent TB outbreak in elk, the Animal Health Division requires that
an elk receive a negative health status and a permit before being transported (Alberta
Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 1998b). "This program applies primarily to
tuberculosis and brucellosis but could also include other reportable diseases as
circumstances require" (Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 1998b:sec.l 1).
In addition, a 1988 moratorium, which will remain in place until effective screening
methods are developed, prevents the importation of any ungulate (Alberta Agriculture,
Food and Rural Development 1998b).Finally, red deer and red-deer hybrids are not
permitted within Alberta (Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 1998b).
In Saskatchewan, there are currently 410 licensed game farms, which support
approximately 16,500 elk (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998a) [figures 23 and
24]. The industry was valued at $85 million in 1996, and the number of licensed game
farms continues to increase by more than 30 percent annually (Saskatchewan Agriculture
and Food 1998a, Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c). Elk farming was

and Rural Development 1998b).
95

Elk can be imported from the Yukon and neonatal calves can be imported from
Saskatchewan (Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 1998b).
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legitimized as an agricultural activity in 19S7 under the Game Farming and Game Products
Merchandising Regulations (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998a). These
regulations are administered primarily by the Department Agriculture and Food; however,
the Department of Environment and Resource Management has the authority to manage
disease transmission (import/export permits), or other facets of game farming that may
impact the management of wildlife (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1996a).
Figure 23: Number of Game Farms in Saskatchewan
(Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c)
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Figure 24: Farmed Deer in Saskatchewan
(Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c)
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Under these regulations, a game farm owner must be licensed, and must pay an
annual fee of $100 (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998a). A license is not granted
until the game farm operator meets the fencing requirements (7 ft), individually and
uniquely identifies his/her animals, provides documentation that the farm resides on private
land, and agrees to maintain annual reports for all inventory and changes in inventory
(Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998a). Additionally, the initial stock must be
purchased from a breeder. Crown wildlife cannot be used to stock game farms, and import
or export permits are required for live game animals that enter or exit the province
(Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998a). The Game Farming and Game Products

182

Merchandising Regulations also require the humane treatment (housing, handling and
transportation) of game farm animals (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998a),
Finally, game farm meat products must be labeled in order to identify the processor
(Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998a). This regulation is in place to prevent home
slaughter, which often accompanies the payment of access fees, or paid hunting
(Saskatchewan .A.gricalture and Food 1998c).
As a result of a number of controversial issues surrounding the game farm industry'
Saskatchewan is currently in the process of revising their game farm regulations
(Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c; Although the Provincial government is
committed to the protection of wildlife and wildlife related activities (i.e., hunting,
outfitting, eco-tourism, etc.), it is also committed to encouraging the sustainable
development of the game farm industry (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c).
First, there is concern over increased levels of poaching and the introduction of diseases
(Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c). However, the government does not
recognize this as a problem, since only two people have been convicted of poaching
wildlife and no known incidents of disease introduction have occurred (Saskatchewan
Agriculture and Food 1998c). Second, there is concern over both the escape of game
farm animals and the intrusion of wildlife into game farm facilities (Saskatchewan
Agriculture and Food 1998c). The Game Farming and Game Products Merchandising
Regulations requires a fence that is approximately seven feet high, but this fence height is

96

This has been stated as being non-negotiable (Saskatchewan Agriculture and
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not adequate for several game farm species (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c).
Under current regulations, escaped game farm animals are considered the responsibility
of the game farm operator; however, there is considerable concern over wildlife threats
posed by escaped game farm animals that are not recaptured immediately (Saskatchewan
Agriculture and Food 1998c). Additionally, there is a concern that current policy does
not address who is responsible for the removal of wildlife prior to stocking the land with
privately owned animals, nor does it address the removal of animals that gain access to the
farms or damage fences (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c). Third, there is
concern over the importation of native and exotic game farm animals with regard to
disease and threats of hybridization and competition (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food
1998c). A fourth concern exists over the fact that game farming is not allowed on Crown
lands (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c). Many game farmers believe that
they should have the same access to Crown lands as other agricultural producers (grazing
leases) (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c). Wildlife interest groups are opposed
to this because it would restrict hunting opportunities and it would negatively impact
habitat available for wild species (fencing requirements) (Saskatchewan Agriculture and
Food 1998c). Fifth, game farmers who are considering entering the business have been
lobbying for permission to capture public wildlife for private and commercial purposes
(Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c). These game farmers argue that selective
live capture programs would reduce game damages and vehicle collisions, as well as

Food 1998c).
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promote the rapid growth of the industry (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c).
However, established game farmers argue that this new source of breeding stock will
depress prices of existing stock (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c). In
addition, wildlife interests fear that the private capture of wildlife would undermine the
public system of wildlife management (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c).
Game farmers are also arguing for permission to establish paid hunting on game farms;
however, hunters fear that this will not only promote an anti-hunting sentiment but will
also encourage other private landowners to begin charging access fees as well
(Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c). Finally, game farmers have proposed to
shift game farm administration and enforcement into the hands of one department
(Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food), and amend domestic livestock legislation to include
game farm animals (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c). This proposal is
unacceptable to wildlife interests who fear that wildlife protection would be compromised
if the Department of Environment and Resource Management were excluded from
regulating the industry (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food 1998c). As previously
stated, the Saskatchewan government firmly believes that game farming and wildlife
management are compatible and it is attempting to alter the current regulations, based on a
stakeholder/public review process to ensure the survival of both (Saskatchewan
Agriculture and Food 1998c).
Although game farming is permitted within British Columbia, elk farming is not (The
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BC Ministry of Agriculture and Food 1998).^’ Bison and fallow deer farming was
legalized in 1987, and reindeer farming was legalized within British Columbia in 1993
(The BC Ministry of Agriculture and Food 1998).

Jurisdiction over game farms is split

between the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Foods and the Ministry of
Environment, Lands and Parks, and game farming is strictly controlled (The BC Ministry
of Agriculture and Food 1998). First, specific standards (i.e., fencing requirements,
animal identification) must be met in order to receive a game farm license (The BC
Ministry of Agriculture and Food 1998). With regard to velvet processing, animals must
be handled in a humane manner (The BC Ministry of Agriculture and Food 1998). Finally,
hunting of game farm animals is prohibited, and meat processing must occur at a licensed
slaughter facility (The BC Ministry of Agriculture and Food 1998).

Game Farm Policy within Rocky Mountain States

On average, Colorado elk farms are relatively small scale-50 acres with less than 50
head (Rich 1993). As of 1993, Colorado was home to 85 elk farms that housed 3,300
animals (Lanka 1993). Privately owned wildlife must be licensed under the Colorado

Fallow deer, bison and reindeer can be farmed (The BC Ministry of Agriculture
and Food 1998).
Reinde farming was conditionally approved for a specific region in 1988 (The
Reindeer
BC Ministry of Agriculture and Food 1998).

186

State Board of Stock Inspection as an alternative livestock farm, or under the Division of
Wildlife as a wildlife park (North American Elk Breeders Association 1997a). Under
Colorado Statute 35-41 5-106, each applicant for an alternative livestock farm must
submit the following information to the Board: proof of inspection of the farm by the
Board, proof that a site review of the proposed location has been conducted by the
Division of Wildlife, individual identification of each alternative livestock animal, and an
annual licensing fee of $300. Additionally, this section (35-41.5-106) states that game
farm licenses are non-transferable; the board must inspect alternative livestock prior to any
movement, sale or slaughter; and that records must be maintained for three years after the
death or sale of an animal. Finally, Colorado Statute 35-41.5-116 states that all fees and
civil fines shall be transmitted to an alternative livestock fund, which is used to carry out
game farm regulation.
Concerns regarding escaped alternative livestock animals, the introduction of exotics
and disease transmission are also addressed. Colorado Statutes 35-41.5-111 and 33-1-106
establish regulations concerning escaped alternative livestock. Under these statutes, an
alternative livestock owner has 72 hours to recover escaped wildlife. Escaped animals
that have not been recovered after this period must be reported to the Division of Wildlife,
who will then recover the animals at the owner's e x p e n s e . I n order to address the issue
of exotics, Colorado Statute 33-1-106 grants permission to the wildlife commission to

According to Colorado Statute 33-1-106, a maximum cap of $1.000 per animal
[not to exceed an aggregate of $5,000j is established for legally held alternative livestock
species. However, with regard to the escape of prohibited species, neither a maximum cap
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prevent the introduction of red deer or other hybrid non-native species.

Finally, all

animals that are shipped to Colorado must have a certificate of veterinary inspection,
indicating that have been tested for brucellosis, TB, bangs, and Johne's Disease.
Commercial wildlife farms are also permitted in Idaho, which had 20 game farms
that contained 800 privately owned animals in 1993 (Lanka 1993). Under Idaho Statute
36-7-703, a potential game farmer must submit an application [Division of Animal
Industries] to obtain a permit to hold domestic game animals. The initial application fee is
$100, with an annual renewal fee of $50 and a per head fee of $5 to cover administration
costs. A game farm application must include the following; notice that the potential
wildlife farm is privately owned; the potential site does not have a substantial impact on
free-ranging wildlife populations; the farm is enclosed [fence requirement of 8 feet]; and
an agreement that records will be kept, animals will be individually and uniquely identified,
and an annual report will be provided to the Division of Animal Industries. Additionally,
Idaho Statute 36-7-708 grants the fish and game commission authority to insure the
humane treatment of captive animals. However, the authority to regulate the breeding,
raising, producing and marketing of commercial wildlife is vested in the department of
agriculture. Finally, although pre-veterinary inspections and testing for all wildlife and

per animal nor incident is mandated.
The Colorado Division of Wildlife has spent over $150,000 between 1989-1992
in an effort to remove populations of exotic ungulates (Kahn 1993). To date, these efforts
have not been successAil (Kahn 1993). According to Kahn (1993 498), “breeding
populations of exotic ungulates have been established in the wild in at least six sites.”
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exotics are required, "[o]nce non-prohibited exotic'*’*wildlife are imported into Idaho they
are unregulated" (Lanka 1993 43).
Unlike other Rocky Mountain states, game farms are prohibited in Wyoming. ‘**^
There is currently one Wyoming game farm, containing 300 captive animals, which was
grandfathered in 1974 (Lanka 1993). During August of 1989, Mr John T Dorrance 111
sought permission from the Wyoming Game and Fish Department to operate a game
farm/ranch (Lanka 1993). Additionally, House Bill 193 was sponsored by representatives
Zumbrunnen and Tysdal to amend existing game farm laws [Wyom. Statute 23-1-103 and
23-3-301]. House Bill 193 was designed to authorize and regulate the private ownership
and sale of game animals. Interestingly, H.B. 193 also granted jurisdiction to the
department of agriculture. Mr. Dorrance's application and H.B. 193 generated significant
public interest; in turn, a committee was formed to conduct a review of the potential
implications of exotic wildlife and game farms in Wyoming (Lanka et. al. 1990). The final
draft of this report legitimated concerns regarding competition, disease transmission,
hybridization, and the establishment of free-ranging populations of exotics (Lanka et. al
1990). In turn, Wyoming statutes 23-1-103 and 23-3-301 were not amended.

'**' All exotic species that will cross breed with native wildlife are prohibited (i.e.,
red deer) (Lanka 1993).
***^ According to Wyoming Statutes 23-1-103 and 23-3-301, "[tjhere shall be no
private ownership of live animals classified in this act as big or trophy animals" (Lanka et
al 1990:103). Additionally, the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission has stated that they
are not in favor of game farms (Lanka et al. 1990).

CHAPTER 14

DISCUSSION

An analysis of elk farm policy requires a discussion of the struggle between groups,
which hold diverse perceptions of elk farming, to represent wildlife policy/management
decisions. According to Greider and Garkovitch (1994 17), "[wjhen society addresses
diverse environmental questions, knowledge of the groups with vested interests in that
particular physical environment by having incorporated it into their landscapes becomes a
factor in understanding subsequent events". In turn, the historical and comparative
analysis of Montana game farm policy was conducted in an effort to understand the public
perceptions of the elk industry within the Rocky Mountain region, and the relative
influence (access to power) of various interest groups within the larger political system.
Based on a review of the historical development of game farm policy in Montana,
institutionalism and elitism, which favor incremental policy changes, have been operating.
Game farming was legalized in Montana in 1917, and has since become a highly
controversial and political issue within Montana. As seen within figure 25, all of the bills
that have been passed since 1983 were supported by the majority, based on testimonies
provided at the hearings. 103 For instance. House Bill 556 had 15 supporters and 11

103 I have chosen to analyze testimonies rather than visitor comments because those
people/organizations that provide testimonies are more involved in the struggle; therefore,
they hold well defined opinions.
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people in opposition. Similarly, 16 people were in support of House Bill 338 while 1
person was opposed. Finally, 29 people provided testimony in support of Senate Bill 389
and 11 provided opposing testimonies.
However, figures 25 and 26 also represent the fact that the political system is more
than a simple group struggle. The majority also supported HB 412, SB 173, and SB 215
but these bills were not passed. Additionally, the largest number of people participated in
the SB 215 hearings - followed by HB 556, SB 389, SB 173, HB 412, and HB 338.
Senate Bill 215 had the largest numbers of visitors in attendance at the committee hearing,
as well as a large number of supporters (73 S : 23 O) but it failed. Why did it fail? Senate
Bill 215, which sought to transfer jurisdiction to the Department of Livestock, failed
because it represented a radical policy change. Similarly, SB 173 garnered a substantial
amount of public support (37 S . 11 O); however, a moratorium on game farming also
represents a radical policy change. In turn, the Montana Legislature has responded with
incremental policy changes that favor tighter restrictions rather than a complete ban on the
industry
According to figure 36, there have been varying levels of community/interest group
involvement within the political struggle over game farming between 1893 and 1995.
Based on the historical review of game farm policy in Montana, it seems that political
involvement is directly related to recent events in Montana. First, there was not much
involvement in the committee hearings regarding HB 448, which established a new
regulatory framework for game farming, in 1983. This lack of involvement is related to
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the fact that HB 448 was a compromise, or consensus bill, which was developed by the
Game Farm Task Force (MFWP, DOL and game farmers). As a result of the increase in
problems associated with Montana game farms, political interested rocketed during the
1991 Legislative Session. First, earlier in the year a Montana game farmer transported TB
infected elk into Alberta and Colorado, which has since resulted in a moratorium on the
importation of ungulates into Alberta. Additionally, this same game farmer was accused
of smuggling illegally captured elk from Montana. Since this individual’s ranch is on the
northern border of Yellowstone National Park, there was a huge public outcry regarding
the safety of Montana’s wildlife. In turn, HB 556 was passed to alleviate the problems
associated with poaching, disease transmission and the introduction of exotics.
Public involvement withered in 1993 because HB 338 was once again the product of
a working groups consensus, and there were no major game farming incidents in Montana
during that time. It is important to note that the first moratorium bill was sponsored
during this session as well (HB 412); however, there was a delayed public response to this.
This delayed response became apparent in the 1995 session when political involvement
skyrocketed. This dramatic increase in public involvement can be attributed to the
polarization of the game farm issue within Montana. As stated in the historical analysis of
Montana game farm policy, three bills were introduced in thé 1995 Legislative Session.
The first bill (SB 173) was a second moratorium bill, which can be seen as a radical policy
change. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the second bill was an attempt to transfer
game farm jurisdiction to the Department of Livestock. Senate Bill 215 was also a radical
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policy change. Finally, SB 389 represented an incremental policy change and, therefore,
was the one that was accepted by the Montana Legislature. Although, there were no
major events occurring in Montana with regard to game farming (i.e., disease outbreaks,
etc.), the game farm industry is currently experiencing a major political shift. Game
farming in Montana is becoming a highly polarize, highly controversial issue. In turn,
political interests are beginning to mobilize, and become more involved in the political
struggle to represent within game farm policy decisions.
According to Dye (1972:31). incremental policy changes may occur because there
are "heavy investments in existing programs (sunk costs) which preclude any really radical
changes. . Hence, not all policy alternatives can be seriously considered, but only those
which cause little physical, economic, organizational, and administrative dislocation." A
review of an opponents testimony at the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock and
Irrigation Hearing on SB 173 (moratorium bill), which noted that it would cost about $25
million to phase out game farm facilities in Montana, supports the notion that there are
currently heavy financial investments in Montana's game farm industry. Unlike the wildlife
interests, supporters of the elk industry have been deeply involved in the historical
development of game farm policy in Montana. Wildlife interests have become increasingly
more involved in the development of game farm policy since 1991, however, the elk
industry, which is supported by livestock and private property rights interests, has
developed as an institution that is wielding its political power in an effort to preserve the
current system through the passage of incremental policy changes.
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Figure 25: Interest Group Involvement in the Development of M ontana Game
Farm Policy
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Figure 26: Interest Group Involvement in the Development of
M ontana Game Farm Policy
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Although one trend in Montana game farm policy has been the imposition of tighter
restrictions on the industry, a second trend has been an increase in the Department of
Livestock's regulatory authority over the industry Until 1991, primarily the Department
of Fish, Wildlife and Parks managed game farming.^®'* Similarly, game farm legislation
was referred to the Fish and Game Committees prior to 1995, when it was transferred to
the Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Committees. It is also important to note that in
1947, farmed bison populations were reclassified as domestic livestock and are currently
managed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Livestock. Under current Montana
game farm policy, the Department of Livestock is responsible for game farm inspections,
transportation, marketing, importation, quarantine, interior facilities, and health related
issues. Meanwhile, the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks has authority over record
keeping, fencing, classification of exotic species, and limited removal and inspection
status. Although regulatory authority over game farms is currently split between the two
departments, given the current trends, it seems likely that jurisdiction over farmed elk, like
bison, will be transferred to the Department of Livestock.*’’^
With regard to regional policy, elk farming is legal in Saskatchewan, Alberta,
Colorado, and Idaho. It is illegal to farm elk in British Columbia and Wyoming [figures

According to the 1983 game farm statutes. Fish, Wildlife and Parks had primary
jurisdiction over over farms but was required to comply with existing laws that were
established by the Department of Livestock. After the disease outbreak in 1991, however,
shared responsibility over game farms became a legislative mandate.
The possible implications of this policy shift will be further developed within the
conclusion.
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27 and 28]. Within the states and provinces where elk are commercially farmed, the trend
seems to be one of shifting game farm regulation into the hands of agricultural/livestock
officials. Under Alberta's game farm policy, elk farming is regulated by both the
Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development and the Environmental
Protection and Natural Resources Service, with primary jurisdiction in the hands of
agriculture officials. Saskatchewan splits game farm management between the
Department of Agriculture and Food and the Department of Environment and Resource
Management. The Department of Environment and Resource Management currently has
authority over all aspects of game farming that pose a threat to wildlife populations;
however, there is a strong lobby to have all regulatory authority transferred to the
Department of Agriculture and Food. Within the Rocky Mountain states, Colorado
livestock officials are responsible for the management of alternative livestock, such as elk.
Similarly, Idaho's Department of Agriculture holds the authority to regulate the
breeding, raising, producing and marketing of privately owned wildlife.

106

In Colorado, wildlife officials have authority over the regulation of wildlife parks.
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Figure 27: Distribution of Farm-Raised Elk in the USA (Renecker 1993a)
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Figure 28: Game Farm Numbers in Western North America (Lanka 1993)
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CHAPTER 15

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

At the turn of the century, various interest groups began to recognize that the
relationships between themselves and wild bison were changing as bison populations
dwindled. These individuals viewed the destruction of bison populations as improper
and, therefore, participated in the group struggle to be represented by public policy
outputs. However, the early American government was operating under a two-fold
policy that facilitated both Indian subjugation and the orderly development of the west.
As a result of the forces of institutionalism and elitism operating within the larger
political system at this time, policy changes regarding bison management were
incremental rather than revolutionary.
Since the government was so slow to respond to the bison crisis, private ranchers
saved bison populations from extinction. Although private bison ranches were initially
established in an effort to preserve the bison, urging from conservationists to restock
herds in the United States increased the economic value of breeding stock and
encouraged the growth of bison ranching as an economic endeavor Today, bison are no
longer on the verge of extinction, and many ranchers continue to farm bison for profit.
However, as a result of these early management decisions, members of ver powerful
political groups (i.e. livestock) have changed their perceptions of free ranging bison.
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Additionally, given the physical nature of the bison, there is not much support for the
management of bison as a game animal. Although certain grassroots environmental
organizations and Native Americans support wild bison within the Rocky Mountain
region, these groups are often marginalized within the regional political struggle. In turn,
the policy trend has been to manage ranched bison solely as livestock and split the
management of wild bison between wildlife and agricultural agencies.
According to economic theory, the privatization of natural resources will provide
incentives for their proper management and conservation. The privatization of bison in the
early part of this century was vital to its protection, and has proven successful in various
conservation programs in Afiica (i.e., CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe). However, interest
groups that are opposed to elk farming argue that these types of strategies will jeopardize
both North America’s tradition of public ownership of wildlife and its successful
conservation history. “[Cjommercial ownership of wildlife will erode support and lead to
trivialization” (Posewitz 1993 as cited in Kahn 1993:500). Thus Kahn (1993:501-502)
believes that the “two key issues for wildlife managers, agriculture officials and the captive
wildlife industry are when the public will perceive this change [elk as domestic livestock]
to occur and what will the outcome be for free-ranging elk populations?”
The positive benefits of elk farming include the fact that it represents a means of
economic diversification for struggling agriculturists and is less intensive than traditional
forms of agriculture. However, given the capital investments (i.e. game proof fencing)
required to establish a game farm, it is questionable whether elk farming is indeed the
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‘saving grace’ for traditional agriculturists. It is also questionable whether elk farming
represents a viable diversification strategy. In order to assess the economic viability of this
industry, current subsidies must be removed and the industry must be able to stand on its
own. Additionally, the negative ecological conditions surrounding elk farming seem to
outweigh the positive benefits received from the employment of less intensive agriculture.
Thus, it appears that although elk farming may benefit a few private ranchers, the public
bears [or will bear] the burden of the current and future costs associated with this industry
An assessment of the trends in regional game farm policy indicates that several other
controversial issues may develop in Montana with regard to game farming. First, a
currently contentious issue in Saskatchewan is the petition by elk farmers to gain access to
permits to graze elk, like other domestic livestock, on Crown lands. A second issue that
has recently developed in Saskatchewan is the capture of public wildlife as foundation
stock for game farms. Finally, it is important to note the increasing role of private
property law in the development of elk farm policy
When compared to the development of bison policy, the potential implications of elk
farming as a wildlife management system become clear. There are currently a number of
interest groups who feel that their relationships with elk will be dramatically affected by
the farming of these species and, thus, see elk farming as improper However, these
groups were slow to unite in response to the development of this industry' As a result, the
elk industry has become a legitimate institution within the Rocky Mountain region
(excluding Wyoming and British Columbia) with large financial investments already in
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place. In turn, most policy changes regarding elk farming within Montana have been
incremental.
Although there are ecological concerns that surround the development of the elk
industry, the most important concern may be the effects of fundamental changes in public
perceptions and values of wildlife” (Kahn 1993:502). As policy shifts allow for the
management of elk as domestic livestock, public perceptions of wild elk will be re
negotiated. As seen in the case of the bison this re-negotiation can have dramatic effects
on the future management of elk populations in the Rocky Mountain region.
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